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Impact evaluation of the Economic and Social Empowerment (EA\$E) programme to improve spousal relationships and mitigate intimate partner violence in Syria

Final Impact Report of FAO's Violence Against
Women and Girls (VAWG) pilot interventions

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**Scope:**

This report examines the short-term impacts of the couple's curriculum on intimate partner violence and its pathways, including gender attitudes, joint intra-household decision-making, and time-use. This report uses household survey panel data collected by FAO partners at baseline and endline in Homs and Rural Damascus in Syria.

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Executive Summary

Background: Since the onset of the Syrian conflict, women have faced heightened risks of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), particularly Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). In Phase 1 of the Building Local Resilience in Syria (BLRS) programme, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Syria, through a strategic partnership with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), is piloting interventions aimed at reducing and preventing Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) in Homs and Rural Damascus governorates. The pilot is implemented through Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and combines the provision of agro-processing vouchers worth 400 USD with the Economic and Social Empowerment (EA\$E) curriculum to couples. These interventions aim to rebalance intrahousehold power dynamics, mitigate economic and emotional intimate partner violence (IPV), and improve household welfare, with the goal of increasing women's economic and social participation.

This report is intended for programme implementers, researchers, policy-makers, donors and other stakeholders working on gender equity and IPV prevention programming in Syria and similar contexts. The report balances accountability, by identifying the programme's successes and areas for improvement, with learning, through generating insights and recommendations, while considering the broader challenging context.

Impact evaluation learning questions: We causally estimate the effects of providing the EA\$E curriculum combined with agro-processing vouchers (Vouchers + EA\$E), compared to vouchers alone (Vouchers-only). Key learning questions are:

- **LQ1.** What are the effects of providing Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only on women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration of IPV?
- **LQ2.** What are the programme impacts on shared decision-making and other empowerment measures, such as sense of control and group membership?
- **LQ3.** What are the programme impacts on time spent on work, including domestic work?
- **LQ4.** Does the intervention influence women's and men's gender attitudes and perceptions of community gender norms, including those related to child marriage?
- **LQ5.** Does the programme affect individual wellbeing, relationship quality, and household welfare?
- **LQ6.** Are there differences in impacts between women and men participants? Which pathways are most promising to meet the programme's objectives?

Impact evaluation design and analytical approach: In collaboration with FAO Syria, ISDC conducted a cluster randomised controlled trial with 581 couples to answer these learning questions. Impacts were estimated using difference-in-differences with appropriate controls and village-clustered standard errors. Additional robustness checks were also conducted.

Baseline prevalence of IPV: Baseline prevalence of reported 12-month IPV experience among women was high: approximately 46% and 55% reported experiencing economic and emotional IPV, respectively. Only 26% of men reported 12-month economic IPV perpetration.

Impact findings:

LQ1. What are the effects of providing Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only on women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration of IPV?

- The programme successfully reduced women's reported economic and emotional IPV in the past 12 months by 36 percentage points and 26 percentage points, respectively.
- The frequency and intensity of both forms of women's IPV experiences also decreased.
- There were no significant changes in men's reported perpetration of economic IPV.

LQ2. What are the programme impacts on shared decision-making and other empowerment measures, such as sense of control and group membership?

- Women's reported joint decision-making improved, with largest impacts on decisions about making major purchases and who works outside the home.
- There was no impact on the proportion of decisions made solely or jointly by men. Examining individual items however, reveals marginal reductions in men's sole decision-making in robustness checks. The reductions were related to employment and savings, with corresponding improvements in joint decision-making.
- The programme improved women's sense of control but not group membership.

LQ3. What are the programme impacts on time spent on work, including domestic work?

- The programme reduced women's time spent on domestic work daily, but there were no shifts in men's daily time spent on domestic work.

LQ4. Does the intervention influence women's and men's gender attitudes and perceptions of community gender norms, including those related to child marriage?

- The programme improved women's but not men's composite gender attitudes scores. On examining individual gender attitudes statements, we find improvements in women's attitudes about roles inside and outside the home and women's support for women speaking in public. Men were more likely to support women in leadership.
- Women's reported considerations for and joint decision-making on child marriage for their own daughters improved. There were no such changes for men.
- There were no changes in women's or men's perceptions of community gender norms.

LQ5. Does the programme affect individual wellbeing, relationship quality, and household welfare?

- Women's and men's wellbeing and feelings of being cared for by spouses improved.
- More women reported feeling respected by spouses and satisfaction with marriages.
- There were no changes in household income during this short evaluation timeframe.

LQ6. Are there differences in the programme's effectiveness between male and female participants (husbands and wives)? Which pathways are most promising to meet the programme's objectives?

- The programme had stronger impacts on women's outcomes than men's, particularly with regards to women's IPV experiences (compared to men's perpetration), joint decision-making, gender attitudes, and relationship quality.

- The programme demonstrated strong support for increasing shared decision-making through the “joint budgeting and improving effective communication” pathway.
- There was less support for “challenging power over” and “valuing women’s work” pathways.

Lessons learnt and recommendations: The results offer several opportunities to further strengthen the programme. We also identify areas for future research, as summarised alphabetically and with equal priority below:

1. **Assess effects and sustainability in the longer term:** A post-endline survey (approximately one year after the endline survey, if feasible) could examine whether outcomes such as gender attitudes, which take longer to change, emerge. It will further help assess if programme impacts found in the short run were sustained.
2. **Capture community dynamics:** Participant involvement in Dimitra Clubs should be assessed through a follow-up survey and key informant interviews. At a programme level, the next phase of the BLRS should align and strengthen linkages between household interventions and Dimitra Clubs to reinforce positive normative change.
3. **Evaluate additional forms of IPV:** For the next phase, the programme should integrate monitoring for male backlash and discussion of multiple IPV forms within the curriculum, including physical violence, in ways that ensure the safety of participants. Evaluators should include such measures in the study tools as well.
4. **Expand theory of change to differentiate household wellbeing and women's empowerment:** Programme designers could further differentiate between household wellbeing and empowerment outcomes to guide evaluation designs and identify the most promising pathways of change. Evaluators should measure different empowerment to identify areas of deprivation, trade-offs between dimensions, and spousal gender parity gaps. These steps can be taken in future programme adaptations.
5. **Focus more on husbands and boys/young men:** The post-endline follow-up survey and additional qualitative work can help explore why men’s behaviours and attitudes did not change. These results will inform programme adaptation on whether and how the curriculum should be altered to improve men’s outcomes.
6. **Leverage qualitative and mixed-methods approaches:** Complementary qualitative work can examine why men’s outcomes did not change, understand participants’ experiences with the programme, and gather feedback to strengthen it.
7. **Support and enrol women with lower levels of education:** In any new implementation of the EA\$E curriculum, efforts to identify and enrol women with lower education and literacy, who may face different IPV risks, should be strengthened.
8. **Understand voucher support:** The post-endline follow-up survey should examine how vouchers were used, whether vouchers materialised into income gains in women’s businesses, and if women retained control over this additional financial asset.

Overall, the EA\$E curriculum in addition to the provision of agro-processing vouchers was successful in reducing women's reported IPV experiences, increasing joint decision-making significantly among women and marginally among men in certain domains, reducing women's time spent on domestic work, and improving individual wellbeing and spousal relationship quality. Key steps for the next programme phase adaptation and strengthening include: (i) reaching women with lower levels of education who face different IPV risks, (ii) understanding the lack of impacts on men and accordingly tailoring the programme, and (iii) strengthening household and community linkages to improve normative change. These adaptations will help support women's safe and sustainable economic and social participation to improve household welfare and mitigate all forms of violence in Syria.

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List of Abbreviations

BLRS	Building Local Resilience in Syria
BSSOP	Beneficiary Selection Standard Operating Procedure
CEFE	Competency-based Economies through Formation of Enterprises
DGS	Discussion Group Sessions
EA\$E	Economic and Social Empowerment Framework
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FFS	Farmers Field Schools
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
ISDC	International Security and Development Center
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RCT	Randomised Controlled Trial
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Associations
What Works	What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

Syria continues to experience profound economic, political, and social challenges as a result of prolonged conflict. The conflict has caused widespread infrastructure damage, disrupted production, and contributed to trade limitations and currency depreciation, reducing real incomes and access to basic goods and services (UNDP, 2025; World Bank, 2025). Formal social protection systems have weakened, further limiting support to vulnerable populations (UNDP, 2025). Agricultural production has also declined sharply due to limited access to inputs and damaged water infrastructure across the country, and in Homs and Rural Damascus governorates, the focus of this study (FEWS NET, 2026). In Homs governorate, for instance, wheat and barley cultivation in rainfed areas fell by over 95% (OCHA, 2025). Historic drought conditions in 2025 intensified water scarcity, affecting rural livelihoods. These overlapping and cascading effects have contributed to rising unemployment (from 8% in 2010 to 24% in 2024) and extreme poverty (from 11% to 66%), disproportionately affecting men while women's labour participation increased (UNDP, 2025; World Bank, 2025). Despite political changes in 2024, humanitarian needs remain high, with 35% of the population food insecure in 2025, including 5 million in Homs and 13 million in Rural Damascus (OCHA, 2025). Rural Damascus continues to experience some of the highest needs across all social sectors (OCHA, 2025; FAO, 2025).

The conflict has also displaced approximately half of Syria's population (UNHCR, 2025), and in 2025, around 28% remained internally displaced (UNHCR, 2025). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) often live in overcrowded conditions with limited resources (UNFPA, 2025), placing additional economic, social, and institutional pressures on communities (UNHCR, 2025; FEWS NET, 2026). Homs and Rural Damascus also experience high population return movements, salary delays, and energy shortages, with 62% and 69% of communities reporting less than two hours of electricity daily, respectively (OCHA, 2025). Persistent conflict, militarisation and institutional fragility drive insecurity across the country. Even after the transitional government in March 2025, political fragmentation and insecurity remain, undermining recovery and stability (FEWS NET, 2026).

Amid these conditions, gender inequality remains pronounced, particularly in rural farming communities, where women contribute critically to agriculture, food production, processing,

and household nutrition. Women are engaged in climate-resilient farming, value addition, and marketing, yet discriminatory social norms and unequal gender roles limit their access to productive assets, resources, services and employment opportunities. Crisis-related pressures, including insecurity, economic hardship, displacement, and social fragmentation, are key stressors of IPV, contributing to increased incidence in Syria (Rubenstein et al., 2020; UNFPA, 2025). Rural women face particularly high risks. Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is commonly perpetrated by male family members and reinforced by patriarchal norms (UNFPA, 2025). Many women remain silent due to limited access to services, lack of awareness and stigma (UNFPA, 2024a). The crisis has also heightened women's dependence on potential abusers, restricted mobility, and increased exposure to early/forced marriage and economic control as coping strategies (UNFPA, 2024b). Men experiencing prolonged stress are more likely to perpetrate IPV (Meyer et al., 2025; Stojetz & Brück, 2023). Changes in traditional power dynamics further undermine men's expected provider roles, generating frustration and increasing the risk of VAWG and IPV (UNFPA, 2024a; Rubenstein et al., 2020).

More broadly, women and girls in conflict and humanitarian settings typically experience higher levels of IPV and child marriage than women and girls in non-humanitarian settings (Murphy et al., 2024). Among households in humanitarian settings, conflict exposure, household income, mental health, the use of coping strategies and limited social support have been shown to be strongly and positively associated with violence against women (Rubenstein et al., 2020). IPV also often persists long after the end of armed conflict, with men who were exposed to wartime violence being more likely to perpetrate IPV more than a decade later (Stojetz and Brück, 2023). Armed conflict and forced displacement affect households' risks and resources as well as intrahousehold power dynamics, making it crucial to understand what works to prevent IPV in these contexts (Murphy et al., 2023). However, current evidence on decreasing IPV in conflict, post-conflict and other humanitarian crises relies mainly on cross-sectional data and very few studies employ robust experimental methods to examine the effectiveness of economic and social interventions to reduce IPV risk in these settings (Rubenstein et al., 2020; Spangaro et al., 2021).

The Building Local Resilience in Syria (BLRS) Programme

To fill these gaps, the *Building Local Resilience in Syria (BLRS)* Programme is testing different strategies to transform harmful gender attitudes and reduce GBV and its tolerance in pilot programmes. During BLRS Phase 1, activities in three locations (Al-Hasakah, Homs, and Rural Damascus) were implemented to evaluate different approaches to prevent VAWG and enable

women's safe and sustainable economic and social participation. The VAWG pilots target a subset of beneficiaries participating in BLRS economic interventions with carefully designed and implemented complementary social interventions. In Homs and Rural Damascus, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Syria piloted the Economic and Social Empowerment (EA\$E) couple-based intervention model combined with economic support (agro-processing vouchers) to improve women's economic participation and household welfare.

This report presents the short-term findings from an impact evaluation of the EA\$E couples' curriculum. The rest of the report is structured as follows: The [next section](#) describes the programme context, especially in relation to IPV, the implemented intervention and the theory and pathways of change. [Section 3](#) outlines the impact evaluation objectives and design. [Section 4](#) describes the data, outcomes, and ethics. [Section 5](#) describes the empirical strategy and the analytical methods used. [Section 6](#) presents sample attrition. [Section 7](#) presents the baseline balance and descriptive findings. [Section 8](#) presents the impact results and robustness checks. [Section 9](#) describes the limitations of the study. [Section 10](#) discusses the findings in relation to the Syrian context and broader evidence base. [Section 11](#) concludes with programme strengths and areas for improvements in relation to the different pathways of change. Finally, [Section 12](#) presents lessons learnt and provides actionable recommendations to strengthen the programme and areas for further research. [Appendix A](#) provides supporting tables. [Appendix B](#) covers the evidence use and influence plan. [Appendix C](#) contains details on time trends and [Appendix D](#) presents trends by region. [Appendix E](#) presents regional impact estimates. Finally, [Appendix F](#) lists supporting documentation submitted with this report.

This report is intended for programme implementers, researchers, policy-makers, donors and other key stakeholders working on gender equity and IPV prevention programming in Syria and similar contexts. While the sections on impact evaluation design, data analysis and impact findings (Sections 5 - 9) are written for a technical audience, the discussion, conclusions, recommendations and lessons (Sections 10 - 12) have been drafted for a broader audience. This approach ensures that the findings can effectively contribute to programme strengthening and inform policy development to improve gender equity and prevent IPV, both within and beyond Syria. This report aims to balance accountability, by evaluating the programme's achievements and identifying areas for improvement, with learning, through generating insights and recommendations while considering the broader challenging context. Further details on the use of evidence and the communication plan are available in [Appendix B](#).

1.2. Current evidence on economic IPV and couples' programming

Economic IPV is a lesser-known and not well-understood form of violence that constrains financial autonomy and stability, increases dependency on partners, and prevents exit from abusive relationships (Chatterji et al., 2025). The conceptualization and measurement of economic IPV varies (Postmus et al., 2018), but refers to “an individual’s ability to acquire, use or maintain economic resources, threatening their financial security and wellbeing” (ibid). Broadly, economic IPV can be categorised into three forms: economic control, employment sabotage, and economic exploitation (Postmus, Plummer, et al., 2015; Stylianou et al., 2013; Stylianou, 2018). Economic control refers to preventing access to or knowledge of finances and financial decision-making power, including denying necessities, preventing access to savings accounts, and withholding earned money. Employment sabotage includes behaviours that prevent one from obtaining or maintaining employment and/or education. Economic exploitation encompasses intentional behaviours to destroy financial resources, including refusing to pay bills, gambling jointly earned money, or stealing money. Cultural forms of economic IPV include, but are not limited to, economic neglect or the refusal to contribute to basic household necessities, control over spouse’s labour or their earnings, and constraining access to resources, including dowry or bride price (Chatterji et al., 2025).

The few studies that measure economic IPV estimate that one-third of women (Türkiye) to two-thirds of women (Bangladesh and Nigeria) have experienced economic IPV, though prevalence rates vary by subgroup and are difficult to compare across measures (Chatterji et al., 2025). Economic IPV perpetration rates for men are less studied, with one study estimating that approximately one in five men reported perpetrating economic IPV during their lifetimes (Postmus et al., 2022). Men who perpetrated economic IPV also perpetrated other IPV types, mostly psychological abuse (ibid). Other risk factors for economic IPV include educational disparities between spouses, being pregnant or having children, partner’s alcohol or drug consumption, poverty and traditional gender norms (Chatterji et al., 2025). Experiencing economic IPV is significantly correlated with increased poverty and food insecurity, limited employment stability, poorer mental health and general health (ibid). To the best of our knowledge, there were no estimates of economic IPV experiences or perpetration from conflict-affected settings.

Addressing IPV through economic and social interventions

Economic interventions, such as cash transfers, can affect IPV via three pathways: (i) improving economic security and emotional wellbeing, (ii) affecting intrahousehold conflict, and (iii) empowering women (Buller et al., 2018). Husbands' reactions to changes in intrahousehold power dynamics determine whether IPV reduces or increases, due to male backlash.

There are few studies on economic transfers and IPV from conflict or post-conflict settings. In post-conflict Uganda, a cash component and Gender-Based Violence (GBV) awareness programme found no reduction on GBV or gender equitable relationships, likely because the programme did not adequately engage men (Sengupta, 2014; Simon, 2019). In Ecuador, cash transfers targeting poor households and Colombian refugees found decreases in women's experiences of controlling behaviours and physical and/or sexual IPV (Hidrobo et al., 2016). These impacts were seen through improving food security, decreasing poverty-related stress and increasing women's bargaining power. While there was no evidence of increased backlash, the programme was framed as part of a wider food security intervention, traditional gender attitudes were not challenged as women generally are responsible for household nutrition.

More recently in Syria, women reported that cash transfers given to the household were used to purchase food, water, shelter and clothing, or medical expenses, and to pay back family debt (Blackwell et al., 2019; Falb and Annan, 2019). However, over the course of the programme, although married women reported increased shared decision-making power, they also reported increases in sexual IPV and economic abuse, particularly around husbands taking cash from wives or spending it without discussions. The authors cautioned that increases in IPV reporting may have also stemmed from increases in IPV disclosure, as a result of community acceptance and trust of programme implementers. However, providing economic support alone to women without addressing the root causes of gender inequality may potentially lead to an increase in IPV, as partners may perceive shifts in power dynamics as threats, leading to tensions between couples and potential backlash and violence (Williams et al., 2022). Furthermore, while cash transfer and livelihood programmes have shown potential in reducing IPV in non-conflict settings, there is less available (and a need for more) evidence around the impact of economic assistance in conflict settings, along with a need to engage men and address their attendance in social norms programming (Buller et al., 2018; Bourey et al., 2023; Cross et al., 2018; Spangaro et al., 2021).

Engaging men

Recent trials indicate that interventions engaging men can positively influence attitudes, intentions, and behaviours related to violence, as well as improve relationship quality (Hossain et al., 2014; Vaillant et al., 2020). Male-focused discussion groups and accountability mechanisms encourage critical reflection on, and support of, gender-equitable norms, enhanced relationship quality, and participation in household decision-making and tasks, which may reduce IPV perpetration over time (Bourey et al., 2015). However, reductions in women's reported experiences of IPV are often modest or not immediately observable, suggesting that longer follow-up periods and complementary community-based norm-change components are likely needed to achieve measurable decreases in violence.

Couple-based programming

Programmes that bring husbands and wives together, aim to improve couple communication, address relationship dynamics and challenge harmful gender attitudes such as IPV to help women feel safer in relationships (Dunkle et al., 2020). These programmes often address 'power over', which is defined in terms of obedience, coercion or having control or influence over others (Luttrell and Quiroy, 2009; Malapit et al., 2018; Rowlands, 1995). Addressing harmful gender roles and norms, including men's power over women's behaviour, entitlement within marital and extra-marital sex, and control over economic and political domains, can foster a safe environment and mitigate IPV (Heise and Fulu, 2014).

In Ethiopia, for example, a couple-based violence prevention education programme showed improvements in men's IPV knowledge, and reductions in IPV justification and controlling behaviours (Agde et al., 2025). In Rwanda, the *Indashyikirwa* programme successfully reduced physical and sexual IPV, reported both as wives' experiences and husbands' perpetration (Dunkle et al., 2020). Communication, trust and self-efficacy also improved as a result of the programme. These findings highlight the potential of engaging men and adopting couple-based interventions with broader gender-transformative programming to prevent IPV in conflict- or post-conflict affected contexts.

