The Peace Bargain

The Complexities of Financing Peace Agreements

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
BNTF	Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund
CAR	Central African Republic
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFI	Development Finance Institution
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GPH	Government of the Philippines
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit / German Agency for International Cooperation
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ISDC	International Security and Development Center
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDET	Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial / Territorially Focused Development Plans
PSF	Peace Support Facility
QWIDS	Query Wizard for International Development Statistics
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
RPBA	Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

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Executive summary

The signing of a peace agreement is often seen as the end of a long process to end violence, yet up to half of agreements fail within 10 years. In reality, the agreement is one of various milestones. Just as negotiation leads to the agreement, the agreement itself leads to an implementation phase, the success of which can affect the durability of the agreement reached.

The importance of the implementation phase opens up a series of key questions about what is implemented and how this is financed. From a political economy perspective, such questions are already firmly on the agenda for major international organizations. However, key questions remain, in particular about the extent to which negotiations (and their associated agreements) consider (the financing of) implementation; and on how decisions are made on specific implementation modalities.

To address these gaps, this research aims to shed light on two important questions:

1. To what extent are questions around implementation and its financing addressed during the negotiation of peace agreements?

2. How is implementation financed and how are decisions made on what is implemented and what is not?

To answer these questions, we conducted 89 in-depth semi-structured interviews with individuals intimately involved in the implementation of peace agreements. We took verbatim notes from each interview and subjected them to thematic analysis, in order to derive key themes. Results from these analyses show significant variation in the extent to which implementation is considered during negotiations. In some cases, next to no implementation is specified. In others, detailed responsibilities are produced. More generally, results show that implementation is political, as well as technical, often requiring ongoing discussions and negotiations. This stands in contrast to how these "phases" are often siloed, both in thought and in reality. Implementation decisions are, at least in part, political, with some components easier to finance than others. This, in turn, can create problems with the quantity and quality of funds available in given settings. This research builds around these two slightly contrasting conceptualizations of peace processes. One considers the transition from negotiation to implementation as a model that is linear in time. The second recognizes that the negotiations do not end with a peace agreement but continue in an iterative way, implicitly or explicitly, into the implementation phase. This allows implementation to be both "political" and "practical" at the same time and points to the need to build structures and architecture to support this need for further negotiation

Both conceptualizations imply key issues for the implementation of agreements. First, as negotiations transition to implementation, aspects of the agreement are open to interpretation. Second, just because something has been agreed on during the negotiation is no guarantee that it will be implemented. Where these conceptualizations differ is in the extent to which a signed peace agreement marks the end of a negotiation process. In the second theory, the agreement is an important step in the negotiation process but is not the final milestone. In the first, implementation is more the "technical" doing of specifications already agreed. Consequently, these models vary in the extent to which it is right to think of implementation as the fulfilment of a prior contract.

In these models, key trade-offs exist in peace processes. Processes, as a whole, might be best served by clear implementation plans within peace agreements but the involved parties might not always benefit from the discussions needed to do so when negotiations are on-going. In part, this can arise because needs might change or new needs become apparent; and, in part, also because agreement on implementation can pose material risks to already sensitive political processes. In turn, it might be argued that more complete “contracts” need not be mainstreamed in the process of reaching an agreement.

A further complexity arises as funds available in post-conflict settings consider general humanitarian and aid needs, as well as the needs of negotiated settlements. In turn, funding for implementation is often subsumed under official overseas development assistance, with the projects supported being, to varying degrees, potentially unrelated to the needs of the agreement.

We identify **eight key issues** from the interviews conducted. The first three pertain to the extent to which implementation is addressed during the negotiation phase. The remaining relate to financing within the implementation phase:

1. Peace agreements vary in the extent to which implementation, and its funding, are addressed in the written text.
Some agreements include no provisions for implementation, let alone its financing, while others contain only vague mentions of implementation. Yet others go so far as to specify which modalities should be made available and who should pay for them. We find little evidence that agreements go so far as to specify budgets.

2. Negotiation stakeholders do not have incentives to discuss implementation or its funding in detail.
Those involved in negotiations are not incentivized to discuss implementation. Mediators acknowledge their responsibility to engage in longer-term planning but often have limited agenda setting power. Focus often falls on reaching the agreement, rather than on planning beyond it. Donors, similarly, are not sufficiently involved in negotiations to make commitments at this stage.

3. Negotiation stakeholders insufficiently plan for dialogue beyond signing the agreement.
The implementation phase is often treated as a technical follow-up to what is agreed on during the negotiation phase. This neglects the need to operationalize the peace agreement, i.e., the need to react to changing circumstances and the ongoing process of negotiation this implies.

4. Implementation lacks coordinated funding efforts.
During the implementation phase, a peace process moves into the public domain and new stakeholders may seek to have their say. The array of actors ranges from the private, public and non-state sectors, yet these actors seldom define or agree on an overarching strategy for their demands or the support they offer.

5. Insufficient space is provided to operationalize peace agreements.
Even when implementation is well-specified, it is still important to translate the text of that agreement into actionable to-dos. This need for operationalization is seldom well-planned for and is usually not approached as the continuation of the negotiation process. This exposes processes to outside influence. As timelines become extended, needs are likely to change but space is seldom found for dialogue around this changing picture.

6. Implementation processes are insufficiently funded.
Funding availability varies between different contexts and is affected by internal and external developments. Financing can, therefore, be unexpectedly diverted to other activities within a process, redistributed across processes, or even redirected outside of peace processes altogether. It is, therefore, important to plan for different scenarios and to combine sources of financing to limit harm.

7. Implementation processes lack "quality" funding.
Beyond how much funding is available, the usefulness of that money is essential. Implementation can be required quickly and involve politically risky activities. Funds that are inflexible, risk-averse or short-term can hinder the effective financing of an implementation process. Complex funding structures with multiple reporting requirements can reduce the usability of funds.

8. Implementation funding is distributed unequally across provisions.
Some provisions attract more funds than others. This is based on the political priorities of donors as well as differing levels of provision visibility. Donors may be interested in demonstrating rapid results or in reducing political risk. This leads to cherry-picking and uneven distribution of financing across provisions that can put the overall process at risk.

Given these results and the threat they can pose to the successful implementation of a peace agreement and the durability of that agreement, our research supports the following key policy recommendations:

Recommendation 1:
There is a need to build, maintain and reinforce the institutions that support the transition from negotiation to implementation and that are present during the implementation phases. A dedicated organization could support this work, by providing both technical support and material guarantees that underpin the implementation phase.

Recommendation 2:
It is imperative to professionalize the processes that, during the negotiation phase, support the setup of the necessary post-agreement architecture, to allow for continued dialogue around the operationalization and implementation of the agreement.

Recommendation 3:
Plans and frameworks should be put in place to navigate the natural turnover in key participants in processes, to maintain trust and good relations across as well as within phases. Institutionalized and time-consistent trust could be strengthened by involving trust parties and organizations.

Recommendation 4:
The architecture to support implementation should include specific funding structures that can respond to rapidly emerging needs from ongoing negotiations.

This report examines two questions: first, how implementation of peace agreements and their funding are addressed during the negotiation phase; and, second, how the implementation phase is financed. Our research is based on two understandings for how peace processes unfold: a linear process separated into distinct phases and an iterative process that sees continued dialogue throughout. Results emphasize that the iterative model, requiring a continued dialogue on the agreement and its implementation, better represents contemporary peace processes. Yet in terms of actors involved, the needs of the process and other considerations, there remains a clear differentiation between the phases, which complicates the key relationships that are developed during and across them. This suggests a need for renewed focus on the interlinkages – both temporally and conceptually – between the two phases.

This iterative view on peace processes has implications for how implementation and its financing should be conceived. While financing problems are considered technical and, therefore, as elements that have technical solutions, many of the issues we have drawn out suggest that implementation and its funding are highly political. It thus requires novel approaches to building a shared global infrastructure for guiding and funding the transition from conflict to peace. This suggests a need to build supporting architecture that matches this reality, while, at the same time, reflecting the idiosyncrasies and needs of each context.

1 Introduction

This study was **commissioned and funded by the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), through its Stabilisation Platform (SPF).** They contracted swisspeace and ISDC - International Security and Development Center to undertake research on the negotiation and implementation phases of peace agreements; on the relationship between these phases; on how these phases shape the funding landscape of implementing peace agreements; and on how funding considerations can contribute to more successful peace processes. In this report, we look at the mutual dependencies between the negotiation and implementation aspects of a peace process and seek to understand how this might influence both the implementation that is demanded during the negotiation phase and that which is supplied thereafter.

1.1 OBJECTIVE AND SPECIFIC AIMS

The overall objective of this research is to generate relevant data and analysis on the funding landscape of the implementation of peace agreements, covering the following specific aims:

- To analyse how issues related to implementation and its funding are considered in the negotiation phase
- To generate bespoke data and analyse funding aspects of the implementation of peace agreements
- To identify representative expenditures for the key items that comprise peace agreements, for which implementation support is required
- To identify good practices in relevant case studies
- To formulate policy recommendations for the funding of implementing peace agreements

1.2 KNOWLEDGE GAPS

The question of **financing peace** has been firmly put on the agenda at the United Nations and other international humanitarian and development actors.[1] Despite the increasing importance of this agenda, there is a marked "financing gap" in terms of investing in peacebuilding.[2] While military spending has risen substantially from a comparatively high base, (financial) support for peace processes has not increased comparatively. In 2021, USD 2113 billion were spent globally on military expenditure[3], while only USD 42 billion were spent on peacekeeping and peacebuilding.[4] The rising costs associated with acute crises[5] has drawn attention to investments in the prevention of these crises as an effective way to reduce harm. Considering that nearly a third of all post-conflict countries face renewed violence in the first two years after signing a peace agreement[6], there are good grounds for a focus on how peace agreements are implemented and how costly relapses can be prevented.

1 United Nations General Assembly, *Investing in prevention and peacebuilding: Report of the Secretary-General*, (New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 2022). Notably, IMF released a new Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations Strategy in March 2022, and a High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly took place in April 2022 on *Financing for Peacebuilding*. More attention is also being devoted to the topic at different institutions, with the Interpeace establishing a Finance for Peace Initiative and the NYU Center on International Cooperation leading the Good Peacebuilding Financing Initiative.

2 United Nations General Assembly, *Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary General*, (New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 2022.

3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time*, (2022).

4 Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Peace Index 2022: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*, (Sydney, 2022),

5 United Nations General Assembly, *Peacebuilding and sustaining peace*

6 Jean-Paul Lederach, *After the Handshake: Forging Quality Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Humanity United (blog) 2016, www.humanityunited.org/after-the-handshake

This risk of conflict relapse also demonstrates that the transition from the negotiating table to lasting peace is not straightforward. Multiple different dynamics are known to explain the variation in post-negotiation outcomes.[7] Moreover, the complexity of contemporary conflicts increasingly challenges the efficacy of typical pro-peace and security responses. Translating peace agreements into lasting peace and truly transforming conflict situations require financial and human resources and technical support, as well as goodwill and good intentions from all parties.

Based on these observations, we examine the implementation phase of peace processes, with a focus on how this phase is financed. Especially in the current economic context, a better understanding of how peace agreements and their implementation are financed is helpful to generate knowledge-based recommendations on how peacebuilding funds can be used more effectively and efficiently. These observations build on a significant body of work that looks at the political economy of financing the implementation of peace agreements.[8]

In this literature, however, knowledge gaps remain, especially around the question of the extent to which, if at all, negotiation phases consider and plan for the implementation of the negotiated agreements and their financing. This gap arises from a tendency in the literature to look at "negotiations" and "implementation" as two distinct, separate, parts of the overall process, involving different actors, different strategies and different scopes. At the same time, basic economic theory would suggest that actors in the negotiation phase should be forward-looking and consider implementation before signing an agreement. Similarly, basic contract theory demonstrates that actors in the implementation phase might look back to the negotiation phase to inform their activities.

Despite these observations, little is known about if and how the implementation needs, and the financing demands that arise from this, are considered and included in the negotiation phase. There is not much knowledge about how decisions on funding specific implementation modalities are made, nor about how key factors like gender issues might be incorporated into the implementation phase. Another knowledge gap concerns discussions on how the implementation of peace agreements is financed once it is embarked upon, who typically finances implementation based on which modalities, and what the consequences are for the durability of peace agreements. While more is known on the extent to which implementation matches what was agreed during negotiations,[9] gaps remain, pertaining to how decisions are reached on which components to support and which to leave unimplemented.

To address these gaps, we pursue two clusters of questions:

Q1. If at all, to what extent are questions around the implementation of peace agreements and its financing addressed during the negotiation of peace agreements? How are implementation considerations integrated into peace agreements and how do such considerations influence negotiations? What role does the negotiation phase play for the funding of peace agreement implementation afterwards?

Q2. How is the implementation of peace agreements typically financed? Who are the most relevant actors and what mechanisms are used to fund implementation? What funds are available and to what extent do they cover the implementation needs? And to what extent does what is implemented or not matter for the overall process?

7 Nico Schernbeck and Luxshi Vimalarajah, *Paving the Way for the Effective and Inclusive Implementation of Peace Accords. A strategic Framework*, (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2017).
8 See Sean Kane, *Peace Agreement Provisions and the Durability of Peace*, CSS Mediation Resources, (Zurich: ETH, 2019)
9 See: https://www.peaceagreements.org/portal

1.3 METHODOLOGY

To answer both sets of questions, we collected bespoke data from 89 semi-structured expert interviews to identify lessons learned on how implementation funding is provided and decided and could be leveraged more effectively to consolidate peace. The interview process was divided into two phases. First, we interviewed 35 experts with experience across multiple peace processes to gain an understanding of the funding landscape as a whole; second, we conducted 54 interviews with individuals who had been more deeply involved in an individual process. This allows us to evaluate the extent to which general lessons can be drawn across cases and applied to individual processes, each of which may have experienced unique opportunities and threats. Interviewees included prominent and highly experienced negotiators, scholars and academics, mediators and actors involved in the implementation process, such as representatives from government, civil society and financial institutions. Due to both the wide geographic spread of interviewees and case studies and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted the interviews online using secure video messaging software, between December 2021 and November 2022.

The questionnaire framework was designed to afford individuals the space to reflect on their personal experiences and informed opinions, while providing the opportunity to discuss key – but potentially sensitive – factors, such as gender issues, donor impartiality, political constraints etc. Put another way, we designed a questionnaire framework to afford respondents freedom to raise primary issues in their practice and to speak about those as they wished. As this study constitutes a general, preliminary exploration we sought to avoid raising specific key factors explicitly. However, we recognize the importance of further exploration of these dynamics, including gender issues, in future studies. We then used qualitative data analysis software to thematically analyse these interviews. The interview data and the questions included in the semi-structured survey guide were based upon desk research and literature reviews.



Figure 1: Overview of case study contexts. Year in parentheses refers to the year an agreement was signed. Authors' own construction from data from OECD QWIDS Database

For the case study interviews, we selected the following contexts: Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Philippines, South Sudan and Yemen.[10] These cases were selected to reflect different types of peace agreements, degrees of implementation "success", geographic areas, points in time, actors involved in the process and funding modalities. We note that our research does not claim to provide a comprehensive comparative study of these cases. Rather, the aim is generating knowledge in an exploratory way, drawing out key findings from the different processes and comparing these results with those that emerged from the interviews with experts with experience working across multiple processes.

1.4 STRUCTURE

This report contains four further sections and two annexes. Section 2 sets out the conceptual background and the theoretical basis from which we derive our research questions. Section 3 draws out the main findings from the interviews, pertaining to the two main research questions. Section 4 lays out and discusses a series of recommendations for the different stakeholders involved in agreement implementation. Section 5 concludes. Annex 1 lists the individuals interviewed for this research; Annex 2 contains an estimation of expenditures related to peace agreements.

10 Specifically, the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (Khartoum Accord), the 2016 Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace in Colombia, the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Bamako Agreement), the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation in Mozambique, the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nepal, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro in the Philippines (and associated agreements/annexes) and both the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict and the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.