In summary, addressing and preventing IPV through combined economic and social programming is crucial, yet the evidence on how to do so remains unclear. On one hand, raising women's bargaining power within the household may increase household wellbeing, decrease spousal conflict and improve self-confidence and autonomy, thereby reducing IPV (Buller et al., 2018). On the other hand, entrenched harmful gender attitudes may create backlash against

women's empowerment, thus increasing the potential for IPV. Hence, and especially in more conservative societies, livelihood programmes for women should not only actively and inclusively engage men, but also intentionally target harmful gender attitudes to prevent increases in IPV (UNFPA, 2024a). In fact, studies that rigorously assess the impact of such interventions are particularly important in this context, as they provide rare evidence on whether and how combining economic support with gender transformative programming effectively reduces IPV.

2. Interventions and Pathways of Change

2.1. Description of the interventions

To address these challenges and as part of the Phase 1 Building Local Resilience in Syria (BLRS) program, FAO in Syria through a strategic partnership with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), is piloting prevention of VAWG interventions in Homs and Rural Damascus. These pilots target eligible beneficiaries (married couples or women headed-households) through Farmer Field Schools (FFS)¹, where women received agro-processing vouchers alongside EA\$E and FFS support. The VAWG pilots in Homs and Rural Damascus comprise two additional complementary and gender transformative interventions: the EA\$E Framework adopted from the International Rescue Committee in cooperation with UNFPA and FAO's Dimitra Clubs. A brief description of these interventions is provided below.

A **voucher scheme for agro-processing** groups (access to vegetables and seasonal fruits, informed by market demand and profitability) was implemented through FFS. These vouchers were worth 400 USD and could be redeemed for tools used in food and agro-processing. Women were eligible for these vouchers based on FAO's Beneficiary Selection Standard Operating Procedure (BSSOP). The BSSOP prioritises vulnerable women with low or no household income, women-headed households, households with persons with disabilities and individuals with a disability, and women relying on agricultural resources. Additional criteria to be eligible for the voucher include having prior experience in food processing activities, required operational tools and equipment, and adequate space for food processing activities

¹ FAO's Farmer Field Schools (FFS) in Syria cover both crop and livestock production. Crop activities include fruit production (apricot, grape, apple, olive) and winter vegetables (garlic, tomato, and other vegetables). Livestock activities include raising cows and sheep. These FFS are complemented by training and capacity-building activities.

for food processing participants. FFS women participants and the spouses of FFS men participants were eligible for the transfer.

Through the **EA\$E intervention**, couples participate in a curriculum to discuss gender issues based on materials developed and tested through the EA\$E programme related to economic power dynamics at household level and practices of early marriage. EA\$E also aims to enhance women's business skills and knowledge. The main objective of the curriculum is to improve shared planning and budgeting of household resources, encourage spousal communication, challenge men not to abuse power, and increase the value of women's work. Underpinning this programme, the theory of change hypothesises that:

- “if women have access to financial services with increased and diversified sources of income,
- and if men respect women and see them as valuable members of the household and if men value the unpaid domestic work inside the house and agriculture activities done by women,
- then women will have more equitable relationships and will experience a decrease in intimate partner violence” (International Rescue Committee, 2012).

This intervention aims to allow couples to reflect on their own beliefs, thoughts, experiences, attitudes, and behaviours that condone violence to create conditions for women to be safe within their homes. The EA\$E framework combines the Discussion Group Series (DGS) and Competency-based Economies through Formation of Enterprises (CEFE) through 15 sessions. The ten-session DGS curriculum covers topics related to household income, cash flow management, financial goal setting, dealing with financial stress, budgeting, and planning. More information is available under [Table A-1](#) in the appendix. Two of these sessions, which focus on early marriage including endogamy, were added to the DGS curriculum during EA\$E adaptation work to the Syrian context. Additional adaptations were also made to the wider curriculum to strengthen its gender transformative elements, including enhanced attention to power, and positive communication and non-violent conflict resolution among couples. The CEFE component comprises five sessions conducted with the same couples who participated in the DGS curriculum. CEFE uses a practical participatory learning methodology to develop and improve managerial and business skills in farm work. It also helps couples identify the strengths of their agricultural business as a profitable business and how to explore potential markets and network with these markets in the pursuit of expanding farm business and

achieving a larger profit margin.² Additionally, three EA\$E groups in Duhmer and Hosh Al-Sultan initially operated separately but later merged after the second session, owing to the facilitators' professional approach and respect for privacy in sensitive matters.

To preserve the integrity of the couples-based curriculum in contexts where sex segregation was required, FAO and UNFPA implemented specific adaptations. Core concepts and session content were delivered in parallel to women's and men's groups, ensuring consistency across sessions. Facilitators encouraged participants to engage in structured reflection and communication exercises at home, allowing couples to discuss session themes together and apply them jointly in their daily lives. At the beginning of subsequent sessions, facilitators created space for participants to reflect on these exercises and share experiences, either within their respective groups or, where culturally appropriate, in joint discussions once groups were merged.

Sessions with women and men together were facilitated by one male and one female facilitator per group per session. When sessions were conducted separately, they were led by same-gender facilitators. Sessions were generally held once a week, either jointly or in sex-aggregated groups, and lasted approximately one and a half to two hours. Some sessions were occasionally postponed due to participants' seasonal work commitments.³

The **Dimitra Clubs** intervention operates at the community level through clubs that bring together women, men, and youth to collectively identify and address local challenges using their own knowledge and resources. These clubs aim to challenge unequal gender norms and promote joint decision-making within households and communities. Implemented alongside EA\$E in the same villages, Dimitra Clubs reinforce change at both household and community levels, fostering an enabling environment for gender equality and the prevention of GBV, including early marriage. Through Dimitra Clubs, opinion leaders and influencers speak out against economic violence and early marriage, by activating men and boys (young men role models) as true allies to prevent economic violence against women and early marriage.


² CEFE is a training plan that uses a practical participatory learning methodology to develop and improve managerial and business skills in farm work and helps farmers to identify the strengths of their agricultural business as a profitable business and how to explore potential markets and network with these markets in the pursuit of expanding farm business and achieving a larger profit margin.

³ Detailed information on facilitators and session composition and duration were provided by FAO.

2.2. Theory of change

Following the EA\$E theory of change, our framework conceptualises how vouchers and the EA\$E curriculum separately and in combination have the potential to improve women’s standing in households and mitigate IPV. This framework is also founded on broader theoretical and empirical insights on the effects of economic and social empowerment interventions and their pathways of change (Buller et al., 2018; Eggers del Campo & Steinert, 2020; Spangaro et al., 2021). We posit that vouchers and EA\$E work via five pathways within the broader context of social and gender norms. Outcomes included in this evaluation are italicised and discussed later in [Section 4.1](#).

Figure 2-1 Theory of change



Note: Authors' own illustration. Measures included in the evaluation are italicised.

Pathway 1: Vouchers → Individual and household welfare → IPV

Economic insecurity is a known driver of household conflict and IPV, particularly in fragile contexts (Gibbs et al., 2020). When livelihoods collapse, the added financial pressures of meeting household needs may negatively affect mental health, thereby increasing the potential for intrahousehold tensions that lead to IPV (Buller et al., 2018). The first pathway

demonstrates how agro-processing vouchers have the potential to improve shared decision-making and IPV. If vouchers are redeemed for business tools and support the development of women's businesses, we expect an increase in women's income generation. This additional income can improve individual and household welfare through decreasing poverty-related stress and the pressure on men to provide for their households, thereby reducing quarreling and the potential for IPV. Dealing with financial stress is a key component of the DGS curriculum (Appendix [Table A-1](#)). Although vouchers have a much more muted effect as they must be redeemed for business tools, other economic interventions such as cash transfers have shown that reducing financial stress and increasing women's access to income and autonomy can lead to decreased IPV if women do not have to ask their husbands for money, which is a known predictor of IPV in some contexts (Barrington et al., 2022; Buller et al., 2018).

Pathway 2: EA\$E → Joint budgeting and planning → Shared decision-making

In patriarchal societies, men often exert control over income and financial decision-making in the household. This gendered role limits women's agency and autonomy in household decision-making, and reinforces women's dependence on men. To combat these gendered roles, a key component of the DGS curriculum is understanding joint decision making and practicing negotiation in developing family budgets. Accordingly, we hypothesise that EA\$E has a direct effect on improving shared decision-making between spouses.

Pathway 3: EA\$E → Effective communication → Shared decision making and IPV

Closely related to joint budgeting and planning, EA\$E also aims to help spouses distinguish between needs and wants and communicate effectively. Improving communication between spouses may improve relationship quality, especially feeling respected, and reduce quarreling, consequently leading to decreased potential for IPV. Furthermore, improvements in feeling respected and cared for may also shift couples to involve each other further in decision-making.

Pathway 4: EA\$E → Challenging "power over" → IPV

To combat harmful and discriminatory gender attitudes, the programme aims to challenge participants to balance power between women and men. Changing such power dynamics can

lead to improvements in relationship quality, including feelings of respect and satisfaction in marriage, thereby reducing IPV.

Pathway 5: EA\$E → Valuing women's work → Individual and household welfare

DGS sessions include discussions on defining the concept of a “successful family” and delve into understanding gender roles in the home to improve gender attitudes around women's work. If women and men recognise the importance of women's economic engagement, allowing women to work for pay would improve individual and household welfare. Improvements in welfare, in turn, can improve relationship quality, such as feeling cared for by spouses and satisfaction with marriage and reductions in IPV. Additionally, if men recognise the burden of domestic work and value women's time spent on income generating activities, women may be freed of the double burden of productive and reproductive work and we would see a shift in men's time use as well. This pathway promotes shared roles and responsibilities within the home as well as attitudes towards women's work.

Enabling environment: Gender norms

Social norms related to women's and men's roles and responsibilities within and outside the home underpin this theory of change. Dmitra Clubs, which target harmful and discriminatory gender norms, are an integral part of the programme, but are not included in this evaluation. Nevertheless, the pathways of change listed above must be considered within the context of broader norms.

Potential unintended or adverse effects

Changes in intrahousehold power dynamics and more progressive shifts in attitudes for some groups but not others can trigger male backlash in patriarchal societies, particularly where women's economic empowerment may challenge existing power structures and threaten men's identities (Eggers del Campo & Steinert, 2020). To mitigate these risks, the curriculum explicitly engages men as partners in change, emphasising the collective household benefits of empowerment.

By addressing financial stress, fostering joint decision-making, and improving gender equitable attitudes, the programme aims to reduce IPV experiences and perpetration and promote individual, spousal and household welfare.

3. Impact Evaluation Objectives and Design

3.1. Objectives and learning questions

The primary objective of the impact evaluation is to assess if and how the couple-based EA\$E curriculum mitigates experiences of emotional and economic IPV, testing the specific pathways and mechanisms of change. Specifically, it rigorously investigates whether integrating the couples' curriculum with agro-processing vouchers specifically positively influences equitable gender attitudes, strengthens joint intra-household decision-making, increases women's empowerment and mitigates experiences of IPV. The impact evaluation considers both women's and men's reports, assessing changes in attitudes toward gender equality, joint decision-making, time-use, and experiences or perpetration of economic and emotional IPV.

This impact study has five specific learning questions:

- LQ1.** What are the effects of providing Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only on women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration of IPV? (Pathways 1, 3 and 4)
- LQ2.** What are the programme impacts on shared decision making and other empowerment measures, such as sense of control and group membership? (Pathways 1 and 2)
- LQ3.** What are the programme impacts on time spent on work, including domestic work? (Pathway 5)
- LQ4.** Does the intervention influence women's and men's gender attitudes and perceptions of community gender norms, including those related to child marriage? (Pathways 4 and 5 and the enabling environment)
- LQ5.** Does the programme affect individual wellbeing, relationship quality, and household welfare? (Pathway 5)
- LQ6.** Are there differences in the programme's effectiveness between male and female participants (husbands and wives)? Which pathways are most promising to meet the programme's objectives? (All pathways)

The learning questions align with two of the three overarching questions presented in the Terms of Reference (see supporting documents).⁴ The third learning question examining the sustainability and heterogeneity of intervention impacts will be examined through a follow-up study in 2026 and is not covered in this report due to the short timeframe between the completion of EA\$E sessions and endline data collection.

3.2. Study design, sampling strategy and timeline


To address these learning questions, this impact study was designed as a two-stage cluster Randomised Control Trial (RCT). In the first sampling stage, ISDC randomly selected villages to receive EA\$E interventions from the list of eligible villages, provided by FAO Syria. Eligible villages were required to have at least one FFS school. If a village were selected to receive the EA\$E intervention, then all schools in that village would also be eligible to receive it. This strategy ensured that any detected impact of the EA\$E intervention was not affected by within-village spillovers. Moreover, it was essential that village assignment for receiving the EA\$E intervention was done randomly to ensure that the schools and couples that received EA\$E were structurally similar to those that did not receive EA\$E (that is, the Vouchers only group). Any non-random assignment of EA\$E could bias the findings of the impact study and the learning objectives.

In the second sampling stage, couples (beneficiaries and their spouses) from FFS in the selected treatment village were invited to take part in the EA\$E sessions. The selection of the couples was not random and was completely voluntary. In Homs, there were 44 eligible villages, and each village had at least one established FFS. In total, there were 98 schools across these 44 villages. In Rural Damascus, 18 villages were identified as eligible for the VAWG interventions, each with at least one FFS. In total, 28 FFSs were identified in these 18 villages. The EA\$E intervention took place at the FFS level, while the Dimitra Clubs intervention was implemented at the village level. All FFS in a targeted VAWG village were eligible for receiving the EA\$E intervention directly, and the Dimitra Clubs indirectly.

⁴ The three overarching questions are: (1) What are the impacts of the VAWG interventions when combined with FFS activities on gender norms, intra-household dynamics, women empowerment, and reduction in economic and emotional violence against women and girls, including early marriage? (2) What are the gendered impacts and pathways on these outcomes? Are there differences in the impact between male and female participants (husbands and wives), and (3) Does the average and heterogeneous impacts of the VAWG interventions vary over time? How sustainable are these interventions in the long-run in improving gender outcomes?

VAWG intervention assignment: In Homs, out of the 44 villages, 22 villages were randomly assigned to receive EA\$E intervention through FFS and 22 villages to the control group. [Figure 3-1](#) shows the impact study design in Homs. FAO pre-selected eligible villages for prioritisation of the logistics, security, vulnerability, and availability of school set-up. To consider their pre-selection in the random allocation, ISDC carried out simulations with 10,000 iterations, where each iteration involved randomising 22 of 44 villages to receive the intervention. The outcome of each simulation was assessed and the best random assignment corresponding to the initial proposition by the FAO Syria team was selected. FAO and UNFPA then re-adjusted their pre-selection to match the proposed random allocation for the remaining villages. In Rural Damascus, in similar fashion to Homs, ISDC supported the FAO and UNFPA team in randomly selecting 5 villages to the treatment and 5 villages to the control group ([Figure 3-2](#))⁵.


Figure 3-1 Study design for Homs



Note: Authors' own illustration.

⁵There are no deviations in the overarching study design with what was proposed in the Terms of References (see supporting documentation). The sample from Rural Damascus governorate was subsequently included in this impact evaluation, which followed a similar approach.

Figure 3-2 Study design for Rural Damascus



Note: Authors' own illustration.

Vouchers + EA\$E sample and selection of participants: In Homs, after defining the assignment of villages, we randomly selected 30 FFS schools from each group of villages to be in the study sample. The choice of 30 schools per group was based on sample power analysis with a 5% confidence interval and 90% power, where the minimum number of couples per Vouchers + EA\$E is equal to 12. More importantly, to account for attrition dynamics, ISDC increased the sample by 4 couples per school in each group. Based on the random sampling, we collected data in Homs from 19 villages that received vouchers only and 17 villages that received Vouchers + EA\$E interventions. Following discussions with the FAO team and considering the challenges in delivering EA\$E in certain villages, only a few villages were substituted from the randomised assignment originally planned⁶. In addition, two villages that were not selected to be part of the study were used to pilot the curriculum, which should not impact the study sample. To mitigate potential selection bias, any differences that were detected between the Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only schools at baseline were corrected by balancing the observable characteristics across the two groups, ensuring the integrity of the initial design. In Rural Damascus, data was collected from all schools in the 10 villages, 5 villages of which received the Vouchers + EA\$E support.

Selection of couples: Given that the FFS beneficiaries included both men and women, the baseline survey collected data from both the beneficiaries and their spouses, regardless of the gender of the main FFS beneficiary. This allows us to compare the direct and indirect add-on effects of receiving EA\$E, where women or men received livelihood support from FFS.

⁶ Implementation deviations occurred in a small number of villages. Specifically, Qotniyeh was originally planned to receive the EA\$E activities but did not, and Ashrafiya and Qanafiyeh were assigned as control villages but received EA\$E activities; and finally EA\$E activities in Hadideh were cancelled. These deviations reflect operational and access constraints during implementation.

Methodological note on pure control: We did not include pure control households in this impact evaluation study because FFS was the main entry point to enrol couples in the EA\$E intervention. Given that there were no such schools set up in pure control villages, it was not methodologically adequate to interview couples selected directly from the pure control villages, as they would have been systematically different from couples enrolled through FFS. Moreover, this approach would have required additional approval and coordination beyond the capacity of the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEAL) team, since the surveys would not have been conducted through the FFS which has additional ethical and practical implications and can affect the response to the questions in the survey. Therefore, ISDC and FAO jointly decided not to include a pure control group as part of this assessment, but to consider Vouchers-only as the control group.

Methodological note on Dimitra Clubs: Dimitra clubs at the community level were planned to be set up in the villages where Vouchers + EA\$E were taking place. In total, 30 clubs were active across the two governorates with 20 main clubs in Homs and 7 in Rural Damascus (10 clubs were planned for rural Damascus).⁷ Although Dimitra Clubs were an important component of the complementary interventions, this round of evaluation does not consider their direct effect on outcomes due to delays in their implementation and because we did not track which couples were part of these clubs and the extent of their involvement in clubs. However, it is possible that some of the findings in this report can be attributed to these broader community interventions as we cannot separate the effects of vouchers and EA\$E from the effects of these clubs. Future rounds of data collection will aim to disentangle this effect to the extent possible.⁸ This caveat and the need for further assessing the impacts of these clubs are added in the Study Limitations and Conclusions and Lessons sections, respectively.

Data collection and timeline: To estimate the impact of the Vouchers + EA\$E interventions, we collected individual survey data from wives and husbands separately (with same gender-enumerators) from all schools in Homs and Rural Damascus before the initiation of

⁷ Based on information provided by FAO, three clubs were not implemented as planned in rural Damascus. For instance, in Deir Ali village the presence of a Druze community posed challenges, as the community strongly opposed external intervention due to its established internal representation. Similarly, while clubs were initially established in Taibeh and Arkis villages, their activities were disrupted following the collapse of the former regime and security reasons.

⁸ The FAO MEAL team has conducted qualitative research on Dimitra Clubs. This report focuses only on ISDC's impact evaluation findings.

most EA\$E sessions⁹ and after the end of the interventions. This approach allows for the comparison of changes before (baseline) and after the intervention (endline) between Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only groups, which are used to estimate the impact of the interventions (using the difference-in-differences approach). Baseline data collection took place as planned, between January and October 2024. Due to programme schedules, baseline data collection was completed prior to the initiation of EA\$E sessions. Endline data collection took place between May and June 2025 in Rural Damascus and between April and July 2025 in Homs, after the completion of all EA\$E sessions. As of January 2026, findings from this impact evaluation were being used to inform the next phase of the BLRS programme, including adaptation of the curriculum to further engage husbands and for use with women breadwinners.

4. Outcomes, Data Collection and Ethics

4.1. Survey tools and outcomes

The data collection tools were developed for the wife and husband separately. These surveys were shared with FAO Syria for feedback. ISDC then reviewed and incorporated the feedback into the final version of the tools, and translated the questionnaires into Arabic.

A comprehensive training for the enumerators was conducted by FAO Syria MEAL team, UNFPA and ISDC. All enumerators were required to attend all the training sessions. The team presented and explained the data collection to all enumerators, and then delivered a session on lessons learned from previous surveys conducted using similar modules, paying particular attention to prior errors conducted in the field. For sensitive questions, for instance on IPV, the training was conducted separately for male and female enumerators. In addition, the team delivered a session on ethical considerations and procedures, particularly when collecting sensitive data. During this session, the importance of data collection ethical standards in line with ISDC's and FAO's protocols for the collection of primary data were explained. A special focus was given to research ethics and compliance with the "do no harm principle" as well as the importance of the use of consent forms. All enumerators piloted the questionnaires following FAO's data collection protocols.

⁹ We do not have sufficient information to exactly identify the FFS where baseline data collection was conducted after the initiation of EA\$E sessions. We include and address this important factor in the Limitations section.