2 Conceptual and theoretical background

2.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: PEACE PROCESSES AND AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION

We build our research around two slightly contrasting conceptualizations of peace processes, each of which is a useful stepping stone to develop the thought experiments that underpin the development of the research. These are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 captures a model, linear in time, where two distinct phases are "siloed" – the first is a negotiation which may or may not lead to the signing of an agreement; the second, following the successful signing of an agreement, is the implementation phase. This reality is intuitive, if perhaps oversimplified. There are often step changes at this point in terms of the actors involved, which shows the usefulness of separating the two phases in narrative discussions. The process, however, is often thought to move from "political" during the negotiation to "technocratic" during the implementation but, in reality, negotiations do not end with the signing of a peace agreement. They are carried through to the implementation phase, where further negotiations take place (explicitly or implicitly). Similarly, the negotiation phase itself does not happen in isolation but, rather, is the continuation of a primary "pre-negotiation" phase. In this sense, while there is progression through different phases over time, the process tends to be iterative and interdependent, with negotiations feeding forwards and backwards. This is depicted in Figure 3.

Both conceptualizations imply two key issues for this research. The first is that, as negotiation transitions to implementation, aspects of the agreement are still open to interpretation, and thus negotiation (e.g., through the threat of at least one party of reneging on the agreement as it exists at that point). The second, consequent to this, is that something having been negotiated in the agreement is no guarantee that it will be implemented (or, indeed, that its implementation is sensible or desirable). How the involved parties make decisions in such a setting of uncertainty is the basis of the research questions of this report.

Figure 2: Linear model of a peace process.



Figure 3: Iterative model of a peace process.

In these diagrams, the **negotiation / mediation** phase refers to the substantive discussions involving the negotiating parties to end a conflict by signing one or multiple agreements aimed at resolving the conflict.[11] Mediation is a specific form of negotiation involving **"a third party assist[ing] two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements".**[12] Conventionally, the signed peace agreement marks the end of a successful negotiation and refers to a formal document reflecting the agreement made between the conflicting parties to resolve the conflict[13], **"outlining new structures and institutions on how to share power and deal with differences in a non-violent manner".**[14] A peace agreement is an important step on the path towards achieving durable peace, but not the final milestone of that process. Peace agreements may be comprehensive and deal with a long list of issues[15], such as the Final Agreement in Colombia, or focus on only a few select issues, such as the Maputo Accord in Mozambique. Either way, there remains an implication that there is work to be done to secure peace after the agreement is signed, as well as during the negotiation phase.

The **implementation phase** refers to the process of enacting and enforcing what has been ratified in the agreement.[16] Implementation usually occurs after a peace agreement is signed, e.g., in Colombia, where most of the implementation took place after the agreement was signed.[17] In a small number of settings, however, implementation was embarked upon during the negotiation phase (e.g., in Mozambique). The **relationship between the negotiation and implementation phases** is recognized as an important interaction in the literature,[18] but has often been overlooked. This report builds on the understanding that a negotiation, if done in a thoughtful and inclusive way, can positively influence the implementation phase[19]; and that peace agreements should provide for their own implementation by including the necessary structures in their provisions.[20] For example, while there are many considerations shaping who ought to be the lead mediator and part of the mediation team, concrete guidance remains limited. Key guidance documents highlight the **"capacity to assist with the implementation of a negotiated settlement"** and **"availability of resources (managerial, financial, human, technical etc.) to carry out a sustained mediation effort"**[21], which highlights the need for strategic foresight and continuous presence. How mediation actors can meaningfully shift to more medium-term planning and secure the necessary funds, now and in the future, however, requires specific guidance not currently available.[22]

A precondition for implementation is the **operationalization** of the agreement, referring to the process aimed at translating a peace agreement into actionable steps that can then be implemented. Operationalization is important because peace agreements are often vague (and sometimes deliberately so), and the provisions they contain are set out in different levels of detail. This calls for further specifications to

11 Simon Mason, *Mediation and Facilitation in Peace Processes*, International Relations and Security Network, (Zurich: ETH, 2007).
12 United Nations, *Guidance for Effective Mediation*, (New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 2012), 4.
13 Christine Bell, *Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for their 'gender perspective',* UN Women Research Paper, (New York, NY: UN Women, 2015)
14 Mason, *Mediation and Facilitation in Peace Processes*, 10.
15 Comprehensive agreements aim to resolve grievances, address resource- and power-sharing, security aspects (reforming the security sector, disarmament), as well as justice reform and others. See: Johannes Karreth et al, *IGOs and the Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements*, (Submitted for consideration for presentation at the 13th Annual Conference on The Political Economy of International Organization, 2020).
16 Mason, *Mediation and Facilitation in Peace Processes*.
17 Felix Colchester, Laura Henao Izquierdo and Philipp Lustenberger, *Implementing Peace Agreements: Supporting the Transition from the Negotiation Table to Reality*, (Zurich: ETH, 2020).
18 For example: Dorina A. Bekoe, "Toward a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The case of Liberia", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 39, 2-3 (2003).
19 Michael C. Van Walt Van Praag and Mike Boltjes, "Implementation of Peace Agreements" in *Managing Peace Processes: process-related questions. A Handbook for AU Practitioners*, ed. African Union and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, (2013).
20 Sean Molloy and Christine Bell, *How Peace Agreements Provide for Implementation*, PAX-Report, (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Political Settlements Research Programme, 2019); Schernbeck and Vimalarajah, *Paving the Way for the Effective and Inclusive Implementation of Peace Accords*.
21 United Nations, *Mediation Start-up Guidelines*, (New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 2011), 17.
22 A total of two pages was dedicated to this aspect in the 118-page long UN Mediation Start-up Guidelines, 2011

make the agreement and its provisions operational on the ground. In addition, it may provide the grounds to view peace agreements less as a legal contract and more as the setting of the frameworks going forward, the implementation of which requires the review and, when necessary, updating of policy.

The exact 'costs' of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, for example, are closely linked to details which are often not, and for good reasons, specified in peace agreements. These include: how many combatants each party to the conflict has; who is defined as eligible to benefit from the DDR process; which (military) ranks should receive what level of compensation; and which weapons qualify for disarmament, as well as how to strike a balance between compensation for former soldiers and victims of war more generally. This means that the operationalization is not merely a technical exercise. Rather, it is deeply political, and requires a structure within which further deliberations can productively be held between the negotiating parties. This is emphasized by Lyons (2016), who argues that **"successful peace implementation therefore is a continuous, flexible process of creating and recreating ripeness so that broad coalitions in each of the major parties continue to favour non-military strategies"**.[23] As part of this, such a structure is not only needed to operationalize written agreement provisions, but also to recall and build on the unwritten and implicit parts of a peace agreement. Furthermore, peace processes do not take place in a vacuum but are often faced with dynamic and complex contexts, which need to be considered continuously to ensure the implementation process remains relevant and reflective of the reality on the ground. Having an ongoing dialogue structure in place is crucial, ideally linked to financial resources, in which operationalization can take place, but which also provides room for further discussions between negotiating parties. Hence, it is not only the written content of a peace agreement that conditions implementation and the success of that implementation, but it also matters how agreements are operationalized and how the specified implementation actions are funded.

2.2 SCOPE: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING FINANCING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

A review of the literature shows a predominant focus on **post-conflict financing and aid needs rather than on implementation funding specifically.**[24] Past research has mostly focused on the various forms of international financing that reach post-conflict contexts, as well as when funding is made available and how it is timed.[25] There has also been a focus on the roles of bilateral and multilateral donor support[26] and the different funding modalities used to channel this international financing.[27] What appears to be missing, however, is a systematic analysis that focuses specifically on implementation funding.

Implementation funding is mainly subsumed under Official Development Assistance (ODA), but ODA is but one of three general forms of international financial flows. The

23 Terrence Lyons, "Successful peace implementation: plans and processes", *Peacebuilding 4, No. 1*, (2016): 73.
24 James K. Boyce and Shephard Forman, *Financing Peace: International and National Resources for Postconflict Countries and Fragile States*, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010); Corinna Jentzsch, "The Financing of International Peace Operations in Africa: A review of recent research and analyses", *African Peacebuilding Network Working Papers* 1, (2014); Léonce Ndikuma, *The role of foreign aid in post-conflict countries* (Amherst, Massachusetts: Political Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts Amhurst, 2015).
25 Maire Braniff, "After Agreement: The Challenges of Implementing Peace", Shared Space, (2012); Schernbeck and Vimalarajah, *Paving the Way for Effective and Inclusive Implementation; Stephen John Stedman, Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers,* (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, 2001)
26 Boyce and Forman, Financing Peace; Colchester, Henao Izquierdo and Lustenberger, Implementing Peace Agreements; Nicolas Ross and Mareike Schomerus, *Donor support to peace processes: A Lessons for Peace Literature Review*, Working Paper 571, (London: ODI, 2020); Van Walt Van Praag and Boltjes, Implementation of Peace Agreements.
27 For example,on channeling funds through national budgets: Lila Wade, "Can you pay for peace? The role of financing frameworks in effective peace operations", *Journal of Peacekeeping* 21, 1-2, (2017). On the role of trust funds: Sean Molloy, *Peace Agreements and Trust Funds*, (Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, 2019).

other two are remittances, and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).[28] Figure 4 shows that, overall, ODA only comprises a small part of overall financial flows to fragile countries. Within ODA, funding for implementing peace agreements plays a critical role as "pioneering investment".[29] If such funding responds to the needs of the peace process and serves to move targeted countries to a positive trajectory towards stability and peace, it will contribute to other investments, as financial flows follow suit in the post-conflict setting.



Figure 4: Financial flows to 52 conflict-affected settings, 2009-2020 (billions of current US$).
Graph retrieved from: UNPBC and UNPBSO, 2021

Within ODA, it is not possible to distinguish the share of dedicated peace agreement funding. Also, respective contributions can fall within any of the ODA subcategories of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding assistance, as well as in domestic contributions being recorded separately. As a result of this, there is no consolidated database on peace agreement funding. There is only indicative information on how much is spent on what, by whom and where. Layered with the difficulty of defining which individual projects are part of the implementation endeavour, this information gap makes it difficult to estimate, let alone understand, how much funding, and from what sources, is dedicated to implement a specific peace agreement.

2.3 MODELS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

The implication of the research questions and Section 2.1 is that the phases of a peace process are connected across time. In particular, those involved during negotiation and mediation might "look forward" to form expectations about the implementation that will take place (Q1); and the extent to which decisions made in the implementation phase are informed by what is, or is not, agreed (Q2), as well as the degree

28 understood as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries"; OECD, Official Development Assistance, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm
29 Paul Collier et al., *Strengthening development finance in fragile contexts*, (London, International Growth Centre: 2021)

to which such agreements are taken to be binding.[30] In other words, these research questions imply a series of interconnections between the phases (see: Figure 3).

In this section, we seek to understand the motivations and rationales that would underpin such "forward"- and "backward"-looking behaviour. To shed light on the incentives to look forward from the negotiation to implementation, we begin with a starting assumption that those involved in the negotiations form expectations about the implementation phase and will reach the best possible agreement, based on those expectations. To consider the incentives of implementers to look backwards, we consider the situation of a peace agreement akin to a classic principle-agent problem, where the negotiation parties must commit to a peace agreement that will be implemented, with some uncertainty, by donors at a later time. Thinking about the interconnected phases in this way allows us to establish the underpinning reasons why two phases often discussed as separate (Figure 2) may be complicatedly interconnected (Figure 3).

2.3.1 Forward-looking negotiation parties

The question about whether negotiation parties are forward-looking implies two things. The first is accepting that once an agreement is signed, commitments can change. Regardless of what goes into the agreement, there remains uncertainty if it can or will be implemented. The second is that negotiation parties have significant power in deciding whether implementation goes ahead – after all, they retain the right to reach an agreement at all and to determine its contents if one is reached. If these parties are forward-looking, they will form expectations about implementation before reaching the final version of an agreement.[31] This fits a general class of "leadership" models in game theory, where the first mover assesses how others will respond to a given action and sets their own action accordingly. In the context of a peace process, this allows those involved in negotiations to make "demands" in the agreement, having formed expectations about what will happen once it is signed.

To consider the implications of this observation, we define a simple game that involves two players: the 'Agreement Parties' and the 'Implementation Parties'. The Agreement Parties may wish to reach an agreement that specifies very clearly what will happen once the agreement is signed, but two factors constrain this. The first is that agreements with more conditions are likely to be more difficult ("costly") to reach, as agreement must be reached on each additional clause. The second is that there is uncertainty about what will be implemented once the agreement has been signed. In other words, there is a tension between the perceived benefits of implementation demands; the complexity of reaching agreement on these demands; and the uncertainty that agreed clauses will be implemented. These trade-offs create a situation where the Agreement Parties might prefer to reach agreements that less fully specify implementation. The incentives to reach agreements that less fully specify implementation grow in uncertainty over implementation and the difficulties in reaching agreement. In other words, even in situations where negotiation parties could be forward-looking, they might act as if they are not. Extensions of this basic framework allow that prior commitments from implementation donors and work aiming to reinforce trust between parties in the two phases can encourage parties to reach agreements that better specify how to operationalize implementation.

2.3.2 Peace agreements as a contract or a process?

Once an agreement has been signed, questions arise about what should be

30 This builds, further, into a debate within the literature, which seeks to consider peace agreements as akin to contracts. See, e.g., Badran, R. (2014). Intrastate peace agreements and the durability of peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(2), 193-217.
31 This fits a general class of game theoretic models focusing on leadership, e.g., Schelling, T. C. (1980). *The Strategy of Conflict: with a new Preface by the Author.* Harvard university press and Von Stackelberg, H. (1934). *Marktform und gleichgewicht.* Springer, Vienna.

implemented, how this should be operationalized, and who should pay. Chronologically, it is easy to understand why this process is often assumed to take place after the signing of an agreement. There is a temptation to think of the signing of an agreement as analogous to the signing of a contract. In this sense, the negotiation parties agree to a contract without full information on the preferences of the implementation parties and, potentially, with access to incomplete institutions to ensure compliance. Implementation parties may have their own incentives and interests in the peace process, which govern their actions. When these interests diverge from those of the negotiation parties, or where institutions to ensure compliance are weaker, implementation may bear increasingly little resemblance to what is specified in the agreement.

In a stylized case, the negotiation parties must commit to an implementation process with uncertain outcomes at the point when the agreement is signed. Once the agreement has been signed, those charged with implementing decisions have some capacity to act in their own interest. Although the negotiation parties may return to violence, they will not do so if their return from the peace process, including implementation, is more beneficial to them. This creates the essential tension and leeway in the model. Implementation parties can follow an implementation path that is suboptimal for the negotiation parties but still maintains peace. This allows implementation parties to maximize their own returns and not those of the negotiation parties. When there is significant divergence in preferences, however, the risk of renewed conflict grows. Although the risk of divergence in preferences can be reduced through less ambiguous implementation clauses in the agreement, this creates a new tension with the previous model, as this imposes costs and may not be an optimal approach for those involved in the negotiation phase.

2.3.3 Key hypotheses and intuition of the models

The outcomes of these models indicate the complexity of the strategic setting, both in terms of what to implement and on how decisions can be made during both the negotiation and implementation phases. At one extreme, the models support outcomes where negotiation parties will forgo detailed specification of the implementation phase, which can create a situation where implementation is underspecified. This gives greater leeway to implementers to support a suboptimal bundle of policies that risks renewed violence. From these general observations of the models, we can produce a series of specific predictions that we test empirically in the next section. Specifically:

1. Negotiation Parties should seek to be clear on implementation plans in agreements but do not always have incentives to do so. In turn, some peace agreements will contain minimal, if any, specific implementation demands.

2. Reaching more complete agreements is likely costlier due to additional negotiation time and potential disagreements over specific items. This reduces the likelihood that agreements will contain detailed implementation and cost plans.

3. Agreements that less fully specify implementation increase ambiguity and, consequently, the potential for misalignment between the actors involved. Although more complete agreements might overcome this problem, they are more difficult to reach.

4. Building trust and relationships between negotiation and implementation parties before the signing of a peace agreement should increase the probability of an agreement containing implementation plans. It should also increase space for parties to align incentives and to minimize divergence in preferences.

3 Findings

This section lays out our project's main findings based on the two sets of research questions and the incentives derived in Section 2.3. The first part is devoted to exploring how implementation financing is already considered during the negotiation phase (Q1). The second part then bundles insights on how funding is relevant during the implementation, including who finances, what when and through which mechanisms, as well as the quantity and quality of available funding (Q2). We introduce each finding with a short description of the key takeaway, which we then elaborate on below. At the end of the section, we discuss how these results sit within the theory in Section 2.3.

3.1 ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FINANCING DURING THE NEGOTIATION PHASE

3.1.1 Finding 1: Peace agreements vary in whether and how funding is addressed in the written text

Key takeaway
Peace agreements vary in the extent to which implementation and its funding are addressed in the written text. Some agreements include no or only vague provisions, whereas others specify both who is responsible for financing and which modalities should be used. Specific budgets are not included in an agreement text, as provisions lack the necessary details to allow for costing exercises.

Table 1 presents an overview of different ways in which and to what extent implementation funding transfers from the negotiation into the written text of a peace agreement. We further elaborate on and analyse these ways in the subsections that follow.

FINDINGS	CASES
There are no explicit or only very vague provisions on implementation funding.	— Northern Ireland (1998): An active decision was made to remain constructively ambiguous throughout the agreement, including on implementation (funding). — Nepal (2007): The agreement does not make any specific reference to implementation funding.[32]
There are provisions on modalities to fund implementation activities (how?).	— Mali (2015): The agreement includes the plan to organize a Donor Funding Conference as well as to establish a Sustainable Development Fund (Art. 37). The international community asked to shift focus of existing development money to the north of the country (Art. 45).[33] — CAR (2019): The Agreement stipulates the development of a joint funding mechanism owned by government and partners of CAR (Art. 36), a process linked to Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) Art. 37).[34] — Philippines: The Framework Agreement (2012) in Chapter VIII: Normalization, Art. 11 stipulates the establishment of a Trust Fund.[35]

32 CPA between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (2006). Exception: Article 4.3 specifies that the Nepali government will "provide food supplies and other necessary arrangements" for Maoist combatants.
33 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (2015).
34 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (2019).
35 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2012).

FINDINGS	CASES
	— Colombia (2016): The Final Agreement stipulates that the financing of the implementation will be specified in the Framework Plan (Chapter 6, Art 6.1.1), while nonetheless referring to funding, e.g., for specific entities, throughout the agreement (e.g., Art. 3.2.2.1; 3.4.4, 6.1.2).[36] — Mozambique (2019): The negotiation was financed by a Swiss-managed basket fund, which was later transitioned into a basket fund managed by the Peace Secretariat and UNOPS to bundle financing for the implementation. — South Sudan (ARCSS): The agreement stipulates a special reconstruction fund is to be established within the first month of the Transition phase (Ch. 3, Art. 2.1).[37]
There are provisions on who is responsible for funding implementation (who?).	— South Sudan (ARCSS): The responsibility to fund the Special Reconstruction Fund was allocated to the government (USD 100 million per year) and indirectly to donors (through the pledging conference) (Ch. 3, Art.2.7).[38] — Mali (2015): The funding responsibility was allocated to the international community (Art. 5, 54) and the government (Art. 14-15).[39] — CAR (2019): A National Implementation Committee was established and tasked with developing budgets and consulting with donors (Art. 30). — Philippines (2014): The Framework Agreement (2012) in Chapter VIII: Normalization, Art. 11 recognizes the need for donor funding for the normalization process. The subsequent Annex on Normalization (2014) makes the Government of the Philippines (GPH) responsible for providing funding but allows both GPH and MILF to access donor funding to supplement.[40] — Colombia (2016): The Final Agreement stipulates that the government shall set up a Trust Fund to pay out a monthly basic income for 24 months for former FARC combatants, following the initiation of the preparation phase for reintegration. This fund is also to be used for social security payments for former FARC members «who are not engaged in remunerated activities»[41], which are to be covered by the government (Art. 3.2.2.7). — Mozambique (2019): The Maputo Accord details that the Peace Secretariat is tasked with the logistics of the implementation including budgeting and fundraising (IV).[42] Moreover, the annex includes a statement by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (MEF) that the agreement is neutral to their budgeting process, effectively shifting responsibilities for financing, especially for DDR, to the international community.

Table 1: Overview of different ways to integrate implementation funding into peace agreement texts

3.1.1.1 No or vague provisions on implementation funding

Some agreements do not contain any provisions on how the implementation should be financed. Our findings show that these gaps are mostly deliberate. Contentious issues are often intentionally not set out in the agreement text, but there is a shared (implicit) understanding on how the non-mentioned issues should be tackled, including financing. Interviewees described these intentional gaps as "strategic omissions." Keeping track of and not ignoring these, often implicit, shared understandings is important for agreement implementation success. Box 1 illustrates this for the Mozambique case.

Another case is that issues may also be 'omitted' with the intention of ensuring an agreement can be reached, i.e., to park difficult issues for a later date, but without a clear view of how to address these issues in the future. While this can simplify reaching an agreement, it risks derailing the peace process in the implementation phase.

36 The Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (2016).
37 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (2015).
38 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (2015).
39 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (2015).
40 Annex on Normalization to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014).
41 The Final Agreement (2016).
42 Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (2019).

Box 1: Pensions in Mozambique

In Mozambique, the contentious and costly issue of pensions for ex-combatants was purposefully excluded from the agreement, and it was agreed that the details about this would be negotiated during the implementation. Yet, signatories had a clear understanding that the bulk of the financing for the pensions would have to come from domestic resources, which contradicted the annex of the agreement mentioning the international community as financially responsible for the agreement implementation process.

Finally, some peace agreements are simply ambiguous on implementation funding. This may be because of an active decision during the negotiation phase to focus on agreed principles or policy directions, or because implementation is understood to be discussed separately. As a negotiation strategy, this approach is known as 'constructive ambiguity'. It is used when negotiating parties are not able or willing to agree to specific language or phrasing or when they agree to disagree on some issues, but are in principle willing to move forward. This can enable avoiding deadlocks while leaving space for the negotiating parties to 'save face' and not be seen to disagree with specific language, or perhaps because it is considered more practical to revisit the contentious issues at a later point.[43] An example for the latter is the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland:

"At the time, being really specific about implementation, I don't think would have worked. It's a Catch-22 – by not having more detailed roads to travel, certain things fall by the way-side over the long term. The civic forum, and the desire for integrated education, are just two examples. If you had more detail on them at the time of the agreement, they might be further down the line now, but I don't know if you would have gotten a consensus on specifics at the time. That's the catch."[44]

3.1.1.2 Provisions on implementation funding modalities or responsibilities are included

If implementation financing is mentioned, we observe that this either entails specifying the modalities to assemble and/or disburse funding,[45] or outlining responsibilities regarding who is expected to finance or take the lead in operationalizing an agreement, including budgeting planned implementation activities.[46] On modalities, agreements may directly call for organizing pledging conferences, conducting funding needs analyses or initiating the setup of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).

In terms of responsibilities, several agreements contain provisions stating that either host governments, negotiating parties or international actors, or a mix of these, assume responsibility for funding implementation. Another variation is creating a dedicated entity or mechanism, such as the Peace Secretariat in Mozambique or the National Implementation Committee in CAR. These entities typically comprise different actor groups and, based on the peace agreement, are mandated to operationalize agreements into implementation actions, develop respective budget proposals and raise the necessary funds.

Even if a peace agreement specifies who ought to finance implementation activities and how, such provisions do not automatically result in agreement implementation being well-financed and successful. The circumstances under which these provisions

43 See: Dražen Pehar, "Use of ambiguity in peace agreements", *Language and Diplomacy*, (2001).
44 Interview 87
45 see second row in Table 1 with examples from Mali, CAR, the Philippines, Colombia and Mozambique.
46 see third row in Table 1 with examples from South Sudan, Mali, CAR, the Philippines, Colombia and Mozambique.

are negotiated and integrated in agreements are crucial. Interviewees confirmed that there is a difference between whether respective provisions are included by technical experts as part of a professional drafting exercise, or whether they are the product of and form a substantial part of the negotiating parties' discussions. They may also be included due to mediators understanding the importance of the implementation phase for lasting stability and peace and the need to provide room for continued dialogue after the signing of the agreement. Moreover, much of the catalytic potential of modalities, such as donor conferences, MDTFs or implementation committees, depends on how these are designed and governed, including the principles on which decision-making is based and which actors are (and are not) included. Box 2, referring to the experience in Mali, illustrates that provisions on modalities and responsibilities of implementation funding do not necessarily lead to a well-structured operationalization and implementation.

Box 2: Insights from Mali

The 2015 Mali peace agreement includes clear provisions on how the implementation should be financed. It defines the need to conduct a needs analysis in the country's North, calls a pledging conference in Brussels, and stipulates the setup of a Sustainable Development Fund to finance the implementation. The agreement further states that both the state and the international community have a financial responsibility in supporting the implementation. Interviewees suggested that this agreement was very much drafted by the international community and mediation experts. Consequently, the provisions on modalities of and responsibility for implementation funding have not been translated into actions. The Sustainable Development Fund, for example, has not been set up in an inclusive way. It is controlled by government authorities and does not involve the other negotiating parties. The fund is blocked, due to lack of funds and, arguably, the lack of political will to progress on the implementation and it is, therefore, unable to contribute to the implementation of actions that deliver on the agreement. Furthermore, interviewees suggested that it was clear from the beginning that the provision which states that the government will financially contribute to the implementation was unrealistic. Finally, this research estimates that while a total sum of EUR 3.2 billion was pledged to the implementation of the agreement at the international pledging conference in 2015[47], the international community has only dedicated some USD 11 million of additional ODA annually, in the five years after the agreement's signing, towards its implementation.[48]

3.1.1.3 No budgets in peace agreements

Many peace agreements do contain detailed considerations on how implementation funding is to be provided and by whom, and how such funding is to be spent. But these agreements almost always fail to specify budgets in the agreement texts or annexes. Although some peace agreements contain clear implementation plans and spell out the entities charged with developing budgets, there are no implementation budgets set out in the agreements themselves. The logic underpinning this observation is that peace agreements are usually not detailed enough to be implemented immediately after their signing. First, they need to be operationalized by setting out specific implementation activities and only on the back of these can detailed budgets and financing plans be developed. Thus, it is simply not feasible to develop and reference budgets in the negotiation stage. As specification of financing and budget responsibility would increase, it could reinforce the idea that a peace agreement is a contract. This might overcome the participation constraint of the negotiation parties, but two tensions

47 OECD and Republic of Mali, *Communiqué Final de la Conférence internationale pour la relance économique et le développement du Mali*, (22 October 2015).
48 Refer to section 3.2.3 for more information.

emerge. The first is that the more detail, the greater the risk that the interests of the parties diverge; the second is that there is a greater the risk of donors lacking incentives to act in line with these implementation plans. It also includes the more general risk that implementation is specified at a period before the full needs of the situation are known, risking time-inconsistency.

However, an interesting example in terms of funding implementation activities are those agreements where implementation already commences, at least in part, during the negotiation phase. For example, before the signing of the Maputo Accord, several confidence-building measures and most provisions of the decentralization chapters had already been implemented. This approach implies that funding these activities must have been discussed, despite the peace agreement containing no references to budgets. In general, this implies that, for at least some implementation activities, financing is accessible, but it differs from what is expected when the agreement is signed. Hence, planning ahead for implementation funding appears to be difficult and can only be undertaken based on estimates and scenarios that need to be sufficiently flexible to adjust to circumstances as they arise.

3.1.2 Finding 2: Negotiation stakeholders are not incentivized to discuss implementation funding in detail

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Key takeaway

Negotiation stakeholders, including mediators, negotiating parties and donors, are not incentivized to discuss implementation funding in detail. Mediators acknowledge their responsibility to engage in more medium- to long-term planning, but often have limited agenda-setting power. Moreover, with mediators often leaving right after signing, incentives are clearly biased towards signing an agreement rather than thinking through its feasibility. Negotiating parties are often preoccupied with the content of the agreement and frequently lack the technical capacities and the head space to engage in planning at this point of the process. Meanwhile, the international community is not sufficiently involved to be able to influence the agreement-making process towards ensuring implementation funding is considered in the negotiation phase.

This section zooms in on the role of negotiating parties, mediators and the international community, regarding discussions about implementation funding during the negotiation phase.

3.1.2.1 The role of negotiating parties

We find that discussing implementation funding is not the negotiating parties' priority. There are various reasons for this. First, a peace agreement and the process around achieving it is often just a means to bring negotiating parties together and get them talking. Thus, the content and, specifically, the details of implementation funding almost take a secondary role. As one interviewee put it,

> "[...] if sentiments are running high, the whole global effort is to sign a deal, get a deal, no matter what the cost, sign the bloody deal, we need an agreement. Sometimes that is the sentiment that is guiding the process, unfortunately."[49]

For example, even though implementation in Mali has been moving slowly, the peace process is seen as an important platform for parties to come together and

49 Anonymous

talk. Second, implementation funding can be extremely political, which discourages discussions during delicate negotiations. For example, budgeting funds for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is closely linked to fundamental questions, such as how many combatants each party to the conflict has, who they are and what ranks should receive which type and level of compensation. The conclusion of the negotiation is a vulnerable moment for the negotiating parties, with all these details adding a further risk layer to the discussions.[50] Third, substantiating budgetary discussions requires technical capacities which negotiating parties may not always have, or not have to the same extent. Text box 3 provides the example of the Philippines showcasing the risks associated with mentioning funding, even just verbally.

Box 3: The risk of raising implementation funding in the Philippines

During the implementation of the Bangsamoro peace process, a government representative informally mentioned the cash package for demobilizing combatants (amounting to 1 million pesos per combatant).[51] This amount, however, exceeded the government's budget for the DDR process: "*Just as simple as by announcing [...] a million pesos of assistance for each former combatant. That is roughly 20,000 dollars. That times the number of combatants was 5 times the whole [peace process] budget. You cannot promise five times the budget that you do not have.*"[52] It resulted that, in fact, the representative had mistakenly referred to the total value of the socioeconomic package, which included in-kind elements such as livelihood support, education, training for combatants and their families, as well as community development. According to the International Crisis Group, combatants were subsequently hesitant to proceed with the third phase of disarmament until their colleagues, who had previously handed in their weapons, had received half of the amount that was promised.[53] This example, while it occurred during the implementation phase, demonstrates the risk of raising budget and financial allocations even just verbally, let alone stating amounts in written documents.

Holding detailed discussions about implementation funding can be risky. But at the same time, interviewees mentioned that it is important to consider whether agreements are implementable. At some point, the negotiation parties should, within the boundaries of the possible, make sure that what they are proposing can actually be implemented. Negotiating parties have, as mediators do, a responsibility to address the topic of implementability in a way that does not threaten or derail the negotiation process. Again, however, the tensions implicit in this must be recognized. On one hand, underspecified agreements may simply transfer costs across time periods, resulting in no overall gain but rather additional costs, for negotiating parties. On the other hand, it asks negotiation parties to make some prediction about future needs, which may be inaccurate to varying degrees.

3.1.2.2 The role of mediators

Although mediators never hold full agenda-setting power, they do have a certain responsibility to address 'implementability' during negotiations, including the question of funding implementation activities. One mediator stated,

50 In the Mali peace process, for example, signatory parties have still not been able to decide on the number of ex-combatants to be reintegrated, although the peace agreement was signed seven years ago (Interview 48).
51 International Crisis Group, *Southern Philippines: Keeping Normalisation on Track in the Bangsamoro,* (2021).
52 Interview 62
53 International Crisis Group, *Southern Philippines.*

"The point is that the mediator needs, towards the end of the negotiation phase, to make sure that the parties are aware of the feasibility and likelihood of implementability of what they are discussing. And this is his or her, or his team's, responsibility."[54]

While some mediators take on this responsibility during the negotiation and actively try to include implementation into discussions, others seem to be focused more on signing a peace deal. Due to short-term mandates, mediators often leave the peace process immediately after an agreement is signed – although in some situations, they may not even remain present for the whole negotiation phase. Given that a successful mediation is often a political achievement in itself, planning for implementation at the same time may not be the mediator's primary interest. Hence, the fact that mediators' mandates often end with the signing of the agreement may decrease their incentive to include implementation funding more actively during the negotiation.

In effect, this means that trust and opportunities may be lost, as research has shown that mediators have the most intimate contact with the negotiating parties. Thus, replacing a mediator with another focal person at the onset of the implementation process could be detrimental to the trust built during the negotiation phase, with the consequence of trust having to be rebuilt as part of the implementation phase. The example of Mozambique in Box 4 shows how continuity across negotiation and implementation, with mediators staying engaged, can have a positive impact on elevated trust levels supporting the entire process.