The baseline and endline household surveys included the same modules. The main themes analysed in this report and their corresponding placement in the [Theory of Change](#) are presented below:

- **IPV (main outcome):** Captures women’s experiences of economic and emotional forms of IPV over the past 12 months. Economic IPV includes actions such as taking a spouse’s earnings or spending household money on personal expenses. Emotional IPV covers insults, belittlement, intimidation, or threats of harm or divorce. Economic IPV was reported by both husbands and wives, while emotional IPV was administered only to wives.
- **Household decision-making (Pathways 1, 2, 3 and 4):** Captures who usually decides (my spouse, myself, jointly with my spouse, or someone else from the household) on household economic and agricultural matters such as spending, saving, children’s education, and income-generating activities over the past 12 months.
- **Time use (Pathway 5):** Reflects total time spent on domestic work for women and men capturing shared responsibilities.
- **Gender attitudes and perceptions of community norms (enabling environment, Pathways 4 and 5):** Measures beliefs about men’s and women’s roles, women’s participation, and tolerance of violence. Key statements include: “A man should have the final word in his home” and “Women should be able to safely speak out without harm”. Respondents express their level of agreement to each of these statements (from strongly agree to strongly disagree). Gender norms outcomes reflect respondents’ perceptions of the proportion of women and men in the community who agree with different items.
- **Child marriage:** Captures whether respondents would consider marrying their own daughters before age 18, the acceptability of child marriage under various situations, decision-making around marriage of children in the household, and gender attitudes about child marriage.
- **Individual and household wellbeing (Pathway 1):** Includes respondents’ self-reported wellbeing, mental health (worry, feelings of depression), and relationship quality with spouses (feeling respected, feeling cared for, satisfaction with marriage, and quarrelling with spouse). Household welfare is captured with the log of household income.

- **Respondent and household characteristics:** Respondent's age, age at first marriage, literacy, education, disability status, household size and household income.

Detailed descriptions of indicator construction and other outcomes are provided in Appendix [Table A-2](#).

Most survey modules are based on standardised tools, and when necessary were adapted to the Syrian context in consultations with the What Works team supporting the VAWG pilots under BLRS. Questionnaires were translated from English into Arabic, digitised in XLS forms, and administered via Kobo Collect on tablets or phones to reduce entry errors through built-in validation and skip logic. Both wives and husbands were interviewed, with a unique couple ID ensuring proper matching across baseline and endline surveys. All wives and husbands completed the survey at baseline and endline.

The digitised tools were developed reflecting the Principles for Digital Development, including Principles 1 and 2, with an understanding of the Syrian context and close collaboration with programme partners; Principle 4 on Building for Sustainability by minimising environmental impact with paper-based surveys; and Principle 8 on addressing privacy and security to mitigate harm, especially the topic of the programme and evaluation, and live up to the commitment of 'do no harm' (DFID, 2018).

4.2. Ethical considerations

ISDC adheres to stringent practices and guidelines to ensure the confidentiality, privacy, and protection of both data and participants, in line with its 'do no harm' policy and internal ethical standards for fieldwork and empirical research.¹⁰ Respondents provided verbal consent after being informed of the study's purpose, data use, and their right to withdraw at any time without penalty. Participants were also informed that their participation in the survey did not affect any intervention they received or may receive in the future. This study received ethical approval from Humboldt University. Given the sensitive nature of the study, FAO and ISDC took additional ethical and safeguarding measures, which include but are not limited to:

¹⁰ These standards are in line with the FCDO's ethics principles and standards for research, evaluation and monitoring, including, for example, maximising benefits and minimising harm; respecting people's rights and dignity; acting with honesty, competence and accountability; and delivering work of integrity and merit (DFID, 2019), and protection from harm, especially from sexual abuse, exploitation and harassment.

- **Privacy and confidentiality:** Interviews were conducted in safe, private locations with same-gender enumerators. Enumerators were selected from outside the respondents' villages to minimise recognition and social desirability bias.
- **Framing of research:** The study was introduced as research on household and family wellbeing, not GBV, to reduce risks of stigma or backlash. Women were not administered questions about physical IPV; women and men were administered questions about economic IPV experiences and perpetration, respectively.
- **Mitigating attrition:** Participants in the couples curriculum received a small stipend to cover costs of participation and help mitigate attrition.
- **Managing distress:** Enumerators were trained to recognise signs of distress and follow a survivor-centred approach, pausing or stopping interviews if preferred by participants.
- **Referrals:** All participants received information referral cards at the end of the interview. Participants who showed clear signs of distress, disclosed violence, and/or requested immediate support were reminded of available support, with referrals provided along with transport and accompaniment if the participants accepted support.

4.3. Training enumerators

FAO and UNFPA delivered comprehensive training sessions for enumerators before each wave of data collection. The baseline training covered the survey tool, ethical considerations, and data quality procedures. ISDC closely collaborated with the FAO team to provide feedback and support when needed. In addition, extensive sessions on ethical practices in collecting sensitive IPV data were discussed in groups. All enumerators, hired directly by the partner, were required to attend all the training sessions. For sensitive questions, the training was conducted for male and female enumerators separately. The enumerators were well trained on administering these questions before the field data collection.

4.4. Data collection, monitoring and cleaning

During data collection, which was led by the FAO's MEAL team, close coordination was maintained with field coordinators through dedicated WhatsApp channels to provide timely support as needed. Access to certain areas posed challenges, particularly following changes in government control. Ongoing security concerns and population displacement within and

across villages further complicated fieldwork. As a result, many households were not reachable, and following up with the same participants was challenging (see attrition analysis in [Table 6-1](#)). Given the volatile context, the field team was advised to conduct repeated visits where feasible and to schedule appointments in advance, while ensuring that the safety of enumerators was not compromised. Upon completion of data collection, the coordination team shared anonymised raw data at the end of the data collection. Feedback was provided afterwards, and issues were discussed and resolved with the coordinators.

For data cleaning, we ensured that the individual time-invariant characteristics and ID corresponded to the same respondent at both waves. New variables and outcome indicators were generated (for instance, experience of any economic or emotional IPV in the past 12 months was calculated as binary yes/no variable), and a clean panel dataset, including only couples with both baseline and endline surveys, was prepared for the impact analysis.

Data access: Micro-level data are not made publicly available due to confidentiality and data protection considerations. However, upon reasonable request, the data may be made available to relevant stakeholders for purposes such as replication, verification, or evaluation, subject to appropriate safeguards and approval.

4.5. Roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders

The evaluation team conducted its work independently, and the findings in this report are independent of other parties with an interest in the evaluation and were discussed with the BLRS FAO Syria team only for contextualisation. Below we describe the role and responsibilities of the evaluation team and the various stakeholders:

ISDC was responsible for the literature review, the impact evaluation design and randomisation, development of the questionnaire, providing support during data collection (including monitoring the quality of the data), data cleaning and analysis, interpretation of the findings, drawing lessons and recommendations, and the writing and revising of the impact report. The **FAO Syria MEAL** team, which is separate from the programme implementation team, supported the coordination of the data collection for baseline and endline, conducting data entry checks and matching the sample with the project's beneficiary list and attendance in the couple's curriculum sessions. The FAO Syria MEAL team also provided early feedback on the design and the questionnaire as well as on the first draft of the impact report.

The **FAO Syria BLRS** team and **UNFPA** were responsible for the implementation of the activities and provided contextual input and shared assessment that were conducted in the areas where the interventions are taking place to help with the framing of the findings in this report. They also provided feedback on the first draft of the report.

Consultants on the **What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls** team helped revise the theory of change of the interventions and the adaptation of the interventions to the Syrian context. They also provided feedback on the data collection tools, and reviewed the first draft of the impact report.

FCDO provided funding for the BLRS project including the impact study. They also provided input and feedback on the design of the interventions, the study tools, and the draft report.

ISDC incorporated the feedback from the stakeholders where feasible and appropriate and explained in revised versions with comments on why any feedback was not incorporated.

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

5. Empirical Strategy and Methodology

We use primary data collected as part of the cluster RCT for all analyses.¹¹ We begin by providing descriptive characteristics of the analytical sample along with time trends on key outcomes, which do not differentiate between treatment and control status. These trends reflect broader temporal patterns in the main outcomes during the study period that are independent of the programme, provided for context, and are not directly attributable to the programme. For each variable, means are estimated for baseline and endline, separately for women and men.

We then move to providing estimates of the causal programme's impacts on all outcomes. The main impact estimates reported reflect attendance at all sessions for Vouchers + EA\$E compared to no sessions for the Vouchers-only group. These impacts of the Vouchers + EA\$E interventions in comparison to the Vouchers-only group are assessed using a difference-in-differences approach.¹²

¹¹ We do not include any secondary data in the analyses.

¹² Difference-in-difference impacts are estimated with the following specification: $Y_{it} = a + b_1 * Endline_t + b_2 * (Vouchers + EA\$E)_i + b_3 * (Endline_t \times (Vouchers + EA\$E)_i) + g'X_i + e_{it}$, where Y_{it} are our outcomes of interest for individual i at time t , $Endline$ is the indicator for the post-treatment period, $(Vouchers + EA\$E)$ represents the treatment indicator, X is a vector of baseline covariates consisting of husband and wives' education [none

To further address differential attrition as previously discussed, all regression estimations control for women's and men's (wives' and husbands') education at baseline. Education is an ordinal indicator coded as none (reference), primary, high school, and university or higher. Standard errors are appropriately clustered at the village level. Impacts are estimated separately for women and men for all outcomes and include governorate fixed effects (Homs and Rural Damascus). Programme effects were also estimated for villages in Homs, but there were no qualitative differences compared to overall results.¹³

To test the robustness of the results, especially due to potential selection of participants into the programme and timing differences between baseline and when EA\$E sessions began among FFS, we also estimate:

- Single-difference impact estimates on the main outcomes with the same controls as in the main difference-in-differences specification, and
- Effects on outcomes of attending all sessions versus less than 15 sessions or no sessions.

Even with these robustness checks and barring limitations, we have highest confidence in the difference-in-difference estimates, followed by single-difference estimates. The estimates on attending all sessions versus fewer than all sessions should not be interpreted as causal.

6. Sample, Attrition and Compliance

6.1. Sample size and panel attrition

[Table 6-1](#) presents the planned versus realised number of interviews across the intervention groups and sample attrition rates. The initial study aimed to interview 240 individuals (120 couples from 10 FFS) in Rural Damascus and 1,440 individuals (720 couples from 60 FFS) in Homs. At baseline, 316 interviews and 1,196 interviews were conducted in Rural Damascus and Homs, respectively.¹⁴ There were lower numbers of interviews at endline, where the overall attrition rates were 20% for Rural Damascus and 22% for Homs.

(reference), primary, high school, university or higher] and governorate (Homs versus Rural Damascus) fixed effects, and e is the error term for individual i at time t . b_3 represents the difference-in-differences programme impact.

¹³ The number of clusters in Rural Damascus was too small to allow robust estimation.

¹⁴ A larger number of couples in schools in Rural Damascus were enrolled and interviewed than originally planned.

From these completed interviews (252 + 936 = 1,188), only the panel sample of couples is used for further analysis. The panel sample only includes households that had complete information, especially on IPV indicators, from both spouses.¹⁵ The final panel sample includes 581 couples (1,162 individuals) from Rural Damascus and Homs.

Table 6-1 Sample and attrition rates by governorate and reasons for attrition

Governorate	Sample size				
	Planned	At baseline	At Endline	Missed (N)	Attrition rate (%)
Rural Damascus	240 ¹⁶	316	252	64	20%
Homs	1,440	1,196	936	260	22%

Reasons for non-interviews	Reasons for attrition			
	Homs		Rural Damascus	
	# of Couples	# of Interviews	# of Couples	# of Interviews
Left the village	88	172	11	22
Did not attend the endline	18	36	13	26
Did not continue the DGS	26	52	8	16
Missed (total)	132	260	32	64

Note: Numbers on planned and completed interviews by endline and reasons for non-interviews were provided by FAO. All reasons for non interviews were due to last conflict in the region, displacement due to the fall of the Syrian regime and in few cases spouses died or they contracted illnesses that prevented them from participating (information provided by FAO). The final panel sample of couples for analysis includes only households that had complete information from both spouses (N=581 couples or 1,162 individuals).

Overall and differential attrition by treatment status results are provided in Appendix [Table A-3](#). Tests of overall attrition (i.e., for overall sample and not considering treatment status) indicate that attrition was not significantly associated with treatment status, suggesting balanced dropout across Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only households. Households with more educated husbands were less likely to drop out of the sample. There were no differences in overall attrition by wives' education. When considering differences by treatment status, households in the Vouchers + EA\$E group were marginally ($p < 0.10$) less likely to drop out if the

¹⁵ From 1,188 interviews, two individuals were dropped from the panel sample because there were multiple spouses per household. The retained spouses were matched based on age in the baseline survey. One additional couple had endline but not baseline data and was dropped, resulting in 1,184 interviews. Main outcomes were missing as follows: baseline: one man missing decision-making indicators, two women missing emotional IPV; endline: six men missing economic IPV, 23 women missing economic IPV and one woman missing emotional IPV. These individuals and their partners form 11 couples (22 interviews), resulting in 1,162 individuals or 581 couples who were retained in the final panel sample.


¹⁶ ISDC originally planned for a minimum of 12 couples to participate in the study. However, since FFS schools had 25 couples, and participation is voluntary, the actual sample is higher than the planned sample size.

husband had a disability. However, households in the Vouchers + EA\$E group were more likely to drop out of the study compared to households in the Vouchers-only group after controlling for other covariates (Column 2 Appendix [Table A-3](#)). The primary reason for dropping out of the study was because of significant displacement of families from their villages due to conflict in the region and the fall of the Syrian regime, reflecting the challenging conditions of data collection, and likely not the nature of the intervention itself ([Table 3-1](#)).

6.2. Compliance

In addition to sample attrition, participation in the EA\$E sessions is an important measure of compliance with the programme. We find that the majority of women and men attended all sessions ([Figure 6-1](#)). Almost 80% of women and approximately 72% of men attended all sessions. Among those in the Vouchers + EA\$E group, the average number of sessions attended was 14.5 for women and 14.4 for men, indicating high compliance with the programme.

Figure 6-1 Number of sessions attended by husbands and wives in the treatment group




Note: The Vouchers + EA\$E group received 10 Discussion Group Sessions and 5 Competency-based Economies through Formation of Enterprises sessions for a total of 15 sessions.

We also assess baseline predictors of attending all sessions and the number of sessions ([Figure 6-2](#)). Women’s primary level education compared to no schooling was associated with attending fewer sessions and men who were heads of household were less likely to attend sessions than men who were not heads of household. We also found that women were more likely to attend all sessions if their husbands were heads of household. There were no other differential baseline characteristics on the number of sessions attended or on attendance at all sessions for women or men in the treatment group. These predictors reflect descriptive and not causal relationships.

Overall, these results indicate that compliance with session attendance is high, but adherence to the programme is not fully random and can be attributed to characteristics such as educational attainment.

Figure 6-2 Predictors of session attendance



Note: Figure presents OLS estimates of outcomes regressed on baseline individual and household characteristics, with clustered standard errors and 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes.

7. Baseline Balance and Descriptives

7.1. Baseline balance

To further ensure that treatment and control groups in the panel sample were comparable, baseline equivalence between Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only households was assessed on key outcomes, as well as the main demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of couples and their households, at baseline. These tests examine if any systematic differences existed prior to the intervention, and whether the differences could be driving results rather than the intervention itself.

Overall, [Table 7-1](#) shows that women in Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only households reported similarly on IPV and empowerment outcomes. There are similar findings for men, except for the “Stopped wife from working outside home” statement on economic IPV, for which men in Vouchers + EA\$E only households reported less perpetration than their counterparts in Vouchers-only households at baseline. Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households also reported working longer on domestic work compared to women in Vouchers-only households. The number of acceptable situations of child marriage were also lower among Vouchers + EA\$E households compared to Vouchers-only households for women and men. Additionally, women in Vouchers-only households were more likely to report that economic problems and being worried about family honour as acceptable reasons for child marriage. For men, accepting bride price was higher in Vouchers-only compared to Vouchers + EA\$E households at baseline. Tests of balance on all outcomes are presented in Appendix [Table A-4](#).

Appendix [Table A-5](#) examines how women and men in Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only households differed on common sociodemographic characteristics. Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households were more likely to be literate, less likely to be the head of household, less likely to have no education, and more likely to have a high school education compared to women in Vouchers-only households. Men in Vouchers + EA\$E intervention households were marginally more likely to have high school or tertiary or university-level education compared to men in Vouchers-only households. There were no differences in household size, household income, or region of residence between Vouchers + EA\$E and Vouchers-only households.

These findings of baseline equivalence and reasons for attrition increase confidence in the randomisation process. To further address differential attrition by treatment status, women and men's baseline education will be controlled for in all analyses.

Table 7-1 Baseline balance of main outcomes among panel

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Any IPV	0.61 (0.04)	0.57 (0.06)	0.64 (0.05)	0.44	-	-	-	-
Any emotional violence	0.55 (0.04)	0.52 (0.06)	0.57 (0.05)	0.48	-	-	-	-
Any economic violence [†]	0.46 (0.04)	0.40 (0.06)	0.51 (0.05)	0.16	0.26 (0.03)	0.28 (0.03)	0.25 (0.05)	0.64
Stopped wife from working outside home	0.26 (0.04)	0.24 (0.05)	0.28 (0.06)	0.63	0.15 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.10 (0.02)	0.02
Spent money household needed	0.28 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.34 (0.04)	0.08	0.12 (0.02)	0.11 (0.03)	0.14 (0.04)	0.49
Refused to give wife money	0.27 (0.04)	0.20 (0.04)	0.32 (0.05)	0.08	0.09 (0.01)	0.11 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.45
Took wife's earnings	0.20 (0.03)	0.17 (0.04)	0.22 (0.04)	0.44	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.84
Sense of control (-24 to 24)	-5.29 (0.30)	-5.61 (0.36)	-5.01 (0.46)	0.31	-	-	-	-
Number of groups	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.95	-	-	-	-
Group membership	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.87	-	-	-	-
Number of sole or joint decisions	4.65 (0.25)	4.64 (0.45)	4.66 (0.27)	0.98	8.00 (0.06)	8.04 (0.09)	7.96 (0.07)	0.47
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.55 (0.03)	0.55 (0.05)	0.55 (0.03)	0.95	0.96 (0.01)	0.96 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.79
Number of sole decisions	0.43 (0.05)	0.40 (0.08)	0.45 (0.06)	0.63	2.88 (0.21)	3.11 (0.29)	2.69 (0.30)	0.32
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.56	0.34 (0.02)	0.36 (0.03)	0.31 (0.03)	0.34

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Number of joint decisions	4.23 (0.25)	4.24 (0.42)	4.21 (0.27)	0.95	5.12 (0.20)	4.94 (0.29)	5.28 (0.28)	0.41
Proportion of joint decisions	0.50 (0.03)	0.51 (0.05)	0.50 (0.03)	0.87	0.62 (0.03)	0.60 (0.04)	0.64 (0.04)	0.41
Work hours	13.86 (0.16)	13.62 (0.19)	14.07 (0.23)	0.14	14.24 (0.15)	14.36 (0.24)	14.13 (0.18)	0.45
Work hours (excluding domestic)	4.92 (0.22)	5.17 (0.36)	4.69 (0.26)	0.28	10.19 (0.15)	10.26 (0.20)	10.13 (0.22)	0.67
Domestic work hours	8.94 (0.17)	8.45 (0.26)	9.37 (0.18)	0.00	4.04 (0.15)	4.09 (0.21)	4.00 (0.21)	0.74
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	2.24 (0.73)	1.77 (1.20)	2.65 (0.87)	0.56	3.73 (0.94)	2.88 (1.22)	4.47 (1.36)	0.39
Child marriage ever acceptable (for respondent)	0.51 (0.04)	0.59 (0.06)	0.44 (0.06)	0.08	0.70 (0.04)	0.77 (0.05)	0.64 (0.05)	0.09
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	0.78 (0.07)	0.98 (0.11)	0.61 (0.08)	0.01	1.18 (0.09)	1.40 (0.14)	0.98 (0.10)	0.02
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.60 (0.04)	0.62 (0.06)	0.59 (0.05)	0.71	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.79
N	581	273	308		581	273	308	

Note: Baseline comparison includes the complete panel sample. Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. p -values <0.05 indicate statistically significant differences between the Vouchers-only and Vouchers + EA\$E groups on the corresponding baseline outcome. Grey cells indicate that these questions were not asked to this group.[†] refers to reported economic IPV experience for women and perpetration for men.

7.2. Respondent characteristics at baseline

Women and men were approximately 43 years and 50 years old at baseline, respectively (Appendix [Table A-5](#)). Women tended to get married younger than men – average age at first marriage was 20 years for women but 26 years for men. Most of the panel sample was literate, and approximately 30% of women and 32% of men had a primary-level education, and 27% of women and men had a secondary-level education. Husbands were reported to be heads of household in 89% of households. On average, there were seven people per household and households reported earning approximately 13.5 million Syrian pounds per annum on average.


7.3. IPV prevalence at baseline

At baseline, approximately 46% of women reported experiencing any economic violence in the prior 12 months, respectively (Appendix [Figure C-1](#); Appendix [Table C-1](#)). On average, women experienced one type of economic IPV – the most common types of economic IPV reported were that husbands spent money needed for the household on themselves (28 percent), followed by refusing to give wives money (27 percent), and stopping wives from working outside the household (26%) (Appendix [Figure C-2](#)). In contrast, only 26% of men reported perpetrating any economic IPV at baseline, with the most common form being stopping wives from working outside the household (15 percent).

7.4. Baseline predictors of IPV

To further unpack the study context at baseline, we examine baseline predictors of women’s experiences of economic or emotional IPV in the past 12 months, and men’s reported perpetration of economic IPV during the same period. At baseline, women were less likely to report having experienced economic IPV if their husbands were more educated (all categories compared to no schooling) or if their husbands were heads of household compared to women being heads of household. Women were also less likely to report having experienced emotional IPV if their husbands were heads of household. Men in households that had higher household income were more likely to report perpetrating economic IPV. There were no other statistically significant baseline predictors of women’s experiences or men’s perpetration of IPV.

Figure 7-1 Baseline predictors of economic and emotional violence



Note: Figure presents OLS estimates of outcomes regressed on baseline individual and household characteristics, with clustered standard errors and 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences and perpetration are reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes.

8. Impact Findings

We begin presenting the impacts of the programme on the main outcomes, IPV and decision-making, followed by other empowerment outcomes, gender attitudes, perceptions of gender norms in the community, child marriage, and concluding with individual and household wellbeing.


8.1. IPV impacts

LQ1. What are the effects of providing Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only on women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration of IPV?

The EA\$E couple sessions combined with agro-processing vouchers and implemented through FFS led to reductions in women's 12-month experiences of economic and/or emotional IPV (reduced by 25 percentage points) ([Figure 8-1](#); Appendix [Table A-6](#)). Experiences of any economic IPV decreased (reduction of 36 percentage points), with reductions in both the number of types and intensity of economic IPV experience. Similarly, experiences of any emotional IPV decreased (26 percentage points), with reductions in the number of types and

intensity of emotional IPV experiences as well. While there were substantial reductions in women’s reported experiences of 12-month economic IPV, there were no programme effects on men’s reported perpetration of the same type of violence, including number of types and intensity.

Figure 8-1 Programme impacts on economic and emotional IPV




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences and perpetration are reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

When examining the specific economic IPV items, the programme successfully reduced women’s reported experiences, but not men’s perpetration, of all four items ([Figure 8-2](#); Appendix [Table A-7](#)). The largest reductions were in women’s reports of husbands refusing to give wives money (27 percentage points), followed by husbands spending money needed by the household (26 percentage points).

The programme also reduced how women and men reported on economic IPV. Discordance, or mismatched reporting, in economic IPV experiences for women and perpetration by men (21 percentage points) ([Figure 8-3](#)). The largest reductions in discordance were seen in husbands


refusing to give their wives money (24 percentage points) and husbands spending money that the household needed (23 percentage points).

Figure 8-2 Programme impacts on economic IPV items



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences and perpetration are reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Figure 8-3 Programme impacts on economic IPV discordance



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV discordance is reported between women's experiences and men's perpetration within the same household, reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

For emotional IPV, the largest impacts were reductions in women's experiences of being belittled or humiliated (22 percentage points), husbands doing things to scare or intimidate their wives on purpose (21 percentage points) and being insulted or made to feel bad about oneself (20 percentage points) ([Figure 8-3](#); Appendix [Table A-8](#)). There were marginal ($p < 0.10$) reductions in women's experiences of being threatened about divorce and no reductions in threatening to hurt her or someone she cares about.

Figure 8-4 Programme impacts on emotional IPV items



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences are reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8.2. Empowerment impacts

LQ2. What are the programme impacts on shared decision making and other empowerment measures?

Sole or joint decision-making: The programme had a range of impacts on empowerment measures. For instance, women in Vouchers + EA\$E households reported making a larger proportion of household decisions solely or jointly (increased by 25 percentage points) ([Figure 8-5](#); Appendix [Table A-9](#)). There were no impacts for men in the proportion of sole or joint decisions made. Men, however, were already making 96% of the household decisions solely or jointly at baseline.

On examining individual items, the Vouchers + EA\$E interventions improved women's sole or joint decision making across all items that were administered: the largest improvements were in decisions about making major purchases (33 percentage points), who works outside the house (32 percentage points), and land use (32 percentage points) ([Figure 8-6](#); Appendix [Table](#)

[A-9](#)). For men, there were marginal ($p < 0.10$) increases in sole or joint decision-making related to keeping money from agricultural production (4 percentage points). There were no other statistically significant impacts on men's sole or joint decision-making.


Sole decision-making: The programme decreased the proportion of women's sole decision-making by 4 percentage points ([Figure 8-5](#); Appendix [Table A-9](#)). There were no programme effects on the same outcome for men.

Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households were less likely to report making sole decisions about food purchases (15 percentage points) and savings (12 percentage points) ([Figure 8-7](#); Appendix [Table A-9](#)). There were no other effects on women's sole decision making items or on any sole decision-making items for men.

Joint decision-making: Women reported making a larger proportion of joint decisions as a result of the programme by 28 percentage points ([Figure 8-5](#); Appendix [Table A-9](#)). There were no statistically significant programme effects on the proportion of joint decisions made for men.


The largest gains in women's joint decision making were regarding who works outside the home and making major purchases, which both increased by 33 percentage points ([Figure 8-8](#); Appendix [Table A-9](#)). There were no statistically significant programme effects on any of the joint decision making items for men.

Figure 8-5 Programme impacts on decision-making composite outcomes




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-6 Programme impacts on sole or joint decision-making items




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-7 Programme impacts on sole decision-making items



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-8 Programme impacts on joint decision-making items



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Group membership: There were no programme impacts on women’s group membership (Figure 8-9; Appendix Table A-10). The overall prevalence of group membership was low at baseline and endline (Appendix Table A-4).


Sense of control: Women in the Vouchers + EA\$E households reported having more of a sense of control (a marginal increase by 1.42 points on a scale of -24 to 24, equivalent to approximately a 3% increase) compared to women in Vouchers-only households (Figure 8-9; Appendix Table A-10).

8.3. Time use impacts

LQ3. What are the programme impacts on time spent on work, including domestic work?

The Vouchers + EA\$E interventions did not change the total number of hours that women or men worked daily (Figure 8-9; Appendix Table A-10). However, on breaking down daily time use into different categories, we found that the programme reduced women’s domestic work burden by 0.61 hours or about 37 minutes per day. There were no changes in men’s working hours as a result of the programme.

Figure 8-9 Programme impacts on working hours, group membership and sense of control



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix Table A-2 for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8.4. Gender attitudes and perceptions of gender norms impacts

LQ4. Does the intervention influence women's and men's gender attitudes and perceptions of community gender norms, including those related to child marriage?


The programme improved composite gender attitudes scores among women (by 4.7 points or approximately 9 percent), reflecting more equitable attitudes among women in Vouchers + eEA\$E households compared to women in Vouchers-only households ([Figure 8-10](#); Appendix [Table A-11](#)). There were no statistically significant changes in men's composite gender attitudes scores as a result of the programme.

When assessing impacts on individual items, however, we see changes for both women and men in Vouchers + EA\$E households compared to Vouchers-only households ([Figure 8-11](#); Appendix [Table A-11](#)). Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households had more equitable attitudes on several statements¹⁷, including women being responsible for buying and cooking food, men working outside and women looking after the family (against gendered roles), and women speaking in public. There were no changes in women's attitudes surrounding women in leadership, daughters working outside the home, and women tolerating violence. Findings for men were statistically significant only in two instances in our main specification: men were more likely to support women in leadership ($p < 0.10$), but less likely to agree with gender equity about buying and cooking food. These changes in men's gender attitudes about buying and cooking food were also driven by larger increases in Vouchers-only households (change of 25 percentage points) compared to Vouchers + EA\$E households (change of 4 percentage points) (Appendix [Table C-1](#)).

There were no programme impacts on perceptions of gender norms in the community for women and men, alike ([Figure 8-10](#); Appendix [Table A-12](#)), likely reflecting that it takes longer to see changes in such outcomes.


¹⁷ All statements were coded to align agreement with more gender equitable attitudes. Accordingly, positive values indicate improvements and negative values otherwise.


Figure 8-10 Programme impacts on gender attitudes and perceptions of norms



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. For norms measures, respondents were asked about their perceptions of proportions of women and men in the community who agreed with each statement. For example, the first purple bar of 3.56 refers to the programme's impact on women's perceptions of the proportion of men in the community who agree with the statement that women should be allowed to work outside of the home. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-11 Programme impacts on gender attitude items





Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


8.5. Child marriage impacts

The Vouchers + EA\$E intervention decreased whether women would consider child marriage for their own daughters (reduced by 10 percentage points), but there were no such effects for men ([Figure 8-12](#); Appendix [Table A-13](#)). However, there were no programme impacts on the acceptability of child marriage for their own daughters or the number of acceptable situations of child marriage for women and men. Women and men in Vouchers + EA\$E households were more likely to be worried about family honour (increased by 7 percentage points and 11 percentage points, respectively) compared to their counterparts in Vouchers-only households. However, these results can be explained by imbalance in these outcomes at baseline and larger reductions (trends) in Vouchers-only compared to Vouchers + EA\$E households during the study period (Appendix [Table A-4](#)). For example, at baseline, 12% of women in Vouchers-only households compared to five percent of women in Vouchers + EA\$E households reported that being worried about family's honour was an acceptable reason for child marriage (Appendix [Table C-6](#)). At endline, only three percent of women in both groups reported acceptance on the same item, revealing a larger reduction for women in Vouchers-only households compared to Vouchers + EA\$E households. As difference-in-differences estimations take into account

baseline and endline levels, the larger reductions for the control group appear as “increases” in acceptance.¹⁸ Therefore, these results should not be inferred as unintended negative effects of the programme. Similar patterns emerge for men’s acceptance of bride price and being worried about family honour impacts.

Women in treatment households were more likely to make decisions about whether children in the family should marry (increased by 39 percentage points) compared to women in control households. However, it should be noted that this increase does not necessarily indicate that decisions themselves actually changed regarding child marriage. Gender attitudes about child marriage also improved for women in Vouchers + EA\$E households (increased by 12 percentage points), but there were no such effects for men.


Figure 8-12 Programme impacts on child marriage outcomes



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. The first instance of child marriage acceptance refers to whether the respondent considers child marriage acceptable for their own daughters under any circumstances. The second instance of child marriage being unacceptable refers to respondents’ attitudes about whether child marriage is unacceptable. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

¹⁸ Difference-in-differences crude estimate = (Change between endline and baseline for Vouchers + EA\$E households) - (Change between endline and baseline for Vouchers-only households) = (0.03-0.05) - (0.03 - 0.12) = (-0.02) - (-0.09) = 0.07 increase; our regression specification includes covariates not captured in this crude estimate and illustrative example.

Figure 8-13 Programme impacts on child marriage outcomes



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8.6. Individual, spousal and household wellbeing impacts


LQ5. Does the programme affect individual wellbeing, relationship quality, and household welfare?

There were few impacts on mental health ([Figure 8-15](#); Appendix [Table A-14](#)). Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households reported reductions in feeling depressed weekly (7 percentage points) but were marginally ($p < 0.10$) more likely to report feeling worried monthly. Men in Vouchers + EA\$E households were marginally less likely to feel worried monthly, but there were no other mental health impacts of the programme for men.

In contrast, both women's and men's wellbeing improved as a result of the programme ([Figure 8-16](#); Appendix [Table A-14](#)). Compared to Vouchers-only households, in Vouchers + EA\$E households, women and men reported increases in wellbeing scores (12 percentage points and 11 percentage points, respectively). For women, these impacts were driven by increased agreement on statements about feeling positive about oneself, optimistic about the future, and


actively contributing to the happiness of others. There were no statistically significant changes in men's individual items on wellbeing, but most statements shifted positively.

Figure 8-14 Programme impacts on mental health



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. Respondents were asked about how often they felt worried with response options of Daily, Weekly, or Monthly. A similar question was asked about feeling depressed. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-15 Programme impacts on wellbeing




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

An examination of relationship quality shows that both women and men reported feeling cared for by their spouse many times (improvements by 18 percentage points for women and 9 percentage points for men) because of the programme ([Figure 8-16](#); Appendix [Table A-14](#)). Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households were also more likely to report feeling respected by their spouses and satisfaction with their marriages, even with already high levels of satisfaction at baseline (Appendix [Table C-1](#)), but there were no such changes for men. There were also no programme effects on whether the couple had quarreled in the past 12 months, as reported by women.


To assess household welfare, we measured programme impacts on household income. We did not find any programme impacts on the log of household income in Syrian pounds, as reported by women or men ([Figure 8-17](#); Appendix [Table A-14](#)).

Figure 8-16 Programme impacts on relationship quality



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-17 Programme impacts on household income




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8.7. Impacts by region

We only present impacts for Homs because of an insufficient number of clusters in Rural Damascus. Our results from Homs are qualitatively similar to the main impacts. The programme reduced women’s reported experiences of any IPV (23 percentage points), any economic IPV (36 percentage points) and any emotional IPV (24 percentage points) ([Figure 8-18](#)). There were no programme impacts on men’s reported perpetration of economic IPV. Women in Vouchers + EA\$E households reported reductions in experiencing all the four types of economic IPV, with strongest impacts on husbands spending money that the household needed on themselves ([Figure 8-19](#)). There were no changes in men’s individual economic IPV perpetration items. For emotional IPV, the largest impacts were reductions in women’s experiences of being belittled or humiliated (23 percentage points), husbands doing things to scare or intimidate their wives on purpose (22 percentage points) and being insulted or made to feel bad about oneself (22 percentage points), similar to the overall impacts ([Figure 8-20](#)).


All other programme impacts for Homs are presented in [Appendix E](#).

Figure 8-18 Programme impacts on IPV, Homs



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences and perpetration are reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Figure 8-19 Programme impacts on economic IPV items, Homs



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences and perpetration are reported for the 12

months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 8-20 Programme impacts on emotional IPV items, Homs



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. IPV experiences and perpetration are reported for the 12 months prior to the survey. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for further details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8.8. Results from additional specifications

Impact estimates for the single difference and whether respondent attended all specifications are provided in [Appendix A](#). We provide a brief summary of these findings for the main outcomes below.

IPV outcomes

Single-difference estimates confirm that the programme successfully reduced women’s reported experiences of any IPV (16 percentage points), any economic IPV (24 percentage points) and emotional IPV (17 percentage points) (Appendix [Table A-6](#)), which are slightly lower than difference-in-difference estimates. Similar effects were seen across individual economic IPV items for women (Appendix [Table A-7](#)). Compared to the difference-in-difference estimates, which showed reductions in four out of five types of emotional IPV items, single-difference estimates showed reductions in all five types of emotional IPV items (Appendix [Table A-8](#)). There were no significant programme effects on

men's reported perpetration of economic IPV, including by item (Appendix [Table A-6](#) and [Table A-7](#)).

For women, attending all sessions was strongly correlated with reductions in reporting any economic IPV (by 20 percentage points) but not emotional IPV. There were no correlations between men's attendance at all sessions and economic IPV perpetration.

Shared decision-making

The programme also increased the proportion of decisions that women reported making jointly (28 percentage points) and decreased the proportion of decisions they reported making solely (3 percentage points), similar to difference-in-differences estimates (Appendix [Table A-9](#)). While single-difference estimates also indicate positive shifts in all of women's joint decision-making items, the estimates are sometimes higher and sometimes lower than difference-in-differences estimates. We still find no programme effects on the proportion of men's sole, joint or sole or joint decisions with single-differences. However, there were marginal ($p < 0.10$) reductions in men's sole decisions related to selling or buying items for family, food purchases, who works outside the house, and ($p < 0.05$) savings, which were not seen with difference-in-differences estimates. There were also marginal improvements in men's reports of joint decision making related to the same items, except for food purchases.

Women's attendance at all sessions was also positively associated with joint decision making and negatively related to sole decision-making. Men's attendance at all sessions was correlated with reductions in sole decision making on selling and buying family items, food purchases, who works outside the home, and savings; and increases in joint decision-making regarding buying and selling items, and savings. Due to the selection into attending all sessions, however, we emphasise that these findings are correlational and not causal.

Changes in other outcomes

Compared to difference-in-difference estimates, men's gender attitudes scores improved (by 2.15 points or 4 percent) with single difference estimates (Appendix [Table A-10](#)).

The number of acceptable situations of child marriage decreased for women (by 0.38) with single difference estimates, and women were less likely to consider economic problems, daughter's economic care, girl wanted to marry as acceptable reasons for child marriage (Appendix [Table A-13](#)). Increases on the item of being worried about family honour were no

longer statistically significant for women or men. Men's consideration of bride price as an acceptable reason for child marriage was also no longer significant with single difference estimates, and they were marginally less likely to consider economic problems as an acceptable reason or sole decide about whether children in the family should marry.

With single-difference estimates, women were more likely to report that they felt that people respected them (Appendix [Table A-14](#)).

All other impact estimates are provided in Appendix [Table A-10](#) - [Table A-14](#).

9. Limitations

Below we describe the methodological and operational limitations of the impact evaluation clustered around seven main themes:

1. **Study design and village assignment:** Village assignment could not follow pure randomisation because of operation and access constraints. Relying on a simulation-based procedure was used to minimise any potential bias, and the baseline balance tests indicate that the treatment and control villages were largely comparable. Only some baseline differences were observed for a limited number of outcomes (which is to be expected even when randomising). In addition, a small number of villages deviated from their original assignment due to implementation constraints.¹⁹ Overall balance across a wide range of baseline characteristics suggests that the simulation procedure was successful and that treatment and control groups were broadly comparable at baseline (Appendix [Table A-5](#)).
2. **Participation and attrition:** Participation in the programme was voluntary, and women and men with higher education were more likely to enrol in the couple's curriculum. Although both wife's and husband's education is controlled for in the analysis, this self-selection combined with the focus on couples may limit the generalisability of the findings to less educated populations or contexts with different socio-economic characteristics. Participants in Vouchers + EA\$E households also received a small stipend to support attendance. While attrition did not differ by treatment status, the incentive could have influenced who remained in the programme, potentially affecting

¹⁹ For example, Qotniyeh was initially planned to receive Vouchers + EA\$E but did not. Ashrafiya and Qanafiyeh were initially assigned as Vouchers-only villages, but ended up receiving EA\$E. Also, activities in Hadideh were cancelled.

estimated impacts. In addition, as previously discussed, data collection in certain areas was challenging following changes in government control. Ongoing security concerns and population displacement within and across villages further complicated fieldwork and increased study attrition. Although attrition did not differ by treatment status and most baseline indicators were balanced, this attrition limits the generalizability of our findings.

3. **Programme delivery and contextual adaptations:** The delivery of the programme varied across locations in response to local contextual and cultural considerations. In some areas, women and men participated jointly in sessions, while in others, sessions were conducted in gender-segregated groups. While these adaptations were necessary to ensure contextual appropriateness, these considerations may have influenced programme effects. Furthermore, due to limited sample size and the absence of sufficient statistical power, we are unable to formally assess heterogeneity in impacts by delivery modality (CEFE vs. DGS), FFS type, governorate (only 10 clusters in Rural Damascus), or men's characteristics. The separate effects of Vouchers + EA\$E and Dimitra Clubs could also not be assessed due to delays in Dimitra Club implementation.
4. **Timing of the data collection:** Baseline and endline surveys captured IPV experiences over the 12 months, while the interval between survey rounds was shorter than one year. As a result, some endline reports may overlap with the period preceding baseline and impacts should be interpreted as a lower bound effect of the intervention, as we might still be capturing baseline experiences of IPV during the follow-up.
5. **Administration of sensitive modules:** Based on earlier fieldwork indicating a high prevalence of IPV against women and girls, we were cautious about administering the standard IPV module to women to protect both women respondents and interviewers. Consequently, we did not collect detailed data on particularly sensitive forms of IPV such as physical IPV. Similarly, reflecting implementation partners' concerns and ISDC's 'do no harm' policy, we asked husbands only about economic IPV perpetration, but not about the perpetration of emotional or physical IPV. These choices were made to prioritise the safety of wives and interviewers. As a result, we did not measure IPV severity using conventional methods, which consider the severe and sensitive forms of IPV types. These changes may limit the comparability of this study with other studies. Furthermore, because we do not measure the same outcomes for husbands and wives,

our ability to assess some impacts on husbands and examine couple concordance on all IPV outcomes is limited.