Box 4: Ensuring continuity and creating trusted relationships in Mozambique

The mediation team – comprising just three individuals – played a major role in the transition from the negotiation to the implementation phase in Mozambique. While certain parts of the agreement had already been implemented during the negotiation phase, i.e., the ceasefire and decentralization provisions, other parts were left for concretization during the implementation, including the issue of DDR. Already during the negotiation, the mediators engaged in medium- to long-term planning and raised the need for continued dialogue beyond the signing. Jointly with the negotiation parties, they planned what institutions and governance arrangements would be needed to structure the implementation process, who should be represented, how to ensure continuity of staff and how to manage expectations from donors. Thus, the mediators ensured that the necessary structures were in place, in the form of the Peace Secretariat, allowing them to stay involved in the peace process. The Peace Secretariat – composed of the mediators, negotiation parties and a donor representative - holds competencies over the main funding mechanism and serves as dialogue forum to operationalize the accord. The importance of this continuity – and the structured planning that preceded it – were highlighted equally by donors and negotiation parties.

The mediators, among others, play a key role in continuously creating donor buy-in and trust. This came both from donors recognizing that the Peace Secretariat (PS) had been on the ground for much longer and thus trusting its judgement and also from continuous communication efforts. As one donor put it, *"the PS does a good job of, in rather informal fashion, telling us what it's like to run a peace process, and convincing us why it's so important that a Secretariat like this has the space to run a peace process."*[55] Similarly, mediators raised the necessity for continuity of staff to allow for a principal-driven process. As one mediator put it: *"You cannot simply substitute one person and expect the government counterpart to open up about*

54 Interview 7
55 Interview 59

deeply personal stuff to them. You build all these relationships.'[56] While being rather unusual, the example shows how the commitment by mediators and support staff to stay involved allowed for continuous discussion between negotiating parties, while keeping the institutional memory of the actual mediation phase alive with mediators simultaneously managing donor expectations.

Furthermore, the departure of a key negotiation stakeholder, such as the mediator, also entails the risk of information and knowledge about the implicit understandings of the agreement being lost. As one interviewee puts it,

"It's often that the understanding is not just in the document, but also an understanding between the parties and the mediators, and if the mediators leave, this implicit understanding is also lost."[57]

Given that peace agreements often remain vague until they are operationalized, recollecting these implicit understandings and reflecting them in the operationalization of signed agreements is crucial for smooth implementation.

3.1.2.3 The role of the international community

International donors, including mainly third-party governments or international organizations, usually participate in negotiations as observers or guarantors. In general, donors do not actively influence the content of peace agreements.[58] Several donor interviewees highlighted that it should not be up to (bilateral or multilateral) donors to interfere in what is being discussed and written into an agreement, but that the process should be led by the negotiating parties. Another reason for limited donor influence during the negotiation phase is the absence of (bilateral or multilateral) structures that allow them to get involved. This can be an active decision made by the main stakeholders in the process, as is illustrated with the example of Libya in Box 5.

Box 5: Protecting negotiation spaces from donor influence in Libya

The Berlin process in 2020 for Libya was designed under an "international protective umbrella"[59] to prevent international actors from influencing and even fuelling the conflict by pursuing different interests. In order to mitigate the influence of external actors, including donors, on the process, the United Nations Special Envoy for Libya at the time, *"Salamé designed the Berlin process [to] start with those that interfere with the process so that Libyans have more space to manage it amongst themselves."*[60] Concretely, international working groups were set up in parallel to the Libyan-owned tracks, including an economic working group to address the economic roots of the conflict, which included the World Bank, IMF, the United States and Egypt.

Such indirect presence of foreign states can create incentives for negotiating parties, but also bear risks. In Mali, a commitment from donors to support the peace process brought the opposing groups back to the negotiating table and helped to convince them that negotiation and signing an agreement would be worthwhile, even after these parties had left earlier. But such circumstances also create a risk of unmet expectations. The individuals representing third-party states during such negotiations usually withdraw from the process before it gets to the point of considering how the signed agreement gets implemented. This means that promises and commitments

56 Interview 65
57 Interview 35
58 This does not mean that donors do not aim to shape the implementation of a peace agreement down the line. While the mediation phase is often structured and protected against 'outside' influences, the operationalization and implementation phase are frequently less structured, in turn allowing various actors to use financial incentives as leverage and push for foreign policy objectives under the cloak of implementation.
59 Interview 63
60 Interview 63

made during the negotiation phase are not made by those who are later in charge of delivering them.

As one interviewee stated:

"The key actors involved in the peace process disappear for the implementation. You need the refreshment of new actors, but also require constant commitment by those who were committed in the beginning."[61]

To counter this risk, several interviewees suggested to already involve implementation funders and technical experts in the negotiation phase. However, we find that, while these signals of commitment may seem favourable, inviting these actors already to the negotiating table could undermine the negotiating parties' sense of ownership of and leadership in the negotiation phase. Negotiations are a delicate and intimate space, meaning simply increasing the number of direct participants risks diverting attention from the conflict to be resolved.

Apart from the fact that peace agreements are often not concrete enough to meaningfully discuss funding, we find that there exist some ways to support implementability. These range from informal consultations between mediators and donors, setting up a donor coordination forum or a financial and economic track that is closely linked to the negotiation and allows for exchange among donors. To ensure the flow of information between the international community and the negotiation phase, mediators sometimes act as focal points.

3.1.3 Finding 3: Negotiation stakeholders insufficiently plan for dialogue beyond the signing

Key takeaway
The implementation phase is often treated as a technical follow-up to what is decided during negotiations. This framing neglects the need to operationalize peace agreements through a continued dialogue, which often results in insufficient and frustrating levels of implementation.

As shown, including provisions on implementation and implementation funding does not automatically lead to a successful implementation. Peace agreements are usually vague and should be seen as framework documents that are not yet actionable. They cannot be implemented word by word but require a continued dialogue to be operationalized and implemented. In reality, this results in a close interlink between and overlap of the negotiation and the implementation phases, demonstrating that the implementation is much more than a technical follow-up to the political negotiation. This finding is particularly relevant for peace processes that do not have one comprehensive peace agreement, but that follow a "peace by pieces" approach with several agreements on different levels and recurring cycles of negotiation, agreements and implementation.

This finding calls for a coordinated design and early setup of the structures for such a continued dialogue as part of implementation planning. In practice, this is usually not done: Not only are actors often leaving the specifics of implementation unaddressed during negotiations, but they are also not sufficiently forward-looking in terms of

61 Interview 35

providing the necessary structures for the operationalization of the agreement through a continued dialogue. Instead, artificial boundaries are created between phases.[62] This often leads to an unstructured operationalization phase in which the gains made during the negotiation phase, such as the trust built between the negotiating parties, but also between the mediator and the parties, risk being lost. Finally, this mismatch often results in insufficient and frustrating levels of implementation. An example of a process in which the implementation is primarily seen as a technical task and was thus not prepared for sufficiently is South Sudan (see box 6).

Box 6: Neglecting the need to accompany implementation with dialogue in South Sudan

The revitalized peace process in South Sudan experienced process-related flaws from the beginning. Sudan, the mediator in the process, exerted significant pressure on the two opposing parties. The two did not use the process to build trust, but their incentives to come to an agreement were low during the whole peace process.[63] Rather than setting up a structure that would allow for a strengthening of trust relationships and a continued dialogue about issues to be implemented beyond the signing, the responsibility for implementation was given to the Transitional Government of National Unity, which was to be composed of the two opposing parties as a first step of the implementation. While the agreement contains many detailed provisions and a clear implementation time plan, the fact that implementation takes place in a dynamic context requiring continued dialogue and renegotiation was not considered, and relevant structures were not set up. This illustrates that planning the details of the implementation is not enough to provide for a successful implementation, but that peace processes need structures for a continued dialogue around the implementation.

3.2 FINANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

After the signing of a peace agreement, commitments made and compromises reached during the negotiation must be translated into tangible action. Missing details and ambiguities need to be clarified and the implementation, including its financing, needs to be planned. This includes making highly political decisions, with increased public scrutiny, on how to fund and who is to fund the implementation. This section first examines how and by whom peace agreements are financed, before diving deeper into the operationalization of peace agreements. It then examines the availability of financing for peace agreement implementation, before analysing the determinants of the implementation and funding of specific agreement provisions.

3.2.1 Finding 4: Peace agreements lack coordinated funding efforts

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Key takeaway

In the transition from negotiation to implementation, a peace process moves into the public domain and becomes exposed to a wider set of stakeholders. Under increasing public scrutiny, actors must take highly political decisions on the agreement's operationalization, including who should fund the implementation and how. This

62 Crucially, the emphasis on continuous negotiation does not mean that what has been agreed on and reached is not 'binding'. While there is a need to make peace processes adaptive and responsive to new dynamics, for which these negotiation fora can be co-opted, the need for discussion rather evolves around hatching out the details of the provisions and ensuring that these are based on the needs and aspirations of the conflict parties.

63 Luka Biong Deng Kuol, "The 2018 South Sudanese Peace Agreement. A Litmus Test of Coercive Mediation", *The Zambakari Advisory: Special Issue*, (2019).

involves a diverse set of actors, straddling private, public and non-state sectors. Yet, these actors' efforts and the mechanisms used to disburse funding rarely follow an overarching strategy, leading to opaque, complex and ad hoc financing for agreement implementation.

Peace agreement financing comes from diverse actors with their own structures, logic and motivations regarding whether to fund specific parts of the implementation. Key actors include multilateral institutions, third-party donor states, states involved in the peace process (including the negotiating parties), international financial institutions (IFIs), development finance institutions (DFIs) as well as business actors. Remittances from expatriates may also be a key source of funding. While host governments are frequently expected to or want to be involved in self-financing implementation, their willingness and capacity to do so depends on different factors. These include how easily funding is made available by external actors, macroeconomic factors such as debt levels and fluctuations in international prices, as well as the availability of domestic resources and the capacities to raise and manage them. One interviewee highlighted that, after the signing of the R-ARCSS in South Sudan, the international oil price dropped significantly, which reduced the state's budget. Importantly, this also strengthened those sections of the government that were less favourable towards the agreement. Whether or not a host state wishes to self-finance, anchoring their financial contributions may signal commitment, ensure ownership and entrench accountability. Yet, interviewees advocated for a realistic and context-driven approach, which provides flexibility. This approach does not prima facie assume that a state is not committed to the peace process if it only wishes to start financing once first peace dividends have materialized or if it faces a time lag in disbursing funds. Administrative hurdles, such as unapproved budgets, complicated disbursement procedures and internal divisions, may cause such delays. In some instances, immediate or imposed self-financing may not benefit trust-building between the negotiating parties and between the parties and the international community. Indeed, international financing may be perceived as more neutral than domestic financing in some cases, which could make it more suitable for implementation.

Multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) or the African Union (AU), and third-party donors have contributed significant financing to peace processes. While "alternative" state donors have emerged in development cooperation more generally[64], the funding of peace agreement implementation has evolved less rapidly. Though there is a trend towards "regionalization", where neighbouring states become involved[65], multilateral organizations and "traditional" state donors still account for the bulk of financing for peace agreement implementation. Newer actors include IFIs, DFIs and business actors. While IFIs remain limited in their engagement given their emphasis on fiscal sustainability and, typically, their lack of a legal mandate for funding peace implementation, there are some recent positive shifts.[66] In certain contexts, IFIs have become involved in post-conflict settings due to softer factors, such as receiving a request for involvement, and have stayed involved when internal capacities and interests for support existed. The role of business actors – including illicit, licit, domestic and international[67] – is similarly often ignored or misunderstood. Business actors have been "consistently marginalized and/or

64 Agnieszka Paczysnka, "'New' State Actors and Conflict-Affected States: Confronting Violence, Shifting Ambitions, and Adjusting Principles", *Frontiers in Political Science 3*, (2021); Agnieszka Paczynska, "Emerging donors and conflict-affected states", *The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019); Cedric de Coning and Charles T. Call. *Rising Powers & Peacebuilding: Breaking the Mold?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

65 See for example in Mozambique, Mali and South Sudan

66 For example in C.A.R.; International Monetary Fund, *The IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*, Policy Paper No. 2022/004 (2022).

67 Josie Lianna Kaye, "The business of peace and politics of inclusion: What role for local 'licit' and 'illicit' business actors in peace mediation?", (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2019).

excluded from the analyses by and strategies of peacekeepers, peacemakers and peacebuilders"[68], which also applies to the negotiation and implementation phases. While there are several examples of how business actors facilitated or even financed a peace process, e.g., by supporting the reintegration of former combatants[69], experts clearly outlined the limitations of this perspective. Instead of seeing them as cash providers, negotiation and implementation stakeholders should strategically analyse both their positive and negative impacts. A quote from an interviewee is telling in this regard:

"A company may offer money which will make the local UN people happy because it is funding to do what they do. But no-one looks at the negative impacts the same company may have in the same region, which may well cost them 10 times what the company gave."[70]

Thus, there is need to understand better how domestic or international, licit or illicit business actors can be integrated into war-to-peace transitions.

The different actors can choose from a range of mechanisms and modalities to coordinate and disburse funding for implementation. For example, foreign states can provide earmarked or unearmarked funding, which can then be allocated as budget support to host governments, as bilateral support to (I)NGOs or as contributions to joint mechanisms, such as Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs). Several interviewees highlighted that, despite its potential to build fiscal capacities in the long-term, foreign states often do not use budget support due to transparency and risk concerns. The spectrum of mechanisms gets even more diverse when we look beyond the narrow conceptualization of peace agreement funding and include activities geared towards reforming economies or supporting the transition more broadly. Donors can finance these activities using bonds and debt relief. On the coordination front, donor pledging conferences and Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (RPBAs) are frequent mechanisms to raise funds or coordinate funding.

Based on the involved actors' heterogeneity, procedural complexities and a large pool of possible mechanisms, complex and somewhat opaque funding structures emerge in support of peace agreements. Joint financing strategies, which reflect the different actor groups and strategically use different funding mechanisms, are often not formulated. In their absence, individualized efforts are likely to miss the window of opportunity to keep funding responsive to the peace process and create the necessary buy-in for other financial flows to take root. While some actors frequently engage in joint planning to a certain extent, e.g., by coordinating their funding through a MDTF, larger donors may abstain from this or continue to channel funding bilaterally.

Box 7: Zooming in on Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs)

An MDTF is a "multi-agency funding mechanism, designed to receive contributions from more than one donor (and often also the recipient government), that is held in trust by an appointed administrative agent".[71] Peace agreements are frequently linked to MDTFs: agreements may encourage or mandate their establishment or designate existing MDTFs to channel funding. Yet, the scope of MDTFs varies considerably. Some MDTFs are tasked to support entire peace agreements, some have sectoral competencies, and others are restricted to a specific location. Their hoped

68 Josie Lianna Kaye, Gerald Pachoud and Arthur Boutellis, "Including Business in Peace – An Agenda for Action", (Geneva: TrustWorks Global, 2021): 2.
69 Interview 35
70 Interview 11
71 Oliver Walton, *Helpdesk Research Report: Trust Funds in Fragile and Low Capacity States*, (UK: GSDRC, 2011), 1.

value lies in increased donor coordination, ensuring national ownership, overcoming front-loading issues, lowering administrative burdens and risk-sharing.[72] Moreover, MDTFs can serve as a platform for continued dialogue between critical stakeholders on how to operationalize the peace agreements and sequence the implementation.[73] However, these alleged benefits depend on the MDTF's precise institutional design, such as their inclusion of actors, the agreed rules for decision-making and factors of scope. The latter refers to how much of the total funding for peace agreements is channelled through the MDTFs, which shapes to what extent it can truly serve as a dialogue platform linked to the operationalization.[74]

3.2.2 Finding 5: Insufficient spaces are provided to operationalize peace agreements

Key takeaway

The operationalization of peace agreements is often insufficiently planned for and structured and is not approached as a continuation of the negotiation. This exposes the process to outside influences. Furthermore, the fact that implementation takes a long time, in which contexts change, calls for flexibility and the need to have a dialogue around this.