6. **Social desirability bias:** Responses from both men and women may have been influenced by their perceived expectations of the implementation and evaluation teams, particularly at endline and after the rollout of the couple sessions. In addition, although FAO implemented the programme and supported data collection, different teams were involved in these aspects: the implementation team was separate from the monitoring, evaluation and learning team. While the utmost care was given to ensuring privacy and confidentiality, given the nature of the couple's curriculum and some of the outcomes, the data are highly subject to social desirability bias.
7. **One dataset with multiple outcomes and specifications:** The analysis covers a large number of outcomes and regression specifications. Increasing the number of outcomes and specifications increases the probability of finding statistically significant results. However, adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing are beyond the scope of this report. Furthermore, we only use primary data conducted through this RCT for our analyses, limiting our ability to triangulate our findings.
8. **Sample size limitations:** We do not test impacts by additional characteristics such as household income, disability status, or education because of limitations with sample sizes. Considering these overlapping intersecting identities may reveal within-group nuances that are masked in our overall impacts.

Finally, the unique context of this study and exclusive focus on couples limits the generalizability of these findings to other settings and populations. Nevertheless, despite these main limitations and potentially others that are not discussed, the study adds a wealth of evidence from an understudied context to understand what works to improve household welfare and prevent IPV.

10. Discussion

This section synthesises key findings from our evaluation, interpreted against elements of the Prevention Collaborative's Prevention Triad Framework (Stern et al., 2023). While we interpret the results and add key factors keeping the Syrian context and population in mind, there is much less direct and recent evidence from the country due the challenging nature of the

conflict and setting. Specifically, there are no other evaluations of programmes that combine economic and social support to assess IPV impacts in Homs and Rural Damascus.²⁰ This study contributes to filling this evidence gap. We also touch on aspects of the programme model and operational foundations in this section and the conclusions. Furthermore, we situate these findings within the broader household wellbeing, women's empowerment and IPV prevention literature (see [Section 1.2](#)) to develop insights that may be transferable to other contexts.

First, the programme was **successful in reducing women's reported experiences of economic and emotional IPV** in the 12 months prior to the survey. We found no similar effects on men's reported perpetration of economic IPV. There is an emerging literature related to economic IPV, especially related to its drivers, but there is much less evidence on what works to prevent this form of abuse (Böhret et al., 2025). In rural Côte d'Ivoire, another conflict-affected context, an impact evaluation of EA\$E sessions along with Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) found reductions in women's reported experiences of economic IPV six to eight months after the programme ended (Gupta et al., 2013). The study did not capture men's perpetration of IPV, but supporting qualitative interviews with men highlighted the strong reliance on traditional gender roles with men being the main breadwinners and the complex linkages with poverty and conflict, similar to our study setting (Falb et al., 2014). Findings from other settings also show that food insecurity is a significant driver of men's economic IPV perpetration (Postmus et al., 2022). Therefore, qualitative interviews to assess why men's behaviours did not change, and whether these were due to a lack of changes in gender attitudes or broader economic insecurity, can help further unpack these lack of effects.

Our study was also conducted shortly after EA\$E sessions were completed, thereby limiting the time frame for programme impacts to emerge. In addition, we do not discount that women's and men's responses may have been highly subject to social desirability bias given this short time frame. Other studies in the Spangaro et al. (2021) systematic review on programmes tackling IPV in conflict-affected settings also had a maximum follow-up period of two years. As changing patterns of abuse and gendered social norms require longer durations, there is a crucial need to further ground evaluation timelines with theories of change and allow sufficient time for impacts to materialise. Nevertheless, this study adds immense value to the existing evidence base, filling specific gaps around integrating economic empowerment strategies with

²⁰ Under the BLRS, CARE and Mercy Corps through the Syria Resilience Initiative implemented the Indashyikirwa couple's curriculum and cash transfers to women project in Al-Hasakah governorate at the same time of this study. ISDC evaluated that project as well and the final impact report from that study is not yet publicly available.

gender-transformative components and including measures of men's perpetration of this form of violence (Böhret et al., 2025).

Second, the **programme improved women's reported joint decision-making, and marginally reduced men's sole decision-making on a few items**. We found improvements in women's reported joint decision-making across all items. Although we found no significant effects on the proportion of decisions made solely or jointly by men in our main model, additional robust checks indicated marginal reductions in men's sole decision making surrounding buying or selling items, who works outside the home, and savings. There were corresponding improvements in their reported joint decision-making, demonstrating that the programme shifted intrahousehold decision-making on these specific items in robustness checks.

These patterns in decision-making, that is finding more and larger impacts on women's than men's joint decision-making, is not uncommon. For example, a study in Afghanistan examining women's economic and social empowerment found that women reported more household decision-making in the form of being able to raise their concerns or make suggestions to their husbands, but felt unable to challenge their husbands' views (Gibbs et al., 2020). Although women may perceive these concerns and suggestions as contributing to decisions, husbands may not have similar perceptions. More broadly, decision-making indicators are subject to several constraints, including differences in perceptions between husbands and wives on what constitutes a joint decision, the need to understand these perceptions in each context, and whether these measures appropriately capture women's status (Acosta et al., 2020; Seymour & Peterman, 2018; Peterman et al., 2021). Accordingly, our findings on increases in women's joint decision-making, but only marginal improvements in men's, may indicate differences in perceptions of joint decision-making, rather than a lack of impacts. We also caution that our endline survey was conducted one month after the end of the sessions, and that responses to these questions may be highly prone to social desirability bias, which we elaborate on in the limitations section.

Reductions in men's sole decision making especially around work and savings, albeit marginal, point to early promise of the programme in improving shared household decision-making. Similar to results from the Côte d'Ivoire EA\$E study (Gupta et al., 2013), we expect that these improvements in shared decision-making lead to improvements in relationships and consequently reductions in women's experiences of IPV, supporting a key component of the theory of change.

The programme also **reduced women's daily domestic work** by approximately 37 minutes. There were no programme effects on men's daily domestic work. These findings highlight the need to understand changes in domestic work burdens caused by changes in women's employment. In some cases, rather than husbands helping with household chores, domestic work may fall on other women in the household including younger girls, resulting in a potentially adverse effect of the programme. Additionally, there were no changes in men's attitudes about gendered work roles, but attending all sessions was positively related to more equitable attitudes around work, that men should work outside and women should look after the family. Together, these findings provide limited support for Pathway 5 on valuing women's work.

Third, **women's and men's gender attitudes generally became more equitable** because of the EA\$E programme. For women, there were shifts in gender equitable attitudes about nearly all items, but shifts in men's attitudes were significant in supporting women in leadership roles and women working in semi-segregated environments. Surprisingly, men's attitudes about who should buy and cook food were less gender-equitable, even in robustness checks. We cannot untangle the reasons for this unintended effect, especially because discussions around gender roles in the family were included in the curriculum. Furthermore, while the **programme improved women's attitudes about tolerating violence and perceived shame in seeking help for violence**, there were no such effects for men. There were also no programme impacts on respondents' perceptions of gender norms in the community. Changing attitudes and norms require a longer timeframe than what was covered in this evaluation, thus explaining a lack of these effects. However, in the medium to long term, if women's attitudes and behaviours shift faster than those of men, these dynamics could potentially lead to increased IPV through male backlash effects. A follow-up survey to determine if and by how much women's versus men's attitudes change will help address this concern. In addition, the couple intervention was delivered at the household-level, rather than the community-level, which may explain the lack of effects on community-level norms, and the need for community-level interventions to reinforce positive normative change.

Fourth, women in the programme reported being less likely to consider child marriage for their children, but **effects on the reasons of acceptability of child marriage varied for women and men**. Our main findings revealed that both women and men reported that child marriage was acceptable if they were worried about the family honour and men reported that child marriage was acceptable to accept the bride price, but these effects were driven by imbalances in these

items at baseline and the Vouchers-only households experiencing larger reductions in these outcomes, signalling an overall trend in reduced acceptance of child marriage.

Women's attitudes towards child marriage and reported shared decision-making regarding the marriage of their children also improved because of this programme. Although child marriage was a common practice prior to the conflict, conflict- and displacement-related concerns have added new drivers of child marriage in the country (Mourtada et al., 2017; UNFPA, 2025).²¹ While we see improvements in attitudes and shared decision-making related to child marriage, we are unable to assess whether actual decisions or behaviours also changed as a result of this curriculum, i.e., if couples decided on their children's marriage together or delayed it altogether.

Individual wellbeing, relationship quality and household welfare are key mediators in our theory of change, and were also the entry point to engaging couples and preventing IPV in this programme. We find that the **programme was successful in improving women's and men's wellbeing and feelings of being cared for by spouses. More women in the programme also reported feeling respected by their husbands and satisfied in marriage.** Economic interventions and social programming, separately and in combination, have shown improvements in relationship quality among women and men (Bourey et al., 2015; Stern et al., 2020). Indeed, improved relationship quality is an important stepping stone to reduced IPV, but operationalization of this construct varies across studies and includes emotional closeness, honesty, benevolence, communication frequency, feelings of respect, trust and decreased conflict or quarreling, among others (Buller et al., 2018; Health et al., 2020; Levtoev et al., 2022; Roy et al., 2019). We emphasise, however, that even shortly after the programme ended, we find improvements in the measures we included in the survey, highlighting that improving relationship quality may be an important pathway to reduced IPV. There were no broader changes in households' economic outcomes as a result of the programme. A follow-up survey would allow time for such changes to emerge.

Overall, the programme was successful in beginning to shift individual wellbeing and improve relationship quality, and contributed to improving shared decision making and mitigating economic and emotional IPV in the home.

²¹ There are few updated estimates on the prevalence of early marriage in Syria, but some recent estimates from Syrian refugees in other countries are available (Girls Not Brides, n.d.).

11. Conclusions

This section draws together the key findings and provides an overview of programme strengths and areas for improvements in relation to the different pathways of change presented in the theory of change. While we do not formally test mediation effects, we identify pathways along which significant impacts are observed. We therefore interpret these pathways as indicative of potential mechanisms contributing to reductions in IPV. In doing so, we answer part of LQ6. *Which pathways are most promising to meet the programme's objectives?*

Pathway 1: Reduced financial stress and improved household welfare through vouchers

The programme provided partial support for this pathway. Both women and men reported improved wellbeing ([Figure 8-15](#)), alongside a reduction in women's domestic workload ([Figure 8-9](#)), indicating that the programme may have contributed to improved household welfare through these channels. However, there were no observed effects on household income ([Figure 8-17](#)) when EA\$E was combined with vouchers, suggesting that the addition of the EA\$E couple sessions did not translate into short-term measurable income gains beyond those achieved through vouchers alone, during this study timeframe. These findings highlight that the improved wellbeing and relationship quality pathway is promising even in the absence of improved household income.

Pathway 2: Shared decision-making through joint budgeting and planning from EA\$E

The programme demonstrated strong support for this pathway, particularly for women. The programme substantially increased women's participation in household decision-making ([Figure 8-5](#) to [Figure 8-8](#)), mainly driven by joint rather than sole decisions. We observed improvements across decisions on major purchases, employment and savings. At the same time, women's sole decision-making declined, suggesting a shift towards collaborative decisions rather than simply transferring authority from men to women. Marginal reductions in men's sole decision-making and corresponding improvements in their joint decision-making regarding buying and selling items, employment and savings, point to early promise of the curriculum in these domains.

Pathway 3: Shared decision-making through effective communication from EA\$E

The findings also support this pathway. Improvements in relationship quality (Figure 8-16), including more women feeling respected, more women reporting marital satisfaction, and more couples feeling cared for by their spouses, likely reflect enhanced communication and relational dynamics. These improvements occurred alongside significant reductions in women's experiences of emotional IPV, particularly being humiliated, intimidated, or insulted (Figure 8-4). The reduction in spousal discordance in reporting of economic IPV further suggests improved mutual understanding on how economic behaviours are perceived and reported. Together, these findings indicate that the EA\$E curriculum, which includes sessions to improve spousal communication, plays a central role in shaping everyday interactions between spouses.

Pathway 4: Reduction of IPV by challenging “power over” from EA\$E

Evidence provides partial support for this pathway. There were significant reductions in women's experiences of economic and emotional IPV (Figure 8-1). This effect was consistent across all IPV items, particularly in Homs. However, these results are not consistent with men's reporting of IPV perpetration. The difference in reporting likely reflects a combination of underreporting by men at baseline, increased awareness and honesty at endline, and the limitation of short-term follow-up in truly capturing behavioural change among perpetrators. Importantly, the lack of change among men does not diminish the substantial reductions in women's experience, which already represent meaningful improvements in women safety.

Pathway 5: Improvement of household and individual welfare by valuing women's work from EA\$E

There is partial support for this pathway. While total working hours did not change, women experienced a reduction in domestic labour time (Figure 8-9), coupled with an increase in sense of control and wellbeing (Figure 8-9). Importantly, improved wellbeing among couples (Figure 8-15) may further suggest that valuing women's work had additional benefits beyond economic outcomes. However, mental health impacts were more limited (Figure 8-14), which likely reflect the ongoing psychological distress due to the ongoing conflict and instability, and may require more tailored intervention.

Potential unintended or adverse effects

The evaluation did not identify any adverse effects, including on reasons for child marriage acceptance and gender attitudes about buying and cooking food among men. These two results, which initially appeared as adverse effects, were driven by larger positive changes in the outcomes in Vouchers-only households compared to Vouchers + EA\$E households. However, we highlight caution on the time spent on domestic work findings ([Figure 8-9](#)). Although there were reductions in women's daily time spent on domestic work, there were no corresponding shifts in men's domestic work. We speculate that changes in domestic work for women may fall on other women in the household including younger girls, resulting in a potentially adverse effect of the programme that will need to be tested in a future evaluation.

In sum, the programme successfully strengthened key normative and relational pathways of change, particularly among women, and showed early reductions in all forms of IPV in this study. However, economic stress reduction and male behavioural transformation may require longer timeframes to observe any change.

Despite the challenges faced methodologically and operationally, the programme's ability to influence key risk factors for IPV, even in highly patriarchal and conflict settings, demonstrates its transformative potential. Overall, this study provides valuable evidence for strengthening violence against women and girls programmes in conflict settings.

12. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

Following the discussion and these conclusions, we present the main lessons learnt during this evaluation and provide targeted, actionable recommendations to strengthen the programme (ordered alphabetically as they are equally important and speak to different aspects of the programme and evaluation). In doing so, we highlight insights that could be transferable to future VAWG prevention efforts:

Assess effects and sustainability in the longer term



Lessons learnt → Changes in some outcomes, including attitudes and norms, require long timeframes to emerge. Evaluations should be aligned with these longer timelines and plan multiple follow-ups, if possible, to assess whether impacts are sustained in the longer term.



Areas for future research → The evaluation team should conduct a longer-term follow-up assessment (approximately one year after the endline survey if feasible) to capture whether programme impacts emerged, strengthened, weakened or dissipated over time. Such assessments could also capture community dynamics and changes in intrahousehold work distribution because of women's changing roles.

Capture community dynamics



Lessons learnt → Shifting entrenched social norms requires approaches that target individuals, households, and communities. Evaluations focused on a single programme component could underestimate impacts on normative change if programme elements are designed to influence these outcomes.



Recommendations for programme strengthening → For the next phase of the programme, programme implementers should explicitly align the household-level curriculum with community-level interventions such as Dimitra Clubs, where feasible. Strengthening linkages may reinforce positive normative changes and maximise impacts on perceptions beyond participating couples.



Areas for future research → During the next programme phase, M&E teams should assess women's involvement with Dimitra Clubs through a follow-up survey. Furthermore, incorporating key informant interviews with opinion leaders and influencers of Dimitra Clubs can help us further understand opportunities for and barriers to the diffusion of gender-equitable norms at the community level.

Evaluate additional forms of IPV



Lessons learnt → Improvements in women's gender-equitable attitudes, but not men's, may signal the potential for male backlash. When changes in women's and men's attitudes and behaviours are uneven, some men may perceive changes to established power dynamics as threatening.



Recommendations for programme strengthening → The programme team should monitor for backlash and integrate discussions around multiple IPV forms within the curriculum, including physical violence, in ways that ensure participant safety.



Areas for future research → Future M&E efforts should employ complementary qualitative and experimental methods such as list experiments to explore men's perpetration of different IPV types. These approaches can help determine response bias and the level of concordance in answers between couples, identify potential backlash risks, and inform targeted strategies to prevent harm while supporting progressive changes in gender norms. Such complementary measures can be incorporated into a post-endline follow-up survey and/or future programme phases.

Expand theory of change to differentiate household wellbeing and women's empowerment



Lessons learnt → Capturing multiple dimensions of empowerment, such as control over income, asset ownership, access to credit, and sense of autonomy, can help identify more holistic effects on empowerment and potential trade-offs between domains. Collecting data from both women and men within the same household can further allow for the assessment of gender parity gaps.



Recommendations for programme strengthening → In discussions to adapt and improve the programme, the programme design and implementation team can further specify and differentiate between household wellbeing and empowerment outcomes, and identify where they overlap. Such improvements in the programme's theory of change would help guide evaluation designs. Separating these outcomes can help identify the specific mechanisms of change that bring about the strongest impacts.



Areas for future research → Evaluators will need to measure baseline and endline levels of different empowerment dimensions to identify areas of deprivation, trade-offs between dimensions of empowerment (for example, increased participation in productive activities and decision-making may come at the expense of increased workload), and where women continue to lag behind men, reflecting gaps in gender parity between spouses.

Focus more on husbands and boys/young men



Lessons learnt → Programme effects may be uneven between women and men, or take longer to emerge for some groups compared to others.



Recommendations for programme strengthening → The programme implementation team could explore expanding engagement with husbands, adolescent boys, and young men. Such approaches could include additional

discussion sessions for men if feasible, or incorporating more culturally appropriate positive masculinities content in the sessions. These additions may help improve programme impacts among men.



Areas for future research → Researchers should explore why men's behaviours and attitudes did not change and whether, and how, the content or delivery of the curriculum should be altered. This understanding would help improve men's outcomes while fostering additional support for women. A follow-up survey could also help determine whether impacts for men take longer to emerge.

Leverage qualitative and mixed-methods approaches



Lessons learnt → Relying on quantitative data can limit understanding of programme impacts, and underscores the importance of complementary qualitative approaches to explore underlying mechanisms.



Areas for future research → Using complementary qualitative interviews during the post-endline follow-up would help further unpack the lack of effects among men, understand participants' experiences with the programme, and gather feedback to strengthen the programme to meet goals of ending VAWG.

Support and enrol individuals with lower levels of education



Lessons learnt → Additional, intentional targeting may be required to reach women and men with lower literacy or education. The use of visual aids and practical sessions can reach individuals with lower levels of literacy or education.



Recommendations for programme strengthening → Programme implementers should strengthen efforts to identify and enrol women with lower education levels, who face different risks of IPV, in any new EA\$E curriculum implementation. Promoting the accessibility of the EA\$E programme and encouraging participation through community outreach or networks could further boost enrollment.

During sessions, additional inclusion of practical, visual, and participatory session materials and tailored support mechanisms, such as peer mentors or simplified exercises, can help ensure all women can engage effectively.

Understand voucher support



Areas for future research → While this evaluation focused on effects of EA\$E, further research is needed to examine how vouchers were used and what changes materialised in women’s businesses. For instance, monitoring whether households reinvest income from gains into women’s businesses or spend the money on household needs will inform strengthening this component of the programme. Exploring men’s and family members’ involvement in women’s businesses will also provide a clearer understanding of the dynamics women face in agency over their businesses. Qualitative interviews can shed further light on these dynamics to ensure that increases in women’s income do not lead to tensions among couples through backlash effects. These questions could be further explored in a post-endline follow-up survey.

In summary, the EA\$E curriculum, combined with agro-processing vouchers, was effective in reducing women’s experiences of economic and emotional IPV, increasing shared household decision-making especially among women, and improving women’s and men’s wellbeing and spousal relationship quality. To further enhance impact, enrolling couples with lower education, greater engagement with young men and husbands, and evaluation of the programme alongside broader community-level interventions, such as Dimitra Clubs, will be essential for sustaining reductions in VAWG and promoting women’s full participation and agency in economic and social spheres. These findings, lessons, and recommendations aim to strengthen the BLRS VAWG prevention programme, supporting women’s safe and sustainable economic and social participation while mitigating all types of violence in Syria.

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Appendix A: Tables

Table A-1 Content of couples' curriculum

Curriculum	Session	Key points
Discussion Group Series (DGS)	Overview of the Discussion Groups and pre-session	The DGS session key goals and objectives – defining the concept of “the successful family”.
DGS	Household economy	Discussion on Gender Roles in the family – Understanding and analyzing household economics
DGS	Household cash flow	Household economic planning - identifying priorities.
DGS	Setting financial goals	Distinguish between needs and wants – Application of effective communication skills to priorities needs and wants – setting financial goals.
DGS	Dealing with financial stress (part 1)	Discussion and explanation of negotiation and power – the relationship between power and negotiation outcomes.
DGS	Dealing with financial stress (part 2)	Identifying harmful communication practices – the negative effects of violence – applying productive communication skills.
DGS	Budget and planning	Financial planning and understanding joint decision making – allocating resources according to priorities – practicing negotiation in developing the family budget.
DGS	Early marriage 1	The causes of early marriage – the negative effects of early marriage – benefits of delaying marriage for girls, families and society.

DGS	Early marriage 2	The causes of early marriage – the negative effects of early marriage – benefits of delaying marriage for girls, families and society.
DGS	Comprehensive review and reflection	Reflecting on the discussion sessions – couples reflecting on the future and what they would do differently from the past – couples impressions of the sessions.
CEFE	Introduction and overview	Introduction – Agriculture Business Schools concept – The story of Osama.
CEFE	Assessing the farm’s current situation and the feasibility of investing in new opportunities	Identifying available market opportunities – Assessment of weaknesses and strengths and comparing them with market opportunities.
CEFE	SWOT analysis and its application in agricultural work	Sharing experience (Couples share their experience from visiting the market to explore new opportunities and compare them with their strengths and weaknesses) - Suggestions for adding value – Market Discussion.
CEFE	Assessing the compatibility of the new opportunities with the market situation and value chain.	Planning process - Decision-making for farm planning – Evaluation of alternative value chains – Identifying and engaging potential partners – Marketing challenges.
CEFE	Feedback and application of practical exercises.	Comprehensive feedback – Market assessment – the six mechanisms for profit increase – project feasibility.

Note: DGS = Discussion Group Series. CEFE = Competency-based Economies through Formation of Enterprises

Table A-2 Outcome definitions

Outcome	Definition	Available for	Notes
Economic violence (experience)	<p>Any: =1 if woman reports experiencing any type of economic violence from stopped wife from working outside home, spent money household needed, refused to give wife money, took wife's earnings in past year. Response options once, a few times, and many times were coded =1.</p> <p>Number of types: Total number of types of economic violence women reported experiencing in the past year. Ranges from 0-4.</p> <p>Intensity: Summed index of number of types of economic violence (3 types) and frequency of each type (0=Never, 1=Once, 2=A few times, 3=Many times). Ranges from 0-12, with higher values indicating more intensity (frequency or number of types) of economic violence.</p>	Women	—
Economic violence (perpetration)	<p>Any: =1 if man reports perpetrating any type of economic violence from stopped wife from working outside home, spent money household needed, refused to give wife money, took wife's earnings in past year. Response options once, a few times, and many times were coded =1.</p> <p>Number of types: Total number of types of economic violence men reported perpetrating in the past year. Ranges from 0-4.</p> <p>Intensity: Summed index of number of types of economic violence (3 types) and frequency of each type (0=Never, 1=Once, 2=A few times,</p>	Men	—

Outcome	Definition	Available for	Notes
	3=Many times). Ranges from 0-12, with higher values indicating more intensity (frequency or number of types) of economic violence.		
Emotional violence (experience)	<p>Any: =1 if a woman reports experiencing any type of emotional violence from being insulted, belittled or humiliated, verbally threatened to divorce, verbally threatened to hurt, done things to scare or intimate you on purpose. Response options once, a few times, and many times were coded =1.</p> <p>Number of types: Total number of types of economic violence woman reported experiencing in past year</p> <p>Intensity: Summed index of number of types of emotional violence (5 types) and frequency of each type (0=Never, 1=Once, 2=A few times, 3=Many times). Ranges from 0-15, with higher values indicating more intensity (frequency or number of types) of emotional violence.</p>	Women	—
Household decision-making	<p>Proportion of applicable sole or joint decisions made on expenses related to education or health, selling or buying items, purchasing food, who works outside the household, savings how land is used and what crops to plant, selling produce from agricultural production, and spending on major purchases (eight total decisions possible; proportion ranges from 0-1).</p> <p>Proportion of sole decisions on the same items.</p>	Women and men	—
Child marriage decision-making	Respondent makes sole or joint decision on whether children in the family should marry before age 18	Women and men	—

Outcome	Definition	Available for	Notes
Time use	Total number of working hours from time spent caring for children, household, work on own field, off farm work, work on other paid employment	Women and men	Values >24 hours were rescaled to a 24-hour timeline.
Sense of control	Sum of responses to 12 statements. Responses range from -2 (Strongly disagree) to 2 (Strongly agree). Higher values indicate more sense of control, or disagreement with statements that imply no sense of control. Summed index ranges from -24 to 24.	Women	—
Group membership	=1 if woman participates in at least one group in her community from the list of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural/Livestock/Fish Producer Group (including marketing) • Water Users Group • Forest Users Group • Credit or microfinance group • Mutual aid or insurance group (including burial societies) • Trade and Business Association • Civic/charitable group • Another group 	Women	—
Gender attitudes	Sum of responses to 13 statements on gender attitudes. Response options range from -2 (Strongly disagree) to 2 (Strongly agree). Indicator ranges from -26 to 26 with higher values indicating more equitable attitudes.	Women and men	Reverse coded attitudes about child's health, buying and cooking food, men work outside and women look after the family, men have final word, women working outside the home, women speaking in public, women should tolerate violence, women seeking help for violence brings shame to the family
Gender norms	Individual indicators for proportion of women and men who believe: Women should be allowed to work outside the home	Women and men	*Reverse coded "Men have the right to physically hurt their wives"

Outcome	Definition	Available for	Notes
	<p>Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environments Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives*</p> <p>Higher values indicate more equitable gender norms</p>		
Child marriage	<p>Consider child marriage =1 if respondent reports they would be consider marrying their daughters before age 18, and 0 otherwise (binary)</p> <p>Acceptability of child marriage =1 if respondent reports that child marriage is acceptable for any reason from reasons below, and 0 otherwise (binary)</p> <p>Reasons for child marriage (individual binary indicators) If the family/household was having economic problems To collect bride price To ensure that she was economically taken care of If the girl wants to marry If respondent was worried about her or the family's honour</p>	Women and men	–
Wellbeing	<p>Wellbeing index created from the sum of responses to 6 statements. Response options range from -2 (Strongly disagree) to 2 (Strongly agree). Index ranges from -1 to 1 (rescaled from -12 to 12).</p> <p>Individual items were coded as 1= agree or strongly agree on the statement, and 0 otherwise (binary).</p>	Women and men	One statement, “When things go wrong in my life...” reverse coded
Mental health: Worry	Three binary indicators for feeling worried daily, weekly, monthly	Women and men	–
Mental health: Depression	Three binary indicators for feeling depressed daily, weekly, monthly	Women and men	–

Outcome	Definition	Available for	Notes
Relationship quality	<p>Mostly felt cared for by spouse is a binary indicator of feeling cared for for “Many times” (=1) versus “Never”, “Once” and “A few times” (=0).</p> <p>Mostly felt respected by spouse is a binary indicator of feeling cared for for “Many times” (=1) versus “Never”, “Once” and “A few times” (=0).</p> <p>Satisfaction with marriage is a binary indicator coded as =1 if the respondent was said their marriage is “Satisfying” or “Very Satisfying” and =0 otherwise.</p> <p>Couple quarreled is a binary indicator =1 if respondent reported that they quarreled in the past 12 months and =0 otherwise.</p>	Women and men except for couple quarreled which was asked of women only	<p>Feeling cared for by spouse, feeling respected by spouse, and satisfaction with marriage are positive indicators (higher scores = better outcomes).</p> <p>Couple quarreled is coded as a negative indicator (higher = worse outcome).</p>
Disability (Washington Group Short Set Disability Status)	Any 1 domain/question of seeing, hearing, walking, communicating, remembering, or dressing is coded “A lot of difficulty” or “Cannot do it at all”	Women and men	Based on the Washington Group Short Set on Functioning (WG-SS) Syntax Disability3 indicator. Cutoff recommended by the Washington Group
Disability (sum)	Disability index is the sum of responses to 8 statements on difficulty seeing, hearing, walking, communicating, remembering, raising objects, dressing, and using hands. Response options range from to 0 (No difficulty) to 3 (Cannot do it at all). Scores range from 0 to 24, with higher values indicating higher levels of disability.	Women and men	—

Table A-3 Overall attrition and differential attrition by treatment status

	Household lost to follow up (overall) (1)	Household lost to follow up (differential) (2)
Treatment (Vouchers + EA\$E = 1)	0.05 (0.05)	0.85* (0.46)
Wife = 1, Yes	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Wife's age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Wife: Primary education = 1	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.07)
Wife: Secondary education = 1	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.08)
Wife: High school education = 1	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)
Wife: University education = 1	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.09)
Wife has disability (Washington Group Scale) = 1	0.03 (0.04)	0.12 (0.09)
Husband's age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Husband: Primary education = 1	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)
Husband: Secondary education = 1	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.06)
Husband: High school education = 1	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.07)
Husband: University education = 1	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.20* (0.11)
Husband has disability (Washington Group Scale) = 1	0.06 (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)
Husband is head of household (concordance) = 1	0.08* (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)

	Household lost to follow up (overall) (1)	Household lost to follow up (differential) (2)
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Household size	-0.01	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log of household income (Syrian pounds)	0.03	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Homs = 1	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Rural Damascus = 1	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Tall Kalakh = 1	0.00	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treatment*Wife = 1, Yes		0.00
		(0.00)
Treatment*Wife's age		0.00
		(0.01)
Treatment*Wife: Primary education = 1		0.10
		(0.11)
Treatment*Wife: Secondary education = 1		0.11
		(0.13)
Treatment*Wife: High school education = 1		0.04
		(0.12)
Treatment*Wife: University education = 1		0.13
		(0.14)
Treatment*Wife has disability (Washington Group Scale)		-0.16
		(0.10)
Treatment*Husband's age		-0.01
		(0.01)
Treatment*Husband: Primary education = 1		-0.13

	Household lost to follow up (overall) (1)	Household lost to follow up (differential) (2)
Treatment*Husband: Secondary education = 1		(0.12) -0.10
Treatment*Husband: High school education = 1		(0.11) -0.05
Treatment*Husband: University education = 1		(0.11) -0.13
Treatment*Husband has disability (Washington Group Scale)		(0.15) -0.17*
Treatment*Husband is head of household (concordance) = 1		(0.09) 0.13
Treatment*Household size		(0.10) 0.01
Treatment*Log of household income (Syrian pounds)		(0.01) -0.05
Treatment*Homs = 1		(0.04) 0.00
Treatment*Rural Damascus = 1		(0.12) -0.03
Treatment*Tall Kalakh = 1		(0.09) -0.10
Constant	0.22 (0.22)	(0.08) -0.16 (0.30)
Observations	1,520	1,520
R-squared	0.06	0.08

Note: Column 1 provides regression estimations of overall attrition. Column 2 provides regression estimation of differential attrition by treatment status (all variables are interacted with treatment status (Vouchers + EA\$E = 1 and Vouchers-only = 0)). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-4 Baseline outcomes

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Economic or emotional IPV	0.61 (0.04)	0.57 (0.06)	0.64 (0.05)	0.42	-	-	-	-
Types of IPV (0-10)	2.49 (0.25)	2.24 (0.38)	2.70 (0.32)	0.37	-	-	-	-
Intensity of IPV (0-30)	5.06 (0.52)	4.55 (0.79)	5.51 (0.67)	0.36	-	-	-	-
Any emotional violence	0.55 (0.04)	0.51 (0.06)	0.58 (0.05)	0.46	-	-	-	-
Number of types of emotional violence	1.55 (0.15)	1.46 (0.24)	1.62 (0.18)	0.60	-	-	-	-
Intensity of emotional violence (0-15)	3.16 (0.32)	2.97 (0.52)	3.32 (0.40)	0.60	-	-	-	-
Any economic violence	0.46 (0.04)	0.40 (0.06)	0.51 (0.05)	0.15	0.26 (0.03)	0.28 (0.03)	0.25 (0.05)	0.69
Number of types of economic violence	0.94 (0.11)	0.78 (0.15)	1.08 (0.14)	0.16	0.38 (0.04)	0.42 (0.07)	0.35 (0.06)	0.43
Intensity of economic violence (0-12)	1.90 (0.22)	1.57 (0.29)	2.19 (0.30)	0.15	0.82 (0.09)	0.89 (0.13)	0.76 (0.13)	0.48
<i>Types of economic violence</i>								
Stopped wife from working outside home	0.26 (0.04)	0.24 (0.05)	0.28 (0.06)	0.57	0.15 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.03
Spent money household needed	0.28 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.34 (0.04)	0.08	0.12 (0.02)	0.11 (0.03)	0.14 (0.04)	0.51
Refused to give wife money	0.27 (0.03)	0.20 (0.04)	0.32 (0.05)	0.09	0.09 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.58
Took wife's earnings	0.20 (0.03)	0.18 (0.04)	0.22 (0.04)	0.46	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.82

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Discordance in economic violence reporting	0.48 (0.03)	0.46 (0.04)	0.50 (0.04)	0.56	0.48 (0.03)	0.46 (0.04)	0.50 (0.04)	0.56
Discordance in economic violence reporting (women reporting less)	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	0.25	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	0.25
Discordance in economic violence reporting (women reporting more)	0.34 (0.03)	0.29 (0.05)	0.38 (0.05)	0.23	0.34 (0.03)	0.29 (0.05)	0.38 (0.05)	0.23
<i>Types of emotional violence</i>								
Insulted you or made you feel bad	0.42 (0.03)	0.41 (0.06)	0.43 (0.04)	0.80	-	-	-	-
Belittled or humiliated	0.33 (0.03)	0.30 (0.05)	0.37 (0.05)	0.30	-	-	-	-
Threatened about divorce	0.19 (0.02)	0.17 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.60	-	-	-	-
Threatened to hurt you or someone else	0.23 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.23 (0.04)	0.97	-	-	-	-
Did things to scare or intimidate	0.38 (0.04)	0.36 (0.07)	0.40 (0.05)	0.58	-	-	-	-
<i>Empowerment outcomes</i>								
Sense of control (-24 to 24)	-5.29 (0.30)	-5.61 (0.36)	-5.02 (0.46)	0.31	-	-	-	-
Number of groups	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.95	-	-	-	-
Group membership	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.86	-	-	-	-
Number of sole or joint decisions	4.65 (0.25)	4.64 (0.45)	4.66 (0.27)	0.96	8.00 (0.06)	8.04 (0.09)	7.96 (0.07)	0.50
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.55 (0.03)	0.55 (0.05)	0.55 (0.03)	0.96	0.96 (0.01)	0.96 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.80

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Number of sole decisions	0.43 (0.05)	0.40 (0.08)	0.45 (0.06)	0.66	2.88 (0.21)	3.10 (0.29)	2.69 (0.30)	0.33
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.58	0.34 (0.02)	0.36 (0.03)	0.32 (0.03)	0.35
Number of joint decisions	4.23 (0.24)	4.24 (0.42)	4.22 (0.27)	0.97	5.12 (0.20)	4.94 (0.29)	5.27 (0.28)	0.42
Proportion of joint decisions	0.50 (0.03)	0.51 (0.05)	0.50 (0.03)	0.88	0.62 (0.03)	0.60 (0.04)	0.64 (0.03)	0.42
Work hours	13.86 (0.16)	13.63 (0.19)	14.06 (0.23)	0.15	14.24 (0.15)	14.35 (0.24)	14.14 (0.18)	0.48
Work hours (excluding domestic)	4.92 (0.22)	5.17 (0.36)	4.70 (0.26)	0.29	10.19 (0.15)	10.25 (0.20)	10.14 (0.22)	0.73
Domestic work hours	8.94 (0.17)	8.46 (0.26)	9.36 (0.18)	0.01	4.04 (0.15)	4.10 (0.21)	3.99 (0.21)	0.72
<i>Gender attitudes</i>								
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	2.24 (0.73)	1.71 (1.19)	2.70 (0.87)	0.50	3.73 (0.93)	2.89 (1.23)	4.46 (1.35)	0.39
Children's health	0.52 (0.03)	0.52 (0.05)	0.52 (0.04)	0.99	0.77 (0.04)	0.76 (0.05)	0.77 (0.06)	0.98
Food	0.46 (0.03)	0.49 (0.05)	0.44 (0.04)	0.45	0.53 (0.03)	0.47 (0.04)	0.58 (0.03)	0.07
Against gendered work roles	0.26 (0.02)	0.26 (0.04)	0.25 (0.02)	0.72	0.48 (0.04)	0.44 (0.06)	0.52 (0.06)	0.33
Man does not get final word	0.23 (0.02)	0.21 (0.03)	0.24 (0.02)	0.48	0.39 (0.04)	0.35 (0.04)	0.42 (0.05)	0.29
Wife work outside home	0.17 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.82	0.28 (0.03)	0.23 (0.05)	0.33 (0.04)	0.11
Women speak outside home	0.79 (0.03)	0.81 (0.05)	0.78 (0.03)	0.68	0.82 (0.02)	0.80 (0.03)	0.83 (0.03)	0.49
Women speak in public	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.92	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.80

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Women in leadership	(0.03) 0.77	(0.05) 0.74	(0.04) 0.79	0.39	(0.05) 0.71	(0.06) 0.68	(0.06) 0.74	0.29
Daughter work outside home	(0.03) 0.77	(0.04) 0.76	(0.04) 0.79	0.57	(0.03) 0.69	(0.04) 0.67	(0.04) 0.72	0.40
Women work semi-segregated	(0.02) 0.66	(0.04) 0.66	(0.03) 0.67	0.95	(0.03) 0.67	(0.05) 0.60	(0.04) 0.72	0.17
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	(0.04) 0.67	(0.05) 0.64	(0.06) 0.69	0.45	(0.04) 0.67	(0.06) 0.63	(0.06) 0.70	0.45
Women should not tolerate violence	(0.03) 0.47	(0.05) 0.40	(0.04) 0.53	0.07	(0.04) 0.62	(0.06) 0.59	(0.06) 0.65	0.46
Violence help-seeking not shameful	(0.04) 0.43	(0.05) 0.38	(0.04) 0.48	0.07	(0.04) 0.59	(0.06) 0.60	(0.06) 0.59	0.86
<i>Gender norms</i>	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	
Proportion men: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	65.66	67.72	63.85	0.43	59.66	58.39	60.78	0.65
	(2.52)	(2.55)	(4.10)		(2.72)	(2.84)	(4.46)	
Proportion women: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	68.64	69.52	67.86	0.66	64.82	63.27	66.19	0.49
	(1.89)	(2.58)	(2.70)		(2.17)	(2.03)	(3.66)	
Proportion men: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	55.37	55.95	54.87	0.86	53.24	50.88	55.32	0.47
	(3.13)	(3.63)	(4.93)		(3.11)	(3.58)	(4.87)	
Proportion women: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	60.01	59.80	60.19	0.94	58.04	54.91	60.79	0.27
	(2.55)	(3.01)	(4.01)		(2.72)	(3.11)	(4.20)	
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey	66.89	66.88	66.91	0.99	82.76	81.21	84.13	0.27

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
their wishes	(2.06)	(3.07)	(2.79)		(1.32)	(1.65)	(2.02)	
Proportion women: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	77.27	75.97	78.41	0.48	91.54	90.90	92.11	0.62
	(1.72)	(2.56)	(2.32)		(1.22)	(1.47)	(1.89)	
<i>Child marriage</i>								
Would consider child marriage	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.12 (0.02)	0.14	0.19 (0.03)	0.23 (0.05)	0.15 (0.03)	0.23
Child marriage ever acceptable (respondent)	0.51 (0.04)	0.59 (0.06)	0.44 (0.06)	0.09	0.70 (0.04)	0.77 (0.05)	0.64 (0.05)	0.10
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	0.78 (0.07)	0.98 (0.11)	0.61 (0.08)	0.01	1.18 (0.09)	1.39 (0.14)	0.99 (0.10)	0.02
Economic problems	0.20 (0.02)	0.24 (0.03)	0.16 (0.02)	0.04	0.25 (0.03)	0.28 (0.04)	0.21 (0.03)	0.18
Accept bride price	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.31	0.10 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.00
Daughter's economic care	0.15 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.06	0.19 (0.03)	0.21 (0.03)	0.18 (0.04)	0.47
Girl wanted to marry	0.29 (0.03)	0.35 (0.04)	0.23 (0.05)	0.06	0.32 (0.03)	0.38 (0.05)	0.27 (0.04)	0.12
Worried about family honour	0.08 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04	0.17 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.12 (0.03)	0.08
Other reasons	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.76	0.15 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.15 (0.03)	0.92
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.60 (0.04)	0.62 (0.06)	0.59 (0.05)	0.71	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.79
Solely decides about whether children in family should marry	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.63	0.31 (0.03)	0.30 (0.04)	0.32 (0.04)	0.71
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	0.67 (0.03)	0.64 (0.05)	0.69 (0.05)	0.48	0.67 (0.04)	0.63 (0.06)	0.70 (0.06)	0.42