The implementation and its funding needs not only depend on the written agreement but also on how it is operationalized. Ideally, the operationalization is a continuation of the negotiation. In reality, it often occurs in an uncoordinated and unstructured way. This has several consequences. While the negotiation is an intimate and protected space including only a handful of actors, the implementation typically sees the involvement of a wider set of stakeholders. With details of the agreement not yet being defined, this provides an opportunity for actors to influence how the agreement is operationalized and thus shape the costs of its implementation. Although foreign states, for example, tend not to influence the content or wording of a peace agreement, the lack of structures guiding implementation creates spaces for them to (un) intentionally shape its operationalization. One interviewee highlighted how donors increasingly demanded Colombian stakeholders to speed up the implementation. This increased the workload for Colombian stakeholders, who continued to implement their priorities while in parallel responding to donors' requests. The risks here are twofold. Firstly, national actors may grow frustrated as they fear losing ownership of their peace process. Secondly, implementation funds may be used inefficiently if needs are not met, because they do not reflect donor priorities.

Moreover, peace processes typically unfold in highly volatile and dynamic settings. In contrast, implementation processes are lengthy – the Final Agreement in Colombia, for example, foresaw an implementation period of 10 years.[75] This, in turn, increases the likelihood that the operationalization takes place in a context that is different to the one in which the agreement was signed. Moreover, new needs and bottlenecks might arise. Peace agreements are thus just one crucial step in a process rather than a final milestone. This is not to say that its contents are not meaningful. Peace

72 Molloy, *Peace Agreements and Trust Funds*. For a comprehensive assessment of post-conflict UNDP- and WB-managed MDTFs, see also: World Bank Group, *Review of post-crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs)*, (Washington, D.C: World Bank Group, 2007)

73 This insight emerged from the case study interviews specifically in Colombia.

74 This is an observation from an MDTF in Colombia, which per decision-making rules gives national actors constant veto rights on which projects will be moved forward as part of the implementation phase. At the same time, there are three other MDTFs – which allows for some level of forum shopping – and a vast amount of aid, particularly from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) continues to be channelled bilaterally.

75 Caribe Afirmativo Corporation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *Guide about the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Colombia*, Análisis 1, (Friedrich Ebert Stifung, Caribe Afirmativo, 2017).

agreements act as important trust enablers and guiding documents. Yet, we find that there is a need to approach their operationalization somewhat flexibly, allowing them to remain aligned with the needs of the peace process. Another issue related to the duration of the implementation phase is that essential knowledge about the implicit understandings of an agreement may be lost. For example, in the Philippines:

"[...] a lot of time has passed since the negotiations took place. As the years go by the institutional memory fades. On the side of the MILF, you have a core group that is still around and which has been closely involved in the negotiations and further discussions, they generally recall what has been agreed. On the government side, most people involved are either retired or have moved to other positions, so there are different levels of involvement with this peace process."[76]

A structured approach to the operationalization of peace agreement provisions – through a negotiation party-driven forum that is ideally linked to financial resources – could thus facilitate dialogue and help maintain essential knowledge about the negotiation phase.

3.2.3 Finding 6: Implementation processes are insufficiently funded

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Key takeaway

Funding availability from different sources varies between different conflict contexts and is further affected by internal and external developments. This may result in financing reserved/planned for implementation being unexpectedly diverted to other activities. It is therefore essential to plan for different scenarios and strategically combine domestic and international financing. Moreover, a general donor fatigue regarding peace processes and the funding thereof can be observed.

Most implementation processes require some international funding. In part, this is due to many of the contexts examined in this research being classified as low- or lower-middle income.[77] Additionally, domestic funding for implementation in these contexts is particularly vulnerable to external shocks. For example, falling oil prices have affected the availability of domestic funds in Mali, Colombia and South Sudan in recent years. Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the ability of the Government of the Philippines, which already faced difficulties before the pandemic, to finance the implementation of the normalization annex entailing various aspects related to human security and development, including DDR. Increasing costs of DDR due to COVID-19 protection measures and a need to divert funds towards the public health response further compounded this. Although international actors often face similar challenges, interviewees highlighted how external funds should be used strategically when domestic money is limited, e.g., early on in the implementation or through co-financing arrangements.

We observe that international financing for implementation varies across contexts and follows no distinct pattern or rules. One might expect international financing to be more forthcoming in lower-income contexts. Yet, this not always the case, as evidenced by the substantial international support provided to the Final Agreement in Colombia. Similarly, we estimate that the Philippines received a higher excess ODA in the five years after its peace agreement ($709,000,000 – just over $6 per person over that time) than, e.g., Mali ($56,300,000 – just over $2.50 per person over that time).[78]

76 Interview 57

77 According to current World Bank classification: CAR, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan and Yemen are classified as low-income countries. The Philippines and Nepal are classified as lower middle-income countries, while Colombia and Libya are classified as upper middle-income countries. Northern Ireland is a high-income country. (Refer to: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519)

78 More details can be found on p.22 and Annex 2.

This suggests that financing is not just provided based on income levels. Confounding factors might be the host state's absorption capacities and donor trust in the process, as well as the communication around it. Yet, it may also be that lower-income countries opt for or are pressured into a less costly operationalization of a provision, in turn requiring less funding overall. In line with this, the interviews indicate diverging views regarding the sufficiency of available financing. In Yemen, for example, interviewees perceived that some United Nations and development agencies have sufficient funding available but struggle to spend it. Yet, other entities, such as the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM), are reportedly running out of money.[79] The inability to spend available funds, either due to absorption issues or lack of activities to implement, points towards the importance of looking at both the supply and the demand side of implementation funding.[80]

In general, however, there seems to be a decreasing willingness among international donors to fund peace agreements. This is evident when considering the lack of follow-through associated with fundraising instruments for implementation, such as needs assessments, joint assessment missions, RPBAs and donor pledging conferences. Even though financing needs may be identified and funds pledged, there is a discrepancy between what is promised and subsequently disbursed:

> "[W]e have seen quite often that the allocation and disbursement of money is not really adequate. You may [get] pledged 5 billion for a PA or post agreement development, the big Afghanistan conferences, but the follow-up is only 10-20 percent at the end of the day [...]".[81]

This decreasing willingness to fund is linked to several trends in peacebuilding. Firstly, there is an increasing number of partial peace agreements amidst fewer CPAs; a "peace by pieces" approach. The experience of South Sudan with the ARCSS and the R-ARCSS demonstrates this donor fatigue. Secondly, external donors seem to rarely release additional funding for the implementation but tend to adjust their existing programming instead. Thirdly, changing dynamics within a context, such as new conflicts or emerging humanitarian crises, may also unexpectedly detract funds set aside for implementation. For example, increasing violence of Jihadist and communal armed groups against Fulani and Dogon civilians in central Mali in 2016-17[82] attracted donor funding that was meant for implementation of the agreement that focused on the country's North. Finally, geopolitical changes and emerging crises in other contexts may affect donor countries' overall strategies and cause budget cuts in contexts that are not perceived as relevant enough.

Estimates of international expenditure for implementation align with these findings, even though understanding how much funding is dedicated to agreement implementation is difficult due to its opaque nature.[83] Figure 6 shows that, in the case of Mali (left) and the Philippines (right), the expected ODA follows the actually observed amounts of ODA inflows closely up until the signing of the peace agreement.[84] Specifically, they show that, in both cases, observed ODA is above the predicted amount in the period following the agreement, showing that ODA generally increases following the signing of a peace agreement.

79 Notably, UNVIM participated in the monitoring of the truce.
80 Find more on this in the next chapter.
81 Interview 15
82 See, e.g., International Crisis Group, *Reversing Central Mali's Descent into Communal Violence*, (2021).
83 To be able to more accurately calculate the costs of implementing peace and strengthening the analysis of, and advocacy for, implementation funding, there is a need for more diligent monitoring of expenditures.
84 The numbers were calculated using an approach called synthetic control, which allows for an estimation of expenditures related to peace agreement implementation by generating a simulated (predicted) amount of ODA that the country would have received if no peace agreement had been signed. Overlaying this with the actual ODA received, this approach captures the ODA "premium" a country receives after a peace agreement has been signed. Because synthetic control models work best when data is available for as many years as possible prior to the signing of a peace agreement (or other exogenous event) and requires availability of data also after this signing, this approach could only be conducted for the Philippines and Mali.



Figure 6: Real (solid line) and simulated (dashed line) series of ODA receipt in Mali (left) and Philippines (right) before and after the signing of peace agreements. Authors' own construction from data from OECD QWIDS Database.

In total, this suggests that the ODA "premium" in the Philippines, i.e., net ODA receipt in the five years following the peace agreement, equals approximately $140 million higher per year than the simulated series would suggest. In the case of Mali, the ODA "premium" is $11m on average. This suggests that, cumulatively, USD 709,000,000 of ODA premium in the Philippines and USD 56,300,000 in Mali[85] was dedicated to implementation over a five-year period. Dividing these figures by head of population and averaging across the two cases suggests an estimate of $1 -1.15 per capita per year having been spent on the implementation of those agreements. Given the well-known costs of conflict, these figures overall confirm the findings from the interviews that the marginal expenditure on peace agreement implementation is comparatively small. Over the same period, the total ODA in the Philippines and Mali was USD 5,760,000,000 and USD 388,500,000, respectively. By these calculations, only 12.3% of ODA received by the Philippines and 14.5% by Mali in the first five years after the peace agreement pertains directly to implementation. While this suggests a funding gap may be present, in line with the interview findings that donors often reallocate existing financing, it is plausible that other ODA beyond the "premium" was also dedicated to implementation.

More generally, while this suggests that the signing of a peace agreement may – at least in the medium term – bring additional ODA to a country, the proportional amounts of this additional support are small, both in the beneficiary countries and in contrast to ODA as a whole. This interacts with debates on prioritization in ODA spending, which plays a clear role in post-conflict settings. Redirecting additional funds to these settings could help overcome overall deficits in the field, reinforce progress towards more peaceful societies and do so with relatively minor reallocations of funds.

3.2.4 Finding 7: Implementation processes lack 'quality' funding

Key takeaway

Beyond how much funding is available, the usefulness of that money is essential. Peace agreement implementation can onset rapidly and involve politically risky activities. Funds that are inflexible, risk-averse, short-term and piecemeal could hinder the effective financing of implementation. Complex funding structures, made up of different funders with different requirements, further make it difficult for implementing actors to manage and use the funds.

85 This number increases to USD 84,800,000 excluding the trough in the first year after implementation.

On top of the lack of funding, many contexts experience an unsatisfactory quality of available funding. Both the supply ("funding availability") and the demand ("funding usability") side of implementation funding can make it less useful. Figure 7 portrays an overview of the three main factors determining the quality of existing funds.



Figure 7: Visualization of the different components of "quality" funding.

On the supply side, **timing** is essential. Funding should be available early on when the implementation starts. Various issues compromise the timely availability and disbursement of implementation financing. Domestic and donor funding is often limited immediately after an agreement is signed due to legislative obstructions, rigid budget cycles and a failure to plan ahead. The frequent disbursement delay associated with pledging conferences demonstrates this. Shortcomings related to timely funding availability may also occur with MDTFs set up for implementation. Despite their advantages, larger MDTFs often take long to set up. The Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) in the Philippines, for example, only became operational in 2021, although the Terms of Reference were signed in 2016:

"There was a lot of interest to put funding into the BNTF but that money was just sitting in embassies as the fund was not set up yet. Some funders, instead, designed a bilateral peace process assistance programme that worked directly with the government [...]"[86]

This meant that funding was either not disbursed or donors created bilateral programmes to do so, meaning that opportunities for disbursing more and coordinating funding through the fund were missed. It would therefore be useful to establishing flexible and more nimble mechanisms that can be operationalized quickly to support the early phases of implementation. An example that shows how this could be done is the Peace Support Facility (PSF) in Yemen, which contains a third "shadow" window storing funds for potential implementation (see box 8).

Box 8: Insights from Yemen: Contingency-planning for potential implementation

The PSF in Yemen was launched in 2019 to support the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, which was a partial agreement reached in late 2018 under the auspices of the Office of the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY). This facility has a three-window structure to (1) implement existing agreements (the Hodeidah agreement); 2) deliver activities coming out of track 2 initiatives that aim to catalyse the political process; and 3) provide funding to support the transitional arrangements "as and when the parties agree and post-peace agreement planning".[87] As such, the PSF combines funding for the peace process with funding for implementation of any resulting agreements.

The facility contains unearmarked funds that can be used in a way that is responsive to the developments in the peace process, pending approval of the board and

86 Interview 53
87 See https://www.undp.org/yemen/projects/peace-support-facility

steering committee. Window Three was described in interviews as *"a bit of a shadow window, kept in the drawer for a brighter future. And that was for possible transitional arrangements that would stem from the peace process. In that sense, more on the governance perspective rather than infrastructure. It was a placeholder for possible funding to support core government functions, including, for instance, security sector or economic reforms that the country would have needed after the peace agreement."*[88]

The second factor on the supply side are the funding characteristics. In particular, there seems to be insufficient long-term, risk-tolerant and flexible implementation funding. Moreover, funds are usually given for individual projects rather than the agreement as a whole. This piecemeal, short-term approach of project funding makes oversight and coordination complex. Thinking in terms of projects rather than the implementation process holistically also risks neglecting the sustainability of what is being funded.

"We think about money, this is my project and who will fund that. We don't think, if we want a sustainable health or justice system, then that's all about how do you sustainably finance that." [89]

This emphasizes the need for more flexible funding that is part of a larger financing strategy for implementation. Moreover, funding is not risk-tolerant enough, meaning risky provisions, such as restorative justice in Northern Ireland, may go underfunded. Yet, the example of philanthropies in Northern Ireland shows that even small amounts of risk-tolerant funding can be catalytic (see box 9).

Box 9: The catalytic role of philanthropic funding in Northern Ireland

During the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and a series of follow-on agreements in Northern Ireland, funding came from multiple sources. Significant government funds were channelled through the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), particularly through the various PEACE (PEACE I, II, III, IV and PLUS) programmes. Yet, a need arose for more funding streams with greater *"nimbleness and appetite for risk"*[90]. In this sense, private philanthropic organizations with a presence in Northern Ireland were able to fund things that the EU-related and official funds could not fund or were not funding.

This meant that some key needs identified by civil society, such as restorative justice and the reintegration of former combatants, could take place despite being essentially off-limits to some of the government donors, at least in the early implementation. Similarly, private philanthropies were able to fund work at Track II and Track III levels, the inputs to which and outcomes of which might not have been measurable in standard objective senses. This may have been due to differing reporting and evaluation standards. Ultimately, philanthropic funding supported projects designed to bring people together. In this way, private philanthropies filled gaps that were, or were perceived to be, present in the overarching state-led strategies. While this may have been beneficial, there are also risks, given that what is funded is determined by the analysis of the respective donors. This emphasizes the importance of coordinating activities.

Lastly, on the demand side, shortcomings may pertain to the usability of funding.

88 Interview 84
89 Interview 23
90 Interview 77

Pledged funds go unused due to a lack of absorptive capacity in the organizations or individuals charged with implementation. This may be the case, for example, when organizations are asked to submit proposals to receive funds and implement projects. Here, the funding landscape's increasing complexity and the donor's administrative guidelines, which are sometimes overly strict and complex, may implicitly favour larger international NGOs, multilateral agencies or other implementing agencies with the administrative capacities to apply for funding. On the flipside, this often leads to the exclusion of more 'local' actors, who are unable to satisfy these requirements, but could add an additional element of accountability to the government's implementation progress and could also further local ownership of the peace process. Yet, government agencies may also face difficulties in transparently managing their budgets or budget support. It therefore seems crucial for donor funding to be complemented with technical expertise and capacity-building elements, and for administrative hurdles to be lowered, which could help address some of these shortcomings.

3.2.5 Finding 8: Implementation funding is distributed unequally across provisions

Key takeaway
Some provisions typically attract more funding than others. This is based on political priorities of those providing funds as well as differing levels of provision visibility. While host states are primarily interested in serving their constituents, external donors are usually interested in demonstrating quick results and thereby increasing their visibility. This leads to cherry-picking and an uneven financing distribution across provisions and puts the overall vision of the peace agreement at risk.

The transformation of an agreement into concrete actions is an important step for negotiating parties to show commitment to the peace process and foster trust. Yet, it emerges from the interviews that different actor motivations to fund the implementation of certain provisions leads to an unequal distribution of funding across the agreement.

For external donors, on one hand, agreement provisions leading to highly visible, quick-impact and easily quantifiable activities seem to be more popular to fund. Many interviewees referred to the prestige that comes with funding these provisions, as well as to the strengthened accountability vis-à-vis donor states' parliaments. On the other hand, funding allocation is linked to donors' technical expertise and thematic niche areas. This may mean that elements of peace agreements that do not reflect the priorities or expertise of a participating donor could end up being neglected.