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
<i>Wellbeing</i>								
Worries daily	0.21 (0.03)	0.21 (0.05)	0.21 (0.04)	0.99	0.16 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)	0.17
Worries weekly	0.24 (0.02)	0.23 (0.03)	0.26 (0.03)	0.52	0.19 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.45
Worries monthly	0.27 (0.02)	0.31 (0.04)	0.23 (0.03)	0.09	0.28 (0.03)	0.23 (0.04)	0.33 (0.04)	0.07
Feels depressed daily	0.06 (0.02)	0.07 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.72	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.13
Feels depressed weekly	0.16 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.83	0.07 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.19
Feels depressed monthly	0.20 (0.02)	0.19 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.85	0.17 (0.02)	0.21 (0.03)	0.14 (0.02)	0.07
Wellbeing score (-1 to 1)	0.42 (0.02)	0.44 (0.04)	0.41 (0.03)	0.49	0.41 (0.01)	0.41 (0.02)	0.42 (0.02)	0.78
I am always optimistic about my future	0.83 (0.02)	0.85 (0.04)	0.82 (0.02)	0.59	0.84 (0.02)	0.87 (0.02)	0.81 (0.02)	0.08
There are people in my life who really care about me	0.83 (0.02)	0.85 (0.04)	0.81 (0.03)	0.43	0.87 (0.02)	0.88 (0.02)	0.87 (0.02)	0.80
When things go wrong in my life it generally takes me a long time to get back to	0.38 (0.03)	0.36 (0.05)	0.39 (0.03)	0.57	0.46 (0.03)	0.43 (0.03)	0.49 (0.05)	0.30
In general, I feel very positive about myself	0.80 (0.03)	0.81 (0.04)	0.78 (0.04)	0.58	0.88 (0.02)	0.89 (0.02)	0.86 (0.02)	0.44
I actively contribute to the happiness and wellbeing of others	0.91 (0.01)	0.91 (0.02)	0.91 (0.02)	0.92	0.94 (0.01)	0.94 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.58
People respect me	0.87 (0.02)	0.88 (0.04)	0.87 (0.02)	0.72	0.94 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.43

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	p-value of t-test
Mostly felt cared for by spouse	0.64 (0.03)	0.65 (0.06)	0.64 (0.04)	0.93	0.90 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.88 (0.02)	0.12
Mostly felt respected by spouse	0.67 (0.03)	0.65 (0.06)	0.69 (0.04)	0.63	0.93 (0.01)	0.94 (0.02)	0.92 (0.02)	0.49
Felt satisfied by marriage	0.90 (0.02)	0.91 (0.03)	0.88 (0.03)	0.45	0.98 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.48
Log of household income (Syrian pounds in millions)	13.50 (0.04)	13.54 (0.07)	13.47 (0.04)	0.35	13.51 (0.06)	13.50 (0.09)	13.52 (0.09)	0.88
<i>N</i>	581	272	309		581	272	309	

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. p-values <0.05 indicate statistically significant differences between the Vouchers-only and Vouchers + EA\$E groups on the corresponding baseline outcome.

Table A-5 Baseline balance of sociodemographic and household characteristics

	Wives				Husbands			
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EA\$E	p-value of t-test	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EA\$E	p-value of t-test
Age	43.19 (0.66)	42.71 (1.06)	43.61 (0.77)	0.50	49.81 (0.63)	48.77 (0.93)	50.72 (0.76)	0.11
Age at first marriage	20.02 (0.32)	19.92 (0.55)	20.11 (0.35)	0.77	26.02 (0.39)	25.49 (0.61)	26.49 (0.47)	0.20
Literate	0.85 (0.02)	0.79 (0.03)	0.89 (0.02)	0.01	0.92 (0.02)	0.89 (0.05)	0.94 (0.02)	0.26
No education	0.16 (0.02)	0.22 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.01	0.09 (0.03)	0.13 (0.05)	0.06 (0.02)	0.16
Primary education	0.30 (0.02)	0.31 (0.03)	0.28 (0.03)	0.60	0.32 (0.03)	0.37 (0.04)	0.28 (0.04)	0.12
Secondary education	0.27 (0.02)	0.24 (0.02)	0.28 (0.03)	0.22	0.27 (0.02)	0.27 (0.04)	0.27 (0.02)	0.94
High school	0.14 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.02	0.20 (0.03)	0.15 (0.03)	0.24 (0.04)	0.05
Tertiary or university	0.14 (0.02)	0.13 (0.04)	0.14 (0.03)	0.83	0.12 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.05
Washington Group Short Set Disability Status	0.13 (0.02)	0.10 (0.03)	0.15 (0.02)	0.20	0.12 (0.02)	0.14 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.37
Disability score (0 to 24)	1.67 (0.17)	1.66 (0.25)	1.67 (0.22)	0.97	1.18 (0.07)	1.30 (0.12)	1.08 (0.09)	0.14
Husband is head of household (concordance)	0.89 (0.02)	0.93 (0.02)	0.86 (0.03)	0.07	0.89 (0.02)	0.93 (0.02)	0.86 (0.03)	0.07
Household size	6.74 (0.24)	6.87 (0.44)	6.63 (0.22)	0.63	6.62 (0.22)	6.98 (0.40)	6.31 (0.13)	0.12
Log of household income (Syrian pounds in millions)	13.50 (0.04)	13.54 (0.07)	13.47 (0.04)	0.35	13.51 (0.06)	13.50 (0.09)	13.52 (0.09)	0.88

Homs	0.49 (0.09)	0.60 (0.12)	0.40 (0.12)	0.26	0.50 (0.09)	0.60 (0.12)	0.41 (0.12)	0.28
Rural Damascus	0.11 (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)	0.89	0.11 (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)	0.89
Tall Kalakh	0.30 (0.07)	0.22 (0.09)	0.36 (0.11)	0.35	0.29 (0.07)	0.22 (0.09)	0.35 (0.11)	0.38
N	581	272	309		581	272	309	

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. p-values <0.05 indicate statistically significant differences between the Vouchers-only and Vouchers + EA\$E groups on the corresponding baseline outcome.

Table A-6 Impacts on IPV outcomes

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Economic or emotional IPV	0.54 (0.02)	-0.25*** (0.09)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.07)	-	-	-	-
Any economic violence	0.39 (0.02)	-0.36*** (0.08)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)	0.25 (0.02)	0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Number of types of economic violence	0.73 (0.05)	-0.80*** (0.22)	-0.50*** (0.10)	-0.43*** (0.09)	0.37 (0.03)	0.03 (0.12)	0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)
Intensity of economic violence (0-12)	1.32 (0.09)	-1.37*** (0.40)	-0.77*** (0.17)	-0.66*** (0.15)	0.77 (0.07)	0.04 (0.23)	-0.00 (0.16)	0.00 (0.15)
Any emotional violence	0.49 (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.09)	-0.17** (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-	-	-	-
Number of types of emotional violence	1.29 (0.07)	-0.81** (0.32)	-0.57*** (0.16)	-0.39** (0.16)	-	-	-	-
Intensity of emotional violence (0-15)	2.54 (0.15)	-1.63** (0.67)	-1.15*** (0.31)	-0.82** (0.32)	-	-	-	-
N	544	1,162	581	580	544	1,162	581	576

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. IPV indicators capture women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration. Emotional IPV questions were administered only to women. Grey cells indicate questions were not administered to men. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-7 Impacts on economic IPV items and discordance in reporting

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Stopped wife from working outside home	0.23 (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Spent money household needed	0.21 (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.08)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	0.11 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)
Refused to give wife money	0.20 (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.03)	0.08 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Took wife's earnings	0.16 (0.02)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Discordance in economic violence reporting (between women and men)	0.47 (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.05)	-	-	-	-
Discordance: Stopped wife from working outside home	0.33 (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	0.33 (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.06)
Discordance: Spent money household needed	0.32 (0.02)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	0.32 (0.02)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Discordance: Refused to give wife money	0.26 (0.02)	-0.24*** (0.07)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.03)	0.26 (0.02)	-0.24*** (0.07)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Discordance: Took wife's earnings	0.19 (0.02)	-0.11* (0.07)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.19 (0.02)	-0.11* (0.07)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
N	444	893	357	357	444	893	357	354

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. IPV indicators capture women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A-8 Impacts on emotional IPV items

	Women			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Insulted you or made you feel bad	0.37 (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.07)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
Belittled or humiliated	0.27 (0.02)	-0.22*** (0.08)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Threatened about divorce	0.14 (0.01)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Threatened to hurt you or someone else	0.17 (0.02)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)
Did things to scare or intimidate	0.34 (0.02)	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
N	544	1,162	581	580

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. IPV indicators capture women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration. Emotional IPV questions were administered only to women. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-9 Impacts on decision-making

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.60 (0.02)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.96 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about education or health	0.74 (0.02)	0.11** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.06* (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Solely or jointly decides about selling or buying items for family	0.53 (0.02)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.98 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about food purchases	0.80 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.89 (0.01)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)
Solely or jointly decides about who works outside the house	0.56 (0.02)	0.32*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.99 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about savings	0.65 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.94 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Solely or jointly decides about land use	0.48 (0.02)	0.32*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.98 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about keeping money from agricultural production	0.56 (0.02)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.97 (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Solely or jointly decides about major purchases	0.50 (0.02)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.99 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05 (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.31 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Solely decides about education or health	0.05 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.20 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Solely decides about selling or buying items for family	0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.36 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.10* (0.05)
Solely decides about food purchases	0.19 (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.04)	0.16 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06* (0.04)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Solely decides about who works outside the house	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.45 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.10* (0.05)
Solely decides about savings	0.10 (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.28 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.04)
Solely decides about land use	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	0.36 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)
Solely decides about keeping money from agricultural production	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.32 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Solely decides about major purchases	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.42	0.04	-0.06	-0.02

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Proportion of joint decisions	(0.00) 0.56 (0.02)	(0.02) 0.28*** (0.04)	(0.00) 0.28*** (0.04)	(0.00) 0.20*** (0.04)	(0.02) 0.66 (0.02)	(0.07) 0.03 (0.06)	(0.06) 0.07 (0.04)	(0.05) 0.05 (0.04)
Jointly decides about education or health	0.69 (0.02)	0.11** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.75 (0.02)	0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Jointly decides about selling or buying items for family	0.52 (0.02)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.62 (0.02)	0.07 (0.07)	0.11* (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Jointly decides about food purchases	0.61 (0.02)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.73 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Jointly decides about who works outside the house	0.54 (0.02)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.54 (0.02)	0.01 (0.07)	0.10* (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
Jointly decides about savings	0.55 (0.02)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.67 (0.02)	0.05 (0.09)	0.10* (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)
Jointly decides about land use	0.46 (0.02)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.62 (0.02)	0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
Jointly decides about keeping money from agricultural production	0.54 (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.65 (0.02)	0.07 (0.08)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)
Jointly decides about major purchases	0.49 (0.02)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.56 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
N	544	1,162	581	580	544	1,162	581	576

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. Sample size provided for the whole panel sample, but not all decisions were applicable to all participants so sample sizes on specific items vary. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-10 Impacts on time use, sense of control and group membership

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Work hours	13.42 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.41)	0.25 (0.29)	0.25 (0.28)	14.35 (0.10)	0.44 (0.35)	0.12 (0.28)	0.09 (0.32)
Work hours (excluding domestic)	5.00 (0.13)	0.40 (0.42)	-0.04 (0.29)	0.06 (0.30)	10.24 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.32)	-0.28 (0.31)	-0.32 (0.31)
Domestic work hours	8.42 (0.11)	-0.61** (0.29)	0.29 (0.26)	0.19 (0.24)	4.10 (0.10)	0.51 (0.35)	0.40 (0.32)	0.42 (0.30)
Sense of control (-24 to 24)	-5.23 (0.18)	1.42** (0.70)	1.89*** (0.55)	1.67*** (0.55)	-	-	-	-
Group membership	0.04 (0.01)	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	-	-	-	-
N	544	1,162	581	580	544	1,162	581	576

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. Grey cells indicate that questions were not administered to men. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-11 Impacts on gender attitudes

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in- differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in- differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	3.01 (0.35)	4.73*** (1.22)	4.94*** (1.15)	3.11*** (1.09)	4.01 (0.34)	0.96 (0.92)	2.15** (0.82)	2.52*** (0.72)
Children's health	0.53 (0.02)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.78 (0.02)	0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Food	0.48 (0.02)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.60 (0.02)	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
Against gendered work roles	0.30 (0.02)	0.34*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.49 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.11** (0.06)
Man does not get final word	0.24 (0.02)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.39 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Wife work outside home	0.18 (0.02)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.28 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Women speak outside home	0.85 (0.02)	0.10* (0.06)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.83 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Women speak in public	0.45 (0.02)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.54 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Women in leadership	0.78 (0.02)	0.06 (0.06)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.65 (0.02)	0.11* (0.06)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Daughter work outside home	0.79 (0.02)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.70 (0.02)	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)
Women work semi-segregated	0.69 (0.02)	0.15** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.59 (0.02)	0.09 (0.06)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.06)
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	0.68	0.12**	0.15***	0.11**	0.68	0.04	0.09*	0.07

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Women should not tolerate violence	(0.02) 0.49	(0.05) 0.07	(0.05) 0.13**	(0.05) 0.08*	(0.02) 0.64	(0.06) -0.04	(0.05) 0.03	(0.05) 0.00
Violence help-seeking not shameful	(0.02) 0.49	(0.05) 0.14**	(0.05) 0.22***	(0.05) 0.19***	(0.02) 0.64	(0.06) 0.02	(0.05) -0.00	(0.04) -0.02
N	539	1,152	574	573	541	1,157	580	575

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. All statements were coded so that more positive values indicate more equitable gender attitudes. Individual statements reflect agreement or strong agreement with statements. Individual statements had different sample sizes as some respondents chose not to answer some statements. These respondents were coded as missing. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-12 Impacts on gender norms

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in- differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in- differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Proportion men: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	71.08 (0.93)	3.56 (3.13)	0.46 (3.22)	-0.34 (2.59)	58.71 (1.14)	-0.79 (4.16)	0.87 (4.53)	-0.23 (3.99)
Proportion women: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	72.81 (0.90)	2.29 (3.13)	1.12 (2.88)	-0.38 (2.27)	61.66 (1.10)	-0.34 (4.41)	1.53 (4.28)	0.50 (3.81)
Proportion men: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	60.55 (1.15)	4.89 (3.08)	4.43 (3.74)	2.84 (3.29)	52.21 (1.29)	2.68 (5.71)	6.46 (6.57)	5.99 (5.48)
Proportion women: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	63.49 (1.10)	4.10 (3.03)	4.96 (3.38)	3.25 (3.14)	54.65 (1.28)	1.42 (5.69)	6.22 (6.20)	5.72 (5.07)
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	73.32 (1.06)	4.10 (3.07)	4.22* (2.18)	3.12 (2.02)	86.34 (0.80)	-2.27 (2.82)	1.47 (2.05)	1.52 (1.98)

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in- differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in- differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Proportion women: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	81.01 (0.90)	1.43 (2.89)	4.23** (1.91)	4.13*** (1.50)	93.63 (0.52)	-0.53 (2.56)	0.73 (0.82)	0.71 (0.81)
N	544	1,162	581	580	544	1,162	581	576

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-13 Impacts on child marriage outcomes

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in - differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in - differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Would consider child marriage	0.19 (0.02)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.19 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Child marriage ever acceptable (respondent)	0.53 (0.02)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	0.57 (0.02)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	0.83 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.38*** (0.08)	-0.31*** (0.07)	1.09 (0.05)	0.16 (0.23)	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.13)
Economic problems	0.24 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.26 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.09* (0.05)
Accept bride price	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.09 (0.01)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Daughter's economic care	0.18 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)	0.23 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Girl wanted to marry	0.29 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.28 (0.02)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Worried about family honour	0.07 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.01)	0.11* (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Other reasons	0.04 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.09 (0.01)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.59 (0.02)	0.39*** (0.07)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.98 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Solely decides about whether children in family should marry	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.30	-0.14	-0.13*	-0.12

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	(0.01) 0.68 (0.02)	(0.02) 0.12** (0.05)	(0.01) 0.15*** (0.05)	(0.01) 0.11** (0.05)	(0.03) 0.68 (0.02)	(0.10) 0.04 (0.06)	(0.08) 0.09* (0.05)	(0.08) 0.07 (0.05)
N	526	1,124	545	544	543	1,158	579	574

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A-14 Impacts on individual, spousal and household wellbeing outcomes

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Wellbeing score (-1 to 1)	0.48 (0.01)	0.12** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.42 (0.01)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
I am always optimistic about my future	0.86 (0.01)	0.08** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.86 (0.01)	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
There are people in my life who really care about me	0.88 (0.01)	0.10* (0.05)	0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.90 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
When things go wrong in my life it generally takes me a long time to get back to	0.41 (0.02)	0.12* (0.07)	0.13** (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)	0.44 (0.02)	0.04 (0.07)	0.11* (0.06)	0.14*** (0.05)
In general, I feel very positive about myself	0.85 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.89 (0.01)	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
I actively contribute to the happiness and wellbeing of others	0.93 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
People respect me	0.91 (0.01)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Worries daily	0.21 (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.19 (0.02)	0.10 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
Worries weekly	0.19 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.18 (0.02)	0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Worries monthly	0.25 (0.02)	0.12* (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.27 (0.02)	-0.15* (0.08)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)

	Women				Men			
	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions	Control Mean (SE)	Difference-in-differences	Single difference	Attended all sessions
Feels depressed daily	0.06 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Feels depressed weekly	0.14 (0.01)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.06 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Feels depressed monthly	0.15 (0.02)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.18 (0.02)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)
Mostly felt cared for by spouse	0.69 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.07)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.93 (0.01)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)
Mostly felt respected by spouse	0.70 (0.02)	0.16** (0.07)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.95 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Felt satisfied by marriage	0.90 (0.01)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Couple quarrelled	0.73 (0.02)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	-	-	-	-
Log of household income (Syrian pounds in millions)	13.54 (0.03)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.12)	13.46 (0.03)	0.17 (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)	0.23** (0.10)
N	543	1,161	580	579	543	1,161	580	575

Note: Each point estimate is a separate regression with clustered standard errors. Control group mean is provided from difference-in-difference estimation. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. Grey cells indicate questions were not administered to men. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix B: Use, Influence and Communication Plan

This section outlines the use, influence and communication plan to enable meaningful uptake of the impact findings of the VAWG pilot interventions. The plan identifies key audience groups and stakeholders, how they are anticipated to use the evaluation, and the specific communication products to increase the evidence use and uptake.

[Table B-1](#) maps the stakeholders and describes how the evidence from this impact report can be used, as well as how we aim to increase the outreach and uptake of these findings. This use and influence plan is based on the overall BLRS communication strategy developed by ISDC included as supporting documentation in the submission of this report.