Similar considerations play into the decisions of host states to fund select parts of peace agreements. In addition, decision-making about what is actually implemented may depend on considerations about upcoming elections and the goal of remaining in power. As one interviewee, referring to Colombia and the Philippines, put it,

> "What is the ultimate goal of a peace process? Government officials would want to be re-elected. Would you alienate your electorate base by borrowing money for an area that most voters would prefer to forget about? For a large portion of the electoral base, the conflict is something that they may watch on the television, not something that they would experience [...]"[91]

91 Interview 62

In Colombia, for example, the government's ability to spend was initially constrained, because elections had to take place after the agreement's signing. Similarly, elections and a change in government may also lead to shifting priorities and cherry-picking in terms of implementation funding and to a lacking overarching political vision for the implementation of the peace. After re-election, the government focused on implementing the Territorially-Focused Development Plans (PDETs) and neglected other important parts of the agreement, such as the chapter on illicit drugs.

While it is difficult to generalize which provisions are easier or harder to fund, we can still make some observations. Among the components that are more easily funded, interviewees listed security-related provisions, such as the early phases of the DDR process and provisions related to institution-building, such as transitional justice, capital infrastructure and assistance with basic services. The characteristics of these provisions correspond with the interests of actors, as stated above; they are all highly visible, usually lead to quantifiable results and overlap with the priorities and interests of participating donors. In contrast, provisions that are more difficult to fund include the reintegration phase of DDR, perceived 'soft' provisions relating to gender and women's issues, education and human rights, and provisions that aim to build relationships and transform society. In addition to being less visible, these provisions entail potentially high costs (e.g., reintegration) and may only yield results in the longer term (e.g., capacity-building for civil society or education).

Two aspects of peace agreements provoked contradictory reactions regarding implementation funding: implementation monitoring and DDR. On implementation monitoring, some interviewees, for example referring to Colombia, emphasized that monitoring is difficult to fund. The entity charged with monitoring the implementation of the Final Agreement in Colombia initially struggled to raise funds leading to an ad hoc, patchwork approach to financing:

"From day one, they had to run around […]. First, they got a little funding from the university, then from the US State Department, and from there […] some funding from UN, and the EU, and then from the Bishops' association in Colombia […]. It was ad hoc and very little of it, and they had to spend a lot of energy securing that funding."[92]

Consequently, precious time and human resources had to be diverted to fundraising instead of focusing exclusively on implementation monitoring. This lack of funding seems to be caused by inattention to funding monitoring during the negotiation phase and by a failure to anchor it in the peace agreement. In other contexts, such as South Sudan, monitoring is one of few elements that donors are willing to fund, arguably because this is one of the few activities that is not considered politically risky and unsafe. This illustrates that whether a provision is easy or difficult to fund is strongly context-dependent.

DDR seems to be a very peculiar and multi-layered aspect as well. While it should theoretically attract high levels of funding, considering its relevance from a security perspective, it can also be highly political in some contexts. Like other security arrangements, DDR is complex and includes different phases, stakeholders and funding sources. The early phases, i.e., disarmament and demobilization, usually receive sustained funding from donors who are keen to participate in these important and highly visible activities. In contrast, the reintegration phase is a particularly costly and long-term investment, which transcends financial volumes of individual donors and consequently often lacks appropriate funding. This illustrates the difficulty of coordinating and sequencing funding from different sources over a longer time. This

92 Interview 18

lack of funding, in particular for the reintegration phase, is concerning, as it could risk providing an unviable livelihood alternative to former combatants who may be incentivized to take up arms again.

Interestingly, in our interviews, we see little consistent evidence emerge on key issues in the literature, such as support for the implementation of processes that tackle gender and other intersectional dynamics. This is despite our questionnaire framework having been designed to create the space to reflect on these issues. In the absence of significant data in the interviews on these concerns, it is difficult to be certain exactly why this emerges. On one hand, despite the known importance of these issues in the wider literature,[93] this finding could reflect that structural power dynamics continue to have an impact in "live" settings. Alternatively, it could reflect that these issues tend to be difficult to fund. Donors that tend to prefer visible items or less "political" aspects might, by default, avoid supporting some of the key processes that can build gender inclusion into the process. Alternatively, of course, there could be more prosaic explanations as to why such issues were not raised in the interviews. While beyond the scope of this preliminary study, it appears clear that key issues in the literature, such as gender and intersectional elements, require further dedicated attention to provide a holistic understanding of funding distribution.

3.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The models presented in Section 2.3 imply at least three points:

1. There are potential deviations in preferences over implementation between those who brokered an agreement and those who are charged with (funding) its implementation.

2. As the agreement is often signed before implementation takes place, implementation need not follow plans laid out in that document; further, within a certain tolerance, donors can seek to maximize their own outcomes, rather than that of the whole process.

3. Due to the sequencing of the phases, negotiation parties should be forward-looking, forming expectations about implementation before signing an agreement.

This is supported by empirical observation. Results (6) - (8) speak of a clear divergence in the preferences of donors and other parties. These findings show clear signs that, in some ways, (the funding of) implementation is suboptimal for some parties in the process. Due to budget constraints and misaligned preferences, what is implemented appears to be insufficient in scale and quality. This satisfies the idea of the models that key actors have divergent preferences. Finding (8) further, speaks of the potential that the preferences of donors – the agent – can dominate. We also show support for all four hypotheses as outlined in Section 2.3.3. The main implication of H¬1 is that we should see variation in how highly specified implementation plans are across agreements, which we see in Findings (1) and (2). The case of Northern Ireland, where a deliberate decision was made for the agreement to be "constructively ambiguous" on implementation, due to the difficulty of reaching any agreement, also speaks to H2 and H3. At the same time, even at that point in time, there seemed to be

93 Christine Bell and Kevin McNicholl. "Principled pragmatism and the 'inclusion project': implementing a gender perspective in peace agreements." *feminists@ law* 9, no. 1 (2019); Jacqui True and Yolanda Riveros-Morales. "Towards inclusive peace: Analysing gender-sensitive peace agreements 2000–2016." *International Political Science Review* 40, no. 1 (2019): 23-40.

understanding among the actors of the potential problems this might create further down the line. That such problems arose, going so far as to necessitate additional agreements, speaks further to H3 and H4¬. More generally, these hypotheses are supported by Findings (3) and (4), which show the difficulty of planning and coordinating actions during the implementation phase.

These models do not predict all the findings, however. For example, the models are not clear on why insufficient space is found to operationalize peace agreements (Finding 5). Other findings are not uniquely explained by the models. Findings (1) and (2) could be explained by **dynamic consistency problems** – the risk that it is not rational to implement in the implementation phase what was rational to demand during the negotiation phase. Findings (2) and (3) suggest issues in planning between the phases, while Findings (7) and (8) indicate (weak) flow of information, which could be indicative of **coordination problems**, which arise under incomplete information. This suggests that better decisions could be reached than those that are made; and that an approach to doing so should be based on facilitating a better flow of information (and associated better relationships) between the involved parties.

These findings, therefore, show that it is both useful and limiting to think of peace agreements in the context of **contract theory**. In particular, Findings (3) and (5) suggest this is a simplification of reality – not least because it implies constant renegotiation going forward. Finding (4) strongly suggests that implementation remains highly political. Consequently, thinking of peace agreements as contracts could be one of the reasons why space is seldom found to formalize the ongoing political (negotiation) processes during implementation. Rather than seeking incentives for negotiations to specify more "complete contracts" or stronger "enforcement mechanisms", therefore, effort might be better spent on building these implementation institutions.

4 Synthesis and recommendations

4.1 SYNTHESIS

This research starts by outlining two conceptualizations of peace processes. First, there is the linear model which thinks of peace processes as two distinct phases where the phase of mediating and negotiating a peace agreement is followed by its subsequent implementation phase after an agreement is reached. Second, there is the iterative model, which depicts peace processes as starting off with a primary mediation and negotiation phase, but where negotiations do not finish with the signing of a peace agreement. Instead, they are continued throughout the agreement implementation phase. Each conceptualization can help in its own way to think through the risks that the transition from a negotiation to the implementation of a peace agreement may bring. While the iterative model may be a more accurate reflection of an ideal, key features distinguish the negotiation and implementation phases, including a turnover of actors and parties involved, showing the need to still think of the phases as separate in some ways.

More generally, our findings confirm that the signing of a peace agreement is just the beginning of a long, complex and highly political process that is likely to necessitate continued dialogue between the main stakeholders. Particularly due to the political nature of the implementation phase and the ongoing negotiation this implies that while contract theory is a useful lens to think through the transition from negotiation to implementation, it is an incomplete and potential limiting tool if it is solely relied upon. Implementation funding sits at the critical juncture between negotiation and implementation, where what has been negotiated is translated and operationalized into implementation actions that need costing and budgeting. As a pioneering investment in conflict-affected fragile countries, peace agreement implementation funding can set such countries on a positive trajectory towards stability and peace. This in turn contributes to other investments and financial flows follow suit in the post-conflict setting, including FDI and remittances. Therefore, it is important to get this critical investment right, by alerting and introducing its relevance already during the negotiation and then approaching it holistically during the implementation.

Our research suggests that there is a trade-off between the negotiation and the implementation phases. Quite apart from implementation (funding), peace agreements are difficult to reach. There is often a need to remain ambiguous about precise implementation requirements to ensure that the agreement can be reached at all. Even if implementation processes can be well defined during the negotiation, there is no guarantee that what it was rational to negotiate before the agreement is signed remains optimal afterwards; and further, no guarantees that even previously promised funding will be forthcoming. In this respect, it should be no surprise that peace agreements vary in how, if at all, implementation funding is addressed in the written text (Finding 1); and that there are seldom incentives to discuss implementation funding in detail (Finding 2). Mediators do not hold the necessary agenda-setting power; negotiating parties are often preoccupied with the content of the peace agreements rather than with particulars such as implementation funding; and the international community is not sufficiently involved in the negotiation phase to be able to influence an agreement and the funding of its implementation. As a result of this, negotiation stakeholders, as a collective, insufficiently plan for continued dialogue beyond the moment of signing (Finding 3). Our research finds that implementation is seen as a technical follow-up of what is decided at the negotiation table, which differs from the highly politicized reality. The structures to support the ongoing (political) negotiations this implies are often entirely absent from agreements. This provides a logical point of intervention. Moreover, the importance of personal trust relationships is frequently underestimated.

Moving towards implementation, our research confirms that peace agreements lack coordinated funding efforts (Finding 4). In addition, insufficient spaces are provided during the implementation to operationalize peace agreements (Finding 5). With details of the agreement not yet being defined, this provides an opportunity for actors to influence how the agreement is to be operationalized, thereby shaping implementation, but opportunities are often missed. Moreover, peace processes typically unfold in highly volatile and dynamic settings. In absence of continued dialogue spaces, the peace process, including implementation, risks becoming detached from new realities and emerging needs.

The availability of implementation funding varies significantly across contexts, following no easily distinguishable pattern, but are frequently insufficiently funded (Finding 6). In part, this relates to donor fatigue and, in part, because external donors seem to rarely release additional funding for the implementation and instead tend to adjust existing programming. On top of the lack of funding, many contexts experience an unsatisfactory quality of funding (Finding 7). Funding is often not disbursed in time, particularly in the early stages of implementation. Moreover, there seems to be insufficient long-term, risk-tolerant and flexible implementation funding. In terms of the allocation of funding, we find that funding is distributed unequally across provisions (Finding 8). Some provisions typically attract more funding than others based on the political priorities of those providing funds as well as differing levels of provision visibility. For host states, decision-making about what is implemented may depend on considerations about upcoming elections, the goal to remain in power and the aim to serve their own constituencies. For donors, the political sensitivities surrounding provisions, their alignment with priorities, whether they lend themselves to quickly demonstrating results, and whether they are visible, are some of the factors that make some provisions more attractive to fund.

Box 10: Summary of Findings

Addressing implementation financing during the negotiation phase

- Finding 1) Agreements vary in whether and how funding is addressed in the written text
- Finding 2) Negotiation stakeholders are not incentivized to discuss implementation funding in detail
- Finding 3) Negotiation stakeholders insufficiently plan for dialogue beyond the signing

The financing of the implementation phase

- Finding 4) Peace agreements lack coordinated funding efforts
- Finding 5) Insufficient spaces are provided to operationalize peace agreements
- Finding 6) Implementation processes are insufficiently funded
- Finding 7) Implementation processes lack ‘quality’ funding
- Finding 8) Implementation funding is distributed unequally across provisions

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on these findings, we identify key areas for potential intervention of mediators, negotiating parties and donors.

Recommendation 1

There is a need to build, support, and reinforce the institutions that support the transition from negotiation to implementation and that are present during the implementation phases. A dedicated organization (alongside existing complementary institutions and national efforts) which has some financing capacity but, also, significant technical capacities could support this work, both by providing material guarantees underpinning the implementation phase and by providing support – and when necessary, expertise – to the operationalization architecture.

Establishing such an organization (alongside existing complementary institutions such as the Peacebuilding Fund, UNDP, the World Bank, and IMF) builds on the understanding that a peace process should be approached with a holistic understanding, recognizing that different phases interact, overlap and influence each other. Consequently, there is a need for supporting institutions and infrastructure for all stages of the process, not just during the negotiation phase. This could include, for example, key donor groups that pool expertise and funds towards these goals, like those processes that exist to support the negotiation phase.

While it may make sense for this organization to have some budgetary oversight, such as the management of pooled funds, its primary work should be focused on the capabilities and capacities that should be housed within it. Its overarching aim should focus on overcoming the key problems that our research shows are present in the current implementation "architecture" – in particular, the problems that can arise due to step changes, such as turnover in involved staff, between phases in the process. This is designed to ensure continuity in the process, while also ensuring that changes in preferences and incentives over time and within this transition are well-managed. Its more general purpose is to support the creation of the architecture and structures that are needed to successfully bridge the changes that take place between the negotiation and implementation phases, and to support the creation of the frameworks assisting in the ongoing negotiations over the operationalization and implementation of the agreement. On one hand, this means that this organization should have centralized capacities and oversight of a number of processes, including access to experts, facilitators and support staff who can draw from standardized approaches and plans. On the other hand, it also needs to recognize the complexities, heterogeneities and uniqueness of each situation in which it works. This means that this organization should have specific expertise, relevant to the context in which implementation will take place; should possess the capacity to resource and restructure processes as alliances and alignments change; and should be able to embed itself within multi-actor situations.

This recommendation captures the facts that there are insufficient planning structures currently available in peace implementations and, specifically, that little space is found to "translate" agreements into workable "processes" for implementation. This occurs, particularly, due to the complex political situations in which they take place and the implication that implementation is, in part, an ongoing negotiation process. More generally, this organization would fit in an environment where there tend to be specific facilities founded for specific agreements, without centralized oversight and with limited opportunity for learning within and between processes. It should provide some centralized capacity to define the fundamental structures needed and, where possible, to support the fixed costs associated with putting these structures in place.

We also recommend mediators and negotiating parties to:
— Consider that implementation success strongly depends on the processes' initial and continued ripeness.
— Involve actors in the process that allow for a continuous and coherent process.
— Proactively seek to integrate financial flows reaching conflict-affected contexts beyond specific implementation funding. This can be done through an active communication strategy targeted at IFIs, DFIs and relevant business actors to keep them informed, build their trust and understand their needs and interests.

In addition, we encourage donors to:
— Consider the interrelatedness of the negotiation and implementation phases in their funding choices, by ensuring a mid- to long-term perspective in the appointment of key staff and resource people and in the building-up of relationships with other donors as well as with the negotiating parties and mediators.
— Create synergies between implementation funding and the wider financial flows that reach conflict-affected contexts. Among others, this could be done by supporting mediators in strengthening the catalytic potential of implementation funding by co-designing the strategic communication with IFIs, DFIs and business actors.

Recommendation 2
There should be professionalization of the architecture that can support, during the negotiation phase, the setup of the necessary post-agreement architecture to allow for continued dialogue around operationalization and implementation of the agreement. The organization discussed under point one could provide the backbone and the continuity for the professionalization of the architecture.

A key finding of our research shows the limitation of thinking of implementation only as the technocratic operationalization of the text of a peace agreement. The political reality is much more complex and might go so far as suggesting that a full specification of implementation during the negotiation phase might be suboptimal. Rather, ongoing dialogue is needed to respond to the changing reality in which implementation support takes place. While it may be politically complex, as well as suboptimal, to reach agreements on specific implementation items, our results show the need for architecture to support the ongoing talks that deliver implementation. Expert support should be given during the negotiation phase on the design of these supporting frameworks, so that agreements can specify how implementation decisions will be made, without needing to specify the implementation items themselves, nor who will fund them. Like the process that has professionalized the negotiation and mediation field in recent years, there is a need to professionalize the processes that support the transition from negotiation to implementation.

In this regard, we suggest that mediators, negotiating parties and experts:
— Make sure that the post-agreement architecture providing a platform for continued dialogue is set up in a way that ensures that negotiating parties continue to be in the lead. While a link to the donor community should be made, donor interests should not take over.
— Make sure that the composition of involved actors is adjusted to the needs of

the implementation phase and the context. Hence, the post-agreement architecture might also consider including civil society actors, which could strengthen the legitimacy and ownership of the peace agreement within the respective country and its population.

In this regard, donors could:
— Budget to support the operation of the post-agreement architecture during the implementation phase, e.g., through Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) overseen by a dedicated organization, while being sensitive to the fact that explicit financial commitment for the implementation phase can create expectations with negotiating parties and might already affect the negotiation process.
— Contribute technical expertise and capacity-building of negotiating parties bilaterally and through new structures during the negotiation on the setup of this architecture, while remaining sensitive to not undermining the negotiating parties' ownership of the process.

Recommendation 3

Plans and frameworks should be put in place to navigate the natural turnover in key participants in processes, to maintain trust and good relations across as well as within phases. Institutionalized and time-consistent trust could be strengthened by involving the centralized organization noted in Recommendation 1.

We find implications that interpersonal relationships are a driver of successful outcomes, but these relationships can be threatened by the nature of diplomatic missions. This can mean, for example, that an important individual's mandate comes to an end as a particular phase of the process does. Frameworks should be put in place to minimize the disruption that can be caused by such changes, without disrupting the diplomatic mandate model as a whole. This allows for new trusting relationships to be built in the presence of the previous relationships, for example. Timelines should work towards ensuring as much continuity in staff as possible between phases.

In this regard, we recommend that mediators and negotiating parties:
— Consider a continued mandate for mediators, or some of their support staff, who maintain a relationship of trust with the negotiating parties and planning organizations, beyond the signing of the agreement. This could, for example, be achieved by creating a Special Envoy mandate allowing the mediator to remain engaged. This Special Envoy could then be involved in the post-agreement architecture, to facilitate further dialogue on implementation.
— Encourage, as far as possible, the continued involvement of key members of the negotiating teams and/or their support staff, such as National Advisors, during the implementation and involve them in the post-agreement architecture.
— Maintain the trust created during the negotiation, keep track of implicit understandings of the agreement and make sure that these issues are addressed during implementation. To do this, a roadmap outlining when and how gaps might arise could be discussed during the negotiation phase. A centralized organization could act as a guardian to this roadmap, providing pre-agreed financing if parties stick to the milestones established.

In this regard, donors could:
— Ensure knowledge transfer within a donor agency from mediation/negotiation teams to implementation/development teams. This could be done through closer interaction between staff working on the different phases of the peace

process, e.g., as part of 'peace process working groups' that meet regularly to exchange information, or through better management of staff rotation, e.g., through detailed briefing/handover reports that might draw on confidential internal minutes of the negotiation.
— Ensure transfer of knowledge, including on implicit understandings, across different donors through, a donor coordination forum involving different donors focusing on different parts of the peace process.

Recommendation 4
The architecture to support implementation should include specific funding structures that can respond to rapidly emerging needs from ongoing negotiations.

There is a need to increase the quantity of funds that can be made available in both a timely and flexible way, and, in particular, that can respond to the needs that might emerge rapidly from ongoing negotiations around implementation. This could include fixed multi-donor budgets that cover a particular period of the ongoing negotiation that can, within institutional and legal limits, be spent as negotiation allows. This enables the support of set periods of the overall implementation, rather than specific implementation projects.

In this regard, mediators and negotiating parties could:
— Encourage donors to formulate flexible financing plans for agreement implementation. This can be facilitated by exchanging with the above suggested donor coordination forum by jointly developing different scenarios. Such an exchange could take place by designating one donor representative as messenger between the negotiation parties and the broader donor group.
— Encourage, if the negotiation or agreement envisions a trust fund for implementation, its establishment during the negotiation phase to ensure it is operational for early implementation. If already active during the negotiation phase, this mechanism could fund confidence-building measures or capacity-building of the parties for implementation.
— Sensitize the negotiating parties to the realities of donor requirements and budget cycles in making funds available in order to avoid creating false expectations.
— Designate a single entity charged with supporting the financial aspects of implementation funding for increased streamlining of available funds. This entity should strategically think through how to effectively combine different sources of funding and conduct fundraising activities. Depending on the capacity in the context, this entity could be led by external (like the Peace Secretariat in Mozambique) or domestic actors (like the Fundo Colombia en Paz in Colombia), although a continued ownership of negotiating parties is crucial. Additionally, like the Peace Secretariat in Mozambique, this entity could be linked to the post-agreement architecture outlined above and thereby act as an important linkage between ongoing dialogue and available implementation funding.
— Strategically engage donors with different niche and expertise areas to ensure better distribution of financing across a specific agreement. Private actors, such as philanthropies, could be engaged to fill gaps and provide funding for risky activities that traditional state donors are more hesitant to finance.
— Ensure that intersectional issues, such as those pertaining to gender, women, youth and marginalized groups, e.g., those in minority ethnicities and those from more impoverished backgrounds, are included in these processes. This means considering the intersectional and gender issues of the peace agreement itself

and what this implies for the needs of such groups in the implementation. In turn, this entails a need to ensure that all voices, including those of women, gender minorities, young people and those of individuals otherwise marginalized in society, are presents in discussions around the operationalization of the agreement and in ongoing negotiations pertaining to what is implemented and when. This reflects a need to ensure that gender dynamics are being addressed fairly within the process.

In this regard, we suggest that donors:

— Engage in financial planning and budgeting for different scenarios and be ready to release funds once needed, especially in the early phases of implementation. Again, this could occur through the suggested donor coordination forum that is kept up to date, e.g., through a designated representative, on the status of the negotiations and enabled to plan financially for different scenarios.
— Contribute financially to existing funding mechanisms, rather than creating parallel ones, to help simplify the financing landscape and create synergies and complementarities with different funding sources. If no feasible mechanism exists, donors should encourage the establishment of a peace process-specific funding mechanism that is led by the negotiating parties.
— Approach the implementation of a peace agreement with flexibility and, accordingly, make sure available funding is flexible and responsive to changing needs throughout the implementation phase.
— Coordinate their involvement in financially supporting a peace process to ensure that funds provided are complementary and respond to the priorities of the process. This can again take place through a donor coordination forum.
— Consider funding activities that do not directly lead to quantitatively observable outcomes, but that contribute to long-term changes in the context.
— Consider increasing the timeline of budgets from short-term to longer-term and multi-year support.
— Ring-fence support and financing for implementation that addresses the gendered aspects of the peace agreement and that reflects women's issues in implementation. This implies a need to ensure that gendered issues are being addressed fairly within implementation support.

5 Conclusion

In this research, we explore two related questions. First, we examine how implementation of a peace agreement and its funding are addressed during the negotiation phase that leads to that agreement. Second, we study how the implementation phase is financed. Initially, we constructed two models for how peace processes unfold: a linear process separated into distinct phases and an iterative process that sees continued dialogue throughout. Our findings emphasize that the iterative model, requiring an ongoing dialogue on the agreement and its implementation, better represents the reality of contemporary peace processes. Yet, in terms of actors involved, the needs of the process and other considerations, there remains a clear differentiation between some aspects of the phases, suggesting that the first model remains conceptually useful. Overall, however, these observations suggest a need for renewed focus on the interlinkages – both temporally and conceptually – between the two phases.

This iterative view on peace processes has implications for how implementation and its financing should be conceived. While financing problems are considered technical and, therefore, as elements that have technical solutions, many of the issues we have drawn out suggest that funding is highly political and thus requires novel approaches to building a shared global infrastructure for guiding and funding the transition from conflict to peace. We thus propose to establish a centralized and dedicated organization (e.g., "The Peace Implementation Fund"), which has the mandate, the expertise, the reputation and the resources to strengthen the transition from war to peace, while respecting the idiosyncrasies of each process.

We establish that peace agreement financing is an essential pioneering investment that paves the way for other financial flows in post-conflict contexts. Yet, more research is needed to examine how IFIs, such as the World Bank and IMF, considering that their mandates restrict their contributions to agreement implementation, can be more effectively integrated into these efforts – or indeed how a novel Peace Implementation Fund (for example, managed by and at the United Nations), could support, professionalize and fund these efforts and how this could be integrated with other UN bodies with similar aims, such as the Peacebuilding Fund.

We also demonstrate that the progression from negotiation to implementation and, more specifically, the shift from the pre-agreement negotiation to the post-agreement continued dialogue is at times not directly recognized and thus insufficiently planned for. Future research could draw lessons on how negotiation stakeholders can best manage this transition and, building on insights generated herein regarding the positive example of Mozambique, what the institutional frameworks to support continued dialogue around the implementation and its financing should look like.

Lastly, given that this report is situated at the intersection of the negotiation and implementation phases, future research could look beyond the implementation. Considering the funding distribution issues regarding provisions, future research could examine which provisions are most critical to implement at which points. This could aid in developing a "ranking of criticality", to be used to guide how financing can be better sequenced and distributed across the different provisions contained in peace agreements.

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Annexes

ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW LIST

INTERVIEW CODE	INTERVIEWEE
1	Madhav Joshi, Kroc Institute for International and Peace Studies
2	Sebastian Kratzer, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
3	Thomas Herzberg
4	Anonymous
5	Sven Schneider, Stabilisation Platform, GIZ
6	Anonymous
7	Anonymous
8	Julian Hottinger
9	Cate Buchanan, Athena Consortium
10	Elisabeth Ibscher, Peacebuilding Expert
11	Gerald Pachoud, Managing Partner, Pluto Advisory
12	Visiting Professor, College of Europe
13	Henk-Jan Brinkman, United Nations
14	Yomna El-Bakli, CCCPA
15	Günther Bächler, Mediator, Swiss FDFA
16	Laurie Nathan, Kroc Institute for International and Peace Studies
17	Anonymous
18	Håvard Nygard, Director of Knowledge, NORAD
19	Anonymous
20	Manuel de Rivera, European Union
21	Anonymous
22	Dr. Jago Salmon, Head of UN Coordination Office (Bosnia and Herzegovina), United Nations
23	Rachel Scott, OECD
24	Senior Advisor on Ceasefires and Security Arrangements in the Mediation Support Unit, United Nations DPPA
25	Asbjorn Wee, World Bank Group
26	Anonymous
27	Josie Lianna Kaye, Founder and Director, TrustWorks Global
28	Anonymous
29	Philipp Lustenberger, Co-Head of Mediation Program, swisspeace
30	Anonymous
31	Molly Melin, Associate Professor International Relations
32	Stine Lehman-Larsen, Director for Engagement, Dialogue and Process Design / Deputy Executive Director, European Institute of Peace
33	Luca Willig, swisspeace

INTERVIEW CODE	INTERVIEWEE
34	Emmanuelle Diehl, Senior Program Officer, swisspeace
35	Urko Aiartza, Senior Advisor on Peace Mediation, European Institute of Peace
36	Jared Kotler, Team Leader for Colombia, United Nations DPPA
37	PY Monette
38	Anonymous
39	Alexander Hug, Head of Mission, ICMP Iraq Program
40	Pontus Ohrstedt, Head of Unit for Support to Peace Processes, Folke Bernadotte Institute
41	Anonymous
42	Human Security Advisor
43	Aly Verjee, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg
44	Martin Jaggi, Former Head of International Cooperation, SDC Colombia
45	Anonymous
46	RJMEC Project Manager
47	Abdoul Kassim Fomba, Coordinator, ThinkPeace
48	Anonymous
49	Dan Schreiber, Policy Analyst, Crises and Fragility, Global Policy and Partnerships, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD
50	Alice Beccaro, Coordinator, United Nations Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sustaining Peace in Colombia
51	Former World Bank staff member
52	Sahar Ammar, Program Officer, swisspeace
53	Michael Frank Alar, Independent Consultant on Dialogues, Conflict Transformation and Peace Processes
54	Felix Tusa, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
55	Amb. Mette Sunnergren, Swedish Foreign Office Mozambique
56	Personal Envoy of the SG for Mozambique
57	Civil Society Contact
58	Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of South Sudan
59	Caroline Delaney, High Commissioner, High Commission of Canada to Mozambique
60	Aoife Murphy, Head of Office, Peace Process Secretariat Mozambique
61	Member of diplomatic community in Juba
62	Marcelo Fabre, Senior Conflict and Violence Specialist, World Bank Group
63	Kathrin Däpp, Senior Program Officer Mediation, swisspeace
64	Fillip Warnants
65	Senior Advisor, United Nations
66	Member of the Peacebuilding Fund
67	Franziska Seethaler, United Nations
68	Peter Salisbury
69	Anonymous

INTERVIEW CODE	INTERVIEWEE
70	Miriam Coronel Ferrer, then Government Peace Implementation Panel Chair, Government of the Philippines Peace Implementing Panel for the GPH-MILF Peace Accord
71	Yagya Bikram Shahi, Devsuits
72	Benjamin Konstanzer
73	Anonymous
74	Santosh Bisht, Former Deputy Chief Technical Advisor, GIZ-NPTF
75	Temur Sharapov, Programme Management Officer – Communications, MINUSMA Stabilization & Recovery Section / Trust Fund Unit
76	Attaye Ag Mohamed, Chef de Delegation de la CMA au CSA
77	Martin O'Brien, Director, Social Change Initiative
78	Abdulghani Al-Iryani, Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
79	Amb. Endre Stiansen, Norwegian Embassy South Sudan
80	Dir. Farrah Grace V. Naparan, Head of Secretariat, Government of the Philippines Peace Implementing Panel for the GPH-MILF Peace Accord
81	Anonymous
82	Research Consultant working for local and international organizations
83	Dr. Avila Kilmurray
84	Alberto Natta, former United Nations staff
85	Anonymous
86	Jean-Pierre Lacroix, USG-DPO
87	Professor Brandon Hamber, John Hume and Thomas P. O'Neill Chair in Peace, Ulster University
88	Official, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Ireland
89	Official, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Ireland

ANNEX 2: ESTIMATING PEACE AGREEMENT EXPENDITURES

Introduction
This Annex looks into the quantitative aspects of the financing for peace agreement implementation to determine: **What has been spent on standard aspects of implementation?** Answering this seemingly simple question is prone to a range of difficulties. On one level, accounting tends to be insufficient on the side of both donors and recipients, making it difficult to track transfers clustered around this particular purpose. On the other, definitional issues arise as well. We can think of at least four categories of spending pertaining to the implementation of peace agreements. The first are those that are specified in a peace agreement and are, therefore, inherently linked to implementation; the second are activities that are not specified in the agreement but are clearly linked to implementation; the third are more general pro-peace projects that may or may not be linked to implementation or may have taken place anyway; and the fourth are projects that may reinforce peace but where peace is not the principal goal. Consequently, measuring how much is spent on implementation is prone definitional complexities, as well as more prosaic data source concerns.

In this Annex, we discuss some approaches taken to attempt to measure the extent of financing spent on implementing peace agreements. Expenditures for implementation, broadly, can be broken down into different "chapters", and values for these chapters can be estimated. Our approach comprises two separate estimates. The first is based on the expenditure associated with specific projects identified to (likely) have contributed to implementation. The second estimate is based on the entire Official Development Assistance (ODA) that the country in question has received since the peace agreement was signed, which we treat in two ways. Firstly, we simply look at all ODA received in the years after a peace agreement is signed. Secondly, based on two case studies, Mali and the Philippines, where the data are sufficiently structured, we construct a synthetic control approach which looks at the ODA "premium" that is received after reaching an agreement.

Scope
While the responsibility for implementing peace agreements lies with the states that conclude them, it is recognized that a lot of funding for these provisions will be provided by international donors.[94] In line with this, the OECD States of Fragility (2018) report highlights the critical contributions that external donor aid makes to implementation, even if it may only comprise a small amount of the overall financing in some cases.[95] Indeed, out of eight contexts with peace agreements examined in this study, six contain provisions explicitly referring to international donor support, including financing, for at least some parts of the implementation[96]. This section of the study focuses on the contribution of donor funding to peace agreement implementation.

This exercise focuses on some of the case study contexts examined in the qualitative study. These cases vary in terms of the length of their implementation phases. Therefore, we conduct the research with a focus on the **five years following the signing of a peace agreement.** In this timeframe, many peace deals fall apart and countries relapse into conflict.[97] Additionally, the overall impression from the qualitative

94 Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, "Follow the money: Assessing women, peace, and security through financing for gender-inclusive peace". *Review of International Studies* 48, 4, (2022).
95 OECD. *States of Fragility Report*. (Paris: OECD, 2018). Available at: https://www.oecd.org/governance/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm
96 South Sudan, Mali, CAR, Philippines, Colombia and Mozambique
97 Sebastian von Einsiedel et al. *Civil war trends and changing nature of armed conflicts*. (Tokyo: United Nations University for Policy Research, 2017): 3

component was that the first few years of implementation are critical. In line with this, expenditure estimates were generated in five contexts: Colombia (2016), Mali (2015), Nepal (2006), Philippines (2014) and South Sudan (2015)[98]. Together, the range presented herein is expected to give a valuable estimate of how much external funding has been spent on implementing peace agreements, both broadly and broken down into the main chapters of peace agreements.

Methodology: What has been spent on peace agreements and provisions?
The minimum estimate

The tracking of expenditures related to peace agreement implementation is a complex undertaking. We found only one study that had undertaken a similar exercise by focusing on financing gender provisions.[99] In line with that approach, and to limit the seemingly endless list of projects implemented in conflict-affected and post-agreement contexts, projects were selected from 1) WB- or UN-administered MDTFs[100] that, as the qualitative research has shown, often channel funding for peace agreement implementation[101] and 2) additional funding from the top-5 donors for peace: the US, the UK, Germany, Norway and the European Union (EU) Institutions.[102] Since European donors prefer to channel their funding through MDTFs, funding from those donors should be well-captured across the data sources used. The data on projects identified was then used to determine whether the projects may have aimed to implement the peace agreement. Given the large number of projects implemented annually in these contexts, the projects were limited to the CRS purpose codes that contribute to governance and peace.[103]

Project documents or project descriptions were used to assess whether the project aimed to contribute to peace agreement implementation and whether the project matched the relevant chapter in the respective peace agreements. However, few donor portals make available project documentation or comprehensive descriptions of the projects. In the absence of this, a project was included when project titles or shorter project descriptions indicated support for peace agreement implementation or where there was strong thematic overlap with the peace agreement[104]. Other projects, where this was not possible, were excluded from this exercise.[105] A clear limitation of this approach is that some projects may have been falsely excluded because relevant project documentation was not available, or information was insufficient to classify projects. Consequently, these expenditure estimates represent only a **fraction of the actual expenditure** dedicated to implementation.

Based on this, we calculated the total investment (in current USD) by summing up all the projects that contributed to implementing peace agreements in the case study contexts. This makes up the minimum estimate of international financing for peace agreement implementation.

98 It should be noted that the 2015 ARCSS in South Sudan was followed by the R-ARCSS in 2018. Given that the two agreements are similar in structure – and because it was also observable that donors would amend their programmes to both i.e., "Funding to JMEC/RJMEC" (e.g., Norway) – the expenditures are displayed cumulatively.
99 Davies and True. "Follow the money". Note: Additionally, the APC Colombia compiled a list of all projects financed by international donors in 2019, undertaking a similar classification. Notably, this list was not used in this research.
100 This was restricted to the UN PBF, and relevant MDTFs created specifically to aid the implementation in the examined contexts.
101 Sean Molloy, *Peace Agreements and Trust Funds*, (Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, 2019).
102 Andrew Sheriff et al, *Supporting peacebuilding in times of change: A synthesis of four case studies*. (ECDPM, 2018), Available at: https://ecdpm.org/work/supporting-peacebuilding-in-times-of-change-a-synthesis-of-four-case-studies.
Data was collated from the following donor portals: US Foreign Assistance (https://www.foreignassistance.gov/), EU Aid Explorer (https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/index_en. All funding from member states is used to capture funding from the top donors Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and the EU institutions. Funding from other EU countries is also included), and the Norwegian development aid portal (aidresults.no).
103 OECD, *Development Assistance Flows for Governance and Peace. Backgrounder,* (Paris: OECD, 2014).
104 For example, a project clearly supports a topic in the peace agreement and began after the agreement was signed. E.g., projects on decentralization in the Mali case.
105 Projects with start dates preceding the signing of the peace agreement were excluded unless project documents or descriptions were available to indicate that the project was adapted to the agreement.

The maximum estimate: Overall ODA

The maximum estimate is made up of the overall ODA[106] by **all official** donors in that context during the first five years of implementation. Such an approach is "maximal" in the sense that all of our case study countries were net beneficiaries from ODA in the period before the agreement was signed, suggesting components of ODA are definitively not related to peace implementation. Therefore, the overall ODA is expected to represent the upper maximum of what is likely spent on implementation. Actual expenditure is likely to lie somewhere in between these two estimates.

Moreover, the different chapters of the peace agreements from the five contexts were matched with the corresponding ODA code, as a proxy for the maximum expenditure, as follows[107]:

CATEGORY	PA CHAPTER	ODA CATEGORY AND CODE
Security	DDR, Arms	Reintegration & SALW Control (15240); Child Soldiers (prevention and demobilization) (15261)
	SSR	Security systems management and reform (15210)
	Demining	Land mine clearance (15250)
Fiscal	Decentralization	Decentralization and support to subnational government (15112)
Political	Participation	Democratic participation and civil society (15150)
	Elections / Constitution	Elections (15151)
	Institutions, political transition	Remaining Government and civil society (15100 – excluding above)
Legal	Transitional Justice	Legal and judicial developments (15130)
Other	Rural reform, development	Rural development (43040)
General/ Unspecified	General Support for PA implementation (not for specific chapters)	Remaining Total ODA (excluding above)

The expenditure on different pillars of peace agreements were then calculated per person in the population[108] to give an estimated range between the likely minimum and maximum expenditure on PA implementation based on population size.

106 The data was gathered from the OECD QWIDS database: https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

107 No suitable corresponding code was found for monitoring/verification of implementation; therefore, no maximum estimate is defined. Security-related provisions were more easily matchable than political and development-related provisions.

108 According to the World Bank, in 2021: Colombia (51,265,941), Philippines (111,046,910), Nepal (29,674,920), Mali (20,855,724), South Sudan (11,381,377)

Expenditure Estimates

Colombia (2016-2021):

CHAPTER	MINIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	EXPENDITURE RANGE PER PERSON in US$	
Political (Participation)	4,455,308.72	74,308,608.00	0.51	1.45
Other (Rural Reform/ Development)	25,972,337.52	359,260,168.00	0.51	7.01
Security Total	108,455,451.21	165,326,848.00	2.12	3.22
DDR	43,998,110.22	43,047,728.00	0.86	0.84
Demining	64,457,340.99	122,279,210.00	1.26	2.39
Legal - Transitional Justice	60,450,638.98	740,194,968.00	1.18	14.44
Implementation and Verification («Monitoring»)	3,762,718.95	–	0.07	–
General/Unspecified	90,124,167.41	6,012,812,401.00	1.76	117.29
Total	**293,220,622.79**	**7,351,902,993.00**	**5.72**	**143.41**

Philippines (2014-2019):

CHAPTER	MINIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	EXPENDITURE RANGE PER PERSON in US$	
Political - Transitional Arrangements	5,860,768.66	397,350,447.00	0.05	3.58
Normalization (total)	15,022,518.98	157,513,463.00	0.14	1.42
Security - Demining	3,139,243.31	4,261,588.00	0.03	0.04
Security - DDR	1,623,359.03	2,247,631.00	0.01	0.02
Legal - Transitional Justice	453,248.41	81,533,598.00	0.00	0.73
Other - Development-related	9,806,668.23	69,470,646.00	0.09	0.63
General/Unspecified	18,809,068.21	6,712,268,363.00	0.17	60.45
Total	**39,692,355.85**	**7,267,132,273.00**	**0.36**	**65.44**

South Sudan (2015-2020):

CHAPTER	MINIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	EXPENDITURE RANGE PER PERSON in US$	
Security (total)	25,747,767.79	47,021,852.00	2.26	4.13
Arms-related (DDR, SSR, Weapons)	10,466,064.05	27,415,211.00	0.92	2.41
Demining	15,281,703.74	19,606,641.00	1.34	1.72
Monitoring	70,566,894.06	–	6.20	
Legal - Transitional Justice	1,740,691.75	84,265,826.00	0.15	7.40
General/Unspecified	–	10,456,824,159.00		918.77
Total	**98,055,353.60**	**10,588,111,837.00**	**8.62**	**930.30**

Nepal (2006-2011):

CHAPTER	MINIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	EXPENDITURE RANGE PER PERSON in US$	
Security (total)	29,381,894.32	37,388,668.00	0.99	1.26
Demining	7,084,317.23	327,565.00	0.24	0.01
DRR	21,049,195.08	15,734,593.00	0.71	0.53
SSR	1,248,382.01	21,326,510.00	0.04	0.72
Legal - Transitional Justice	3,419,654.73	23,955,709.00	0.12	0.81
Political (Elections/ Constitution)	11,766,075.78	26,686,781.00	0.40	0.90
Monitoring	2,743,662.95	–	0.09	
General/Unspecified	34,249,380.68	4,428,986,826.00	1.15	149.25
Total	**81,560,668.46**	**45,170,717,984.00**	**2.75**	**1,522.18**

Mali (2015-2020):

CHAPTER	MINIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE in US$	EXPENDITURE RANGE PER PERSON in US$	
Fiscal – Decentralization	63,303,419.55	251,319,519.00	3.04	12.05
Political - Elections	2,694,349.19	19,606,235.00	0.13	0.94
Security (total)	8,792,338.34	67,841,354.00	0.42	3.25
DDR	5,148,942.00	4,151,563.00	0.25	0.20
SRR	3,643,846.26	63,689,791.00	0.17	3.05
Legal - Transitional Justice	1,464,663.00	96,596,765.00	0.07	4.63
General/Unspecified	40,533,309.10	8,758,243,192.00	1.94	419.94
Total	**118,795,646.18**	**9,193,607,065.00**	**5.70**	**440.82**

Reflections and limitations

These estimates unsurprisingly show a large range in terms of expenditures. As is expected, those provisions that are more easily matched by a corresponding ODA DAC code show much narrower expenditure estimate ranges (e.g., demining, DDR). For those provisions that are not easily matched to an ODA DAC code, this range is much larger. Here, the true expenditure is likely closer to the minimum estimate.

The approach taken here certainly has limitations. The qualitative component of this study emphasized that peace agreements are funded through a combination of different funding streams and pots, which further complicates the tracking of expenditures for peace agreement implementation. The extent of international financing unveiled through the minimum estimate is certainly incomplete, as the lack of available data severely limited it. A critical problem was that few donors make available project documents necessary to assess whether an activity contributed to PA implementation. Moreover, for some projects, some information is completely redacted.[109] This means that many projects that do not make available further information, but may contribute to implementation, could not reliably be included in these estimates. Additionally, we find that projects usually aim at combining impact across the different chapters

109 Notably, this occurred with many defence/security-related projects funded by the US.

of peace agreements. Donors may also add a PA-related element to a project that targets other issue areas. In these cases, the actual expenditure of that project for implementation could not be deduced. This likely accounts for instances where the 'minimum' expenditure above is higher than all donors' overall ODA (occurring notably for DDR and demining), which demonstrates the limitations of the approach.

Improved availability of data made available by donors is vital to improve the tracking of expenditure for peace agreement implementation. This could include clearer references to the specific provisions that the project supports. Like the DAC gender equality policy marker, used on the annual reporting of development activities to the DAC, a peace agreement policy marker could be developed to indicate whether projects or activities have peace agreement implementation as a policy objective. This, itself, could be made gender-specific to note the key role in understanding that peace agreements have gendered aspects and that implementation, too, requires such a lens. Using such a tool could allow for more rigorous assessment of projects in tracking expenditures related to peace agreement implementation.

Towards a more accurate measurement?

Noting the limitations in both the "maximum" and "minimum" efforts, we undertake a third effort to capture the expenditure of implementing a peace agreement, that sits somewhere between the two extremes. The nature of this approach is to attempt to understand the ODA "premium" a country received in the aftermath of signing a peace agreement. This allows us to capture the broad funding mechanisms behind ODA that overcome some of the limitations of the minimal approach, while also ensuring that we are not simply capturing ODA that would have been received with or without a peace agreement.

Specifically, we use a "synthetic control model" approach.[110] In this approach, the "treated unit" – in our case, a country that has reached a peace agreement – is simulated as a weighted average of a basket of reference countries that did not reach a peace agreement in the same period. This produces a simulated, synthetic series, which can be compared with the observed (real) series of the same indicator, in the same place, over the same time. This approach works on the principle that a good simulation, i.e., synthetic control variable, will closely follow the real series up until the signing of the peace agreement, at which point the two series should begin to diverge.

Synthetic control models tend to work best when a) there is a fairly long time series before the "treatment" takes place; b) there is a fairly long time series after the implementation, so that divergence can be meaningfully observed; and c) when indicators that tend to be correlated in time and not prone to specific idiosyncratic shocks are used. ODA satisfies the latter but high-quality data is only available for most conflictual countries since the mid-1990s, with accurate data only available until 2020. This leaves only a small number of peace agreements (Colombia, Mali, Philippines and Nepal) that satisfy the basic constraints of the approach. Our analyses focus on two of these countries – Philippines and Mali – due to issues with the construction of the ODA variable in the other two cases. In Colombia, there is significant distortion throughout the series, likely due to support against Colombia's illegal drug trade, which reduces the predictive capacity of the simulated series; in Nepal, net ODA is not reported for the most recent years.

In both the cases of Mali (left) and the Philippines (right), we can see that the

110 Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, "The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country", *American economic review* 93, 1, (2003).

simulated series follows the observed series closely, up until the signing of the peace agreement. In the period afterwards, to the right of the vertical dashed line, the series begin to diverge. Specifically, they show that, in both cases, observed ODA is above the predicted series in the period following the agreement, satisfying the most basic theoretical prediction of this approach – that ODA should rise beyond anticipated levels in the post-agreement period.



Figure A1: Real (solid line) and simulated (dashed line) series of ODA receipt in Mali (left) and Philippines (right) before and after the signing of peace agreements. Authors' own construction from data from OECD QWIDS Database.

In total, these series suggest that the ODA "premium" (i.e., net ODA receipt in the five years following the peace agreement, in the Philippines above that predicted by the simulated series) was approximately $140m higher. In the case of Mali, the ODA "premium" is $11m on average, although this rises to over $16m if we ignore the major outlier in 2016, the year immediately following the peace agreement. Dividing these figures by head of population and averaging across the two cases suggests an upper estimate somewhere in the region of $1 to $1.15 per capita per year having been spent on the implementation of those agreements. That the premia are on a similar scale in each country suggests a robustness to this approach. Similarly, as both predicted series predict a large uptick in ODA during the implementation phase, this approach might end up being a very good approximation of peace implementation expenditure.

This approach provides theoretically satisfactory results – both in the sense that the series in Mali and the Philippines follow the general predictions and that the results from both countries are congruent with each other in terms of scale. In the case of the Philippines, we also find a figure that sits somewhere between the maximal and minimal approaches. At the same time, we note the key limitation of this approach that it is based, only, on two case studies where data and the timing of the peace agreement were sufficient to allow this model to work effectively. The addition of other cases, for example, that were much more expensive (or indeed cheaper) could easily distort these estimates. At the same time, in combination, they provide a ballpark estimate of the additional marginal costs of the excess ODA that is specifically related to the implementation of a peace agreement. We also note, however, a general uptick in the simulated ODA series in both case study countries, suggesting broader expenditure is still required in the post-conflict period to reinforce peace; just that this expenditure is, in some ways, decoupled from the signing of the agreement itself.

ANNEX REFERENCES

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DATABASES USED

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US Foreign Assistance: https://www.foreignassistance.gov/

EU Aid Explorer: https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/index_en

Norwegian development aid portal: https://aidresults.no