Table B-1 overview of key target audiences and evaluation uses

Stakeholder	Evaluation use	Outreach method
UK country office for Syria	<p>Programme adaptation: using insights to inform programming within and across country contexts</p> <p>Use of evidence to justify multi-year project funding</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Impact evaluation report ● Thematic and evidence briefs ● Regular access to internal findings ● Presentations at policy- and practice-relevant forums, such as the annual Fragile Lives conference
FCDO	<p>Contextual policy learning: using evaluation findings to support FCDO planning, and to enable partners to adapt VAWG policies and programmes to different contexts by understanding what works, why it works, and under which conditions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Impact evaluation report ● Accessible online evidence brief on VAWG that uses less technical language based on the results from the pilot and other BLRS pilot programmes ● Direct engagement in regular meetings, as well as planning and executing VAWG-related content at the annual <i>Fragile Lives</i> conference
FAO BLRS team and partners	<p>Programme adaptation: scaling up of effective VAWG prevention models in Syria</p> <p>Internal learning: Understanding which specific interventions (e.g., economic vs. social) drove impact</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Impact evaluation report ● Thematic and evidence briefs ● Data access ● Early findings internal presentation to FAO ● Workshop to adapt the framework for Syria with relevant stakeholders
Government (Ministry of Gender / Social Welfare)	<p>Policy integration: adopting FAO's methodologies into future programming</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Thematic briefs (both the 2-page non-technical pdfs and the online equivalent) ● Direct briefings and presentations for relevant experts


Multilateral agencies within and beyond Syria (e.g., UNFPA, UNHCR, UN Women, World Bank, WHO)	<p>Sectoral alignment: informing best practices based with findings from Syria and relevant global evidence</p> <p>Advocating for further funding and strengthening of VAWG prevention programming</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impact evaluation report • Thematic briefs (both 2-page non-technical pdfs and the online equivalent)
Local NGOs and civil society organisations	<p>Best practices: integrating findings into work on social protection, policy, and advocacy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Posts and infographics on social media and ISDC Newsletter • Online thematic briefs
Programme participants	<p>As the research and evaluation partner, ISDC does not engage with beneficiaries directly with the purpose of disseminating findings. ISDC does not have any personal information on beneficiaries as all data collection was done through FAO and ISDC received anonymized data.</p> <p>ISDC also does not cover whether and how implementing partners will provide feedback to final beneficiaries on the findings.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A
Academic and research institutes	<p>Knowledge building: contributing to the global evidence base on RCTs in VAWG prevention</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impact evaluation report • Findings through social media and ISDC Newsletter • Presentations and discussions at conferences such as the SVRI Forum, Fragile Lives and similar conferences. • Peer-reviewed academic journal open access article based on the findings of the report.

Key communication products

ISDC is producing a range of different communications products to reach the above target audiences. Details on these products can be found in the overall BLRS communication strategy, which is included as supporting documentation in this report's submission.

Implementation and dissemination plan

Figure B-1 Implementation and dissemination plan



The implementation of the communication and influence plan is structured across four strategic phases ([Figure B-1](#)). These phases are designed to progress from generating evidence to sharing knowledge externally. Phases 1 (evaluation) and 2 (full report) have been completed, providing the necessary evidence to assess the impact of the intervention. We are currently transitioning to Phase 3, which involves writing the evidence brief to synthesise the results and lessons from the impact evaluation reports of both FAO's and SRI's VAWG pilots in Syria, and launching the online thematic brief on addressing VAWG in Syria under the BLRS project. Moreover, we will write up peer-reviewed journal articles based on the findings from these impact evaluations, which will be made open access to contribute to key knowledge gaps in the academic literature. In Phase 4, we will present the findings in multiple policy and academic fora, and disseminate all the evidence and reports after obtaining appropriate clearances. We will adopt a strategic social media series designed to amplify the evaluation's findings and foster professional dialogue around its lessons and recommendations. This series will engage users on [LinkedIn](#), [Bluesky](#), and the ISDC newsletter.

Appendix C: Trends in Outcomes


Trends in IPV outcomes

At baseline, approximately 61% of women reported experiencing any economic or emotional IPV in the prior 12 months ([Figure C-1](#); Appendix [Table C-1](#) and [Table C-2](#)). Broken down by type, 46% of women and 26% of men reported experiencing and perpetrating any economic violence in the prior 12 months, respectively. On average, women experienced one type of economic IPV – the most common types of economic IPV reported were that husbands spent money needed for the household on themselves (28 percent), followed by refusing to give wives money (27 percent), and stopping wives from working outside the household (26%) ([Figure C-2](#)). In contrast, only 26% of men reported perpetrating any economic IPV at baseline, with the most common form being stopping wives from working outside the household (15 percent).

By endline, 41% of women reported experiencing any IPV, and 25% of women and 22% of men reported experiencing and perpetrating any type of economic IPV, respectively. While common types of economic IPV did not change for men, 14% of women reported that their husbands prevented them from working outside the household and 12% reported that their husbands spent money that the household needed.


Fifty-five percent of women reported experiencing emotional IPV at baseline, which decreased to 36% at endline. The most common type of emotional IPV was being insulted or making one feel bad (42% at baseline and 24% at endline) ([Figure C-3](#)).

Figure C-1 Trends in economic and emotional violence




Note: Any economic IPV refers to reported experiences for women and perpetration for men, in the 12 months prior to the survey. Emotional IPV outcomes refer to reported experiences for women in the 12 months prior to the survey. Standard errors (95% confidence intervals) are clustered at the village level.

Figure C-2 Trends in types of economic violence




Note: Economic IPV outcomes refer to reported experiences for women and perpetration for men, in the 12 months prior to the survey. Standard errors (95% confidence intervals) are clustered at the village level.

Figure C-3 Trends in types of emotional violence



Note: Emotional IPV outcomes refer to reported experiences for women in the 12 months prior to the survey. Standard errors (95% confidence intervals) are clustered at the village level.

Figure C-4 Trends in economic and emotional IPV, by region



Note: Any economic IPV refers to reported experiences for women and perpetration for men, in the 12 months prior to the survey. Emotional IPV outcomes refer to reported experiences for women in the 12 months prior to the survey. Standard errors (95% confidence intervals) are clustered at the village level.

Reported IPV experiences and perpetration were higher in Rural Damascus compared to Homs ([Figure C-4](#)). Eighty-eight percent of women reported experiencing any IPV at baseline in Rural Damascus, compared to 53% in Homs. The share of women experiencing any economic IPV was 40% at baseline and 22% at endline in Homs, compared to 71% at baseline and 34% at endline in Rural Damascus. Economic IPV perpetration was 22% in both waves for men in Homs, compared to 42% at baseline and 22% at endline for men in Rural Damascus, indicating reductions in perpetration in Rural Damascus but not Homs over the course of the evaluation (not attributable to the programme). Finally, women also reported higher emotional IPV experience in both waves in Rural Damascus, at 71% at baseline and 52% at endline, compared to 50% and 32% for the two waves, respectively, in Homs. Trends in specific types of economic and emotional IPV are listed in Appendix [Table C-1](#) and [Table C-2](#).

Trends in empowerment outcomes

Sole decision-making: On average, women reported making 0.4 decisions solely at baseline, while men reported making 2.9 decisions solely (Appendix [Table C-3](#)). As these values do not account for the number of applicable decisions²², the proportion of applicable decisions were also considered: women reported making 5% of the applicable decisions and men reported making 34% of applicable decisions solely. By endline, women reported making 4% of applicable decisions and men reported making 22% of applicable decisions solely, indicating a shift in sole decision making among men.

Joint decision-making: Women reported making 4.2 decisions jointly at baseline, while men reported making 5.1 decisions jointly with their wives (Appendix [Table C-3](#)). As these values do not account for the number of applicable decisions²³, the proportion of applicable decisions were also considered: women reported making 50% of the applicable decisions and men reported making 62% of applicable decisions jointly. By endline, women reported making 75% of applicable decisions and men reported making 75% of applicable decisions jointly, reflecting improvements in shared decision-making for women and men.

²² Since households with children were also administered items about child marriage decisions and child health and education, we created a proportion of applicable decisions indicator to account for the consideration that households with and without children have a different total number of indicators.

²³ Since households with children were also administered items about child marriage decisions and child health and education, we created a proportion of applicable decisions indicator to account for the consideration that households with and without children have a different total number of indicators.

Daily time use: Women and men bore a heavy work burden (Appendix [Table C-3](#)). When considering domestic responsibilities such as cooking, cleaning and childcare, women worked 13.9 hours per day at baseline and 13.3 hours per day at endline. Men worked 14.2 hours on average at baseline and 14.5 hours at endline. Considering domestic work alone, women spend 9 hours per day on these tasks at baseline and 8.5 hours per day at endline, compared to men who spent 4.0 hours per day at baseline and 4.31 hours per day at endline. These trends indicate slight decreases in women's daily domestic workload and increases in men's daily domestic workload. However, these changes reflect trends for both treatment and control groups over the course of the evaluation and are not attributable to the programme. At baseline, women spent most of their working time on childcare (4.77 hours) while men spent most of their working time on own-farm activities (6.02 hours) (Appendix [Table C-3](#)).

Sense of control: Women reported having a low sense of control overall (Appendix [Table C-2](#)). On a scale ranging from -24 to 24, where higher values indicate more sense of control, women on average had scores of -5.3 at baseline and -3.8 at endline.

Group membership: Group membership was also very low (Appendix [Table C-2](#)). Only four percent and seven percent of women at baseline and endline, respectively, reported being active members of at least one group in their communities. These groups are specified in Appendix [Table A-2](#). While the list does not explicitly name Dimitra Clubs, it captures different types of groups available in communities.

Trends in gender attitudes and norms outcomes

Gender attitudes: Women's and men's gender attitudes became more equitable over time (Appendix [Table C-4](#)). The gender attitudes score ranges from -26 to 26, with higher values indicating more gender equitable attitudes. At baseline, women's score was 2.2, which increased to 7.4 at endline. Men's average scores increased from 3.7 at baseline to 6.5 at endline.

There were also improvements in gender attitudes across all individual statements for women and men. The largest improvements for women were in help-seeking for violence being shameful and gender roles (men should work outside and women should look after the family). For men, the largest improvements were for statements related to daughters working outside the home and the acceptability of child marriage for girls.

Perceptions of gender norms in the community: Women’s and men’s perceptions of gender norms in their community became more equitable across the board (Appendix [Table C-5](#)). At baseline, more than half of all women and men reported perceptions of more equitable gender norms in their community (the respondents’ perceptions of the proportions of women and men in the community who believed in each of the three statements around women working outside the home, women working in semi-segregated environments, and men not having the right to physically hurt their wives). The largest improvements in perceptions of gender norms were in women’s (15 percent) and men’s (nine percent) perceptions of women in the community believing that men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives.

Trends in child marriage outcomes

At baseline, 14% of women and 19% of men reported that they would consider child marriage for their daughters (Appendix [Table C-6](#)). These proportions dropped slightly to 13% for both women and men at endline. Half of women and 70% of men at baseline believed that child marriage was acceptable (see Appendix [Table A-2](#) for survey questions).²⁴ The most common acceptable situations included because the girl wanted to marry (29% of women and 32% of men) and because of economic problems (20% of women and 25% of men) at baseline. By endline, the acceptability of child marriage had decreased: about 34% of women and 33% of men reported its acceptability. The most common situations of acceptance were still because the girl wanted to marry and due to economic reasons, but the proportions of women and men accepting child marriage in these situations decreased.

Decision-making on child marriage: Three percent of women reported making decisions on whether children in the family should marry solely at baseline, which decreased to 1% by endline (Appendix [Table C-1](#)). A larger proportion of men reported making these decisions solely: 31% at baseline, which decreased to 23% at endline. Examining joint decision-making, 57% of women at baseline reported making joint decisions on child marriage, which increased to 72% at endline. The share of joint decision making on child marriage among men also improved, from 66% at baseline to 76% at endline.

²⁴ The list of acceptable reasons was: if the family/household was having economic problems; to collect bride price; to ensure that she was economically taken care of; if the girl wants to marry; if respondent was worried about her or the family’s honour. Acceptability of child marriage =1 if respondent reports that child marriage is acceptable for any reason from reasons above, and 0 otherwise (binary).

Trends in individual wellbeing, relationship quality and household welfare outcomes

Reported wellbeing was low for women and men (Appendix [Table C-1](#) and [Table C-7](#)). At baseline, on a scale of -1 to 1 where higher values indicate better wellbeing, both women and men had scores of 0.40 on average, indicating that wellbeing was towards the positive end of the scale. By endline, these scores had increased to 0.54 for women and 0.47 for men on average, reflecting improvements in wellbeing for treatment and control groups over the duration of the evaluation.

Among mental health outcomes, 21% of women reported feeling worried daily at baseline, which did not change at endline. Sixteen percent of men felt the same at baseline, which increased to 20% at endline. Approximately six percent of women and two percent of men reported feeling depressed daily at baseline. Five percent of both women and men reported feelings of depression at endline. Other mental health outcome trends are presented in Appendix [Table C-1](#) and [Table C-7](#).

Sixty-four percent of women and 82% of men reported feeling mostly cared for by their spouses, which increased to 90% and 96% , respectively at endline (Appendix [Table C-1](#)). Feelings of respect also improved from 67% to 85% for women and 93% to 97% for men over the programme period. Almost all women and men reported feeling satisfied or very satisfied with their marriages. Seventy-nine percent of women reported that they and their spouses had quarreled in the prior 12 months at baseline, which decreased to 71% at endline.

Household income was approximately 13.5 million Syrian pounds and did not change over the course of the evaluation (Appendix [Table C-1](#)).

Table C-1 Outcomes by wave and treatment group (women's and men's measures)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Any economic violence	0.46 (0.04)	0.40 (0.06)	0.51 (0.05)	0.25 (0.03)	0.38 (0.05)	0.13 (0.03)	0.26 (0.03)	0.28 (0.03)	0.25 (0.05)	0.22 (0.02)	0.22 (0.04)	0.22 (0.03)
Number of types of economic violence	0.94 (0.11)	0.78 (0.15)	1.08 (0.14)	0.41 (0.07)	0.68 (0.10)	0.17 (0.05)	0.38 (0.04)	0.42 (0.07)	0.35 (0.06)	0.30 (0.04)	0.32 (0.06)	0.28 (0.04)
Intensity of economic violence (0-12)	1.90 (0.22)	1.57 (0.29)	2.19 (0.30)	0.66 (0.11)	1.07 (0.18)	0.31 (0.10)	0.82 (0.09)	0.89 (0.13)	0.76 (0.13)	0.62 (0.08)	0.66 (0.13)	0.58 (0.09)
Stopped wife from working outside home	0.26 (0.04)	0.24 (0.05)	0.28 (0.06)	0.14 (0.03)	0.23 (0.04)	0.07 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.10 (0.02)
Spent money household needed	0.28 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.34 (0.04)	0.12 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.11 (0.03)	0.14 (0.04)	0.12 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)
Refused to give wife money	0.27 (0.03)	0.20 (0.04)	0.32 (0.05)	0.11 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.04 (0.01)	0.09 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.06 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)
Took wife's earnings	0.20 (0.03)	0.18 (0.04)	0.22 (0.04)	0.08 (0.02)	0.14 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Discordance in economic violence reporting	0.48 (0.03)	0.46 (0.04)	0.50 (0.04)	0.39 (0.03)	0.48 (0.03)	0.30 (0.03)	0.48 (0.03)	0.46 (0.04)	0.50 (0.04)	0.39 (0.03)	0.48 (0.03)	0.30 (0.03)
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.55 (0.03)	0.55 (0.05)	0.55 (0.03)	0.78 (0.03)	0.66 (0.05)	0.90 (0.02)	0.96 (0.01)	0.96 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.02 (0.00)	0.34 (0.02)	0.36 (0.03)	0.32 (0.03)	0.22 (0.02)	0.25 (0.04)	0.18 (0.02)
Proportion of joint decisions	0.50 (0.03)	0.51 (0.05)	0.50 (0.03)	0.75 (0.04)	0.60 (0.05)	0.88 (0.02)	0.62 (0.03)	0.60 (0.04)	0.64 (0.03)	0.75 (0.02)	0.72 (0.04)	0.79 (0.02)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Work hours	13.86 (0.16)	13.63 (0.19)	14.06 (0.23)	13.34 (0.28)	13.22 (0.37)	13.45 (0.42)	14.24 (0.15)	14.35 (0.24)	14.14 (0.18)	14.47 (0.15)	14.35 (0.18)	14.58 (0.23)
Work hours (excluding domestic)	4.92 (0.22)	5.17 (0.36)	4.70 (0.26)	4.80 (0.25)	4.84 (0.33)	4.77 (0.38)	10.19 (0.15)	10.25 (0.20)	10.14 (0.22)	10.15 (0.14)	10.24 (0.20)	10.07 (0.21)
Domestic work hours	8.94 (0.17)	8.46 (0.26)	9.36 (0.18)	8.54 (0.13)	8.38 (0.17)	8.68 (0.19)	4.04 (0.15)	4.10 (0.21)	3.99 (0.21)	4.32 (0.17)	4.11 (0.22)	4.51 (0.25)
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	2.24 (0.73)	1.71 (1.19)	2.70 (0.87)	7.36 (0.82)	4.32 (1.13)	10.05 (0.72)	3.73 (0.93)	2.89 (1.23)	4.46 (1.35)	6.49 (0.77)	5.14 (1.13)	7.67 (0.97)
<i>Gender attitudes statements</i>												
Children's health	0.52 (0.03)	0.52 (0.05)	0.52 (0.04)	0.66 (0.03)	0.53 (0.04)	0.77 (0.03)	0.77 (0.04)	0.76 (0.05)	0.77 (0.06)	0.81 (0.03)	0.80 (0.04)	0.83 (0.03)
Food	0.46 (0.03)	0.49 (0.05)	0.44 (0.04)	0.62 (0.03)	0.47 (0.04)	0.76 (0.04)	0.53 (0.03)	0.47 (0.04)	0.58 (0.03)	0.67 (0.03)	0.72 (0.04)	0.62 (0.05)
Against gendered work roles	0.26 (0.02)	0.26 (0.04)	0.25 (0.02)	0.50 (0.04)	0.33 (0.05)	0.65 (0.04)	0.48 (0.04)	0.44 (0.06)	0.52 (0.06)	0.56 (0.05)	0.54 (0.08)	0.59 (0.06)
Man does not get final word	0.23 (0.02)	0.21 (0.03)	0.24 (0.02)	0.41 (0.04)	0.26 (0.04)	0.54 (0.04)	0.39 (0.04)	0.35 (0.04)	0.42 (0.05)	0.47 (0.04)	0.43 (0.05)	0.50 (0.05)
Wife work outside home	0.17 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.29 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.39 (0.04)	0.28 (0.03)	0.23 (0.05)	0.33 (0.04)	0.36 (0.04)	0.33 (0.05)	0.38 (0.06)
Women speak outside home	0.79 (0.03)	0.81 (0.05)	0.78 (0.03)	0.93 (0.01)	0.89 (0.02)	0.96 (0.01)	0.82 (0.02)	0.80 (0.03)	0.83 (0.03)	0.89 (0.02)	0.85 (0.03)	0.92 (0.03)
Women speak in public	0.44 (0.03)	0.45 (0.05)	0.44 (0.04)	0.60 (0.04)	0.46 (0.05)	0.73 (0.03)	0.54 (0.05)	0.53 (0.06)	0.55 (0.06)	0.57 (0.04)	0.56 (0.07)	0.58 (0.05)
Women in leadership	0.77 (0.03)	0.74 (0.04)	0.79 (0.04)	0.88 (0.02)	0.82 (0.04)	0.93 (0.02)	0.71 (0.03)	0.68 (0.04)	0.74 (0.04)	0.71 (0.04)	0.62 (0.06)	0.79 (0.03)
Daughter work outside home	0.77 (0.02)	0.76 (0.04)	0.79 (0.03)	0.85 (0.02)	0.83 (0.03)	0.87 (0.02)	0.69 (0.03)	0.67 (0.05)	0.72 (0.04)	0.76 (0.03)	0.73 (0.05)	0.79 (0.04)
Women work semi-segregated	0.66 (0.04)	0.66 (0.05)	0.67 (0.06)	0.80 (0.04)	0.72 (0.05)	0.87 (0.04)	0.67 (0.04)	0.60 (0.06)	0.72 (0.06)	0.70 (0.05)	0.59 (0.07)	0.80 (0.05)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	0.67	0.64	0.69	0.82	0.73	0.90	0.67	0.63	0.70	0.78	0.73	0.83
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Women should not tolerate violence	0.47	0.40	0.53	0.68	0.58	0.77	0.62	0.59	0.65	0.71	0.70	0.72
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Violence help-seeking not shameful	0.43	0.38	0.48	0.73	0.60	0.85	0.59	0.60	0.59	0.68	0.68	0.68
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
<i>Perceptions of community norms</i>												
Proportion men: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	65.66	67.72	63.85	74.28	74.44	74.14	59.66	58.39	60.78	59.88	59.02	60.63
	(2.52)	(2.55)	(4.10)	(2.43)	(2.62)	(3.96)	(2.72)	(2.84)	(4.46)	(2.80)	(3.90)	(3.98)
Proportion women: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	68.64	69.52	67.86	76.43	76.09	76.72	64.82	63.27	66.19	61.42	60.04	62.63
	(1.89)	(2.58)	(2.70)	(2.14)	(2.49)	(3.39)	(2.17)	(2.03)	(3.66)	(2.53)	(3.52)	(3.59)
Proportion men: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	55.37	55.95	54.87	67.17	65.15	68.95	53.24	50.88	55.32	57.34	53.54	60.67
	(3.13)	(3.63)	(4.93)	(3.47)	(4.10)	(5.45)	(3.11)	(3.58)	(4.87)	(3.78)	(5.43)	(5.17)
Proportion women: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	60.01	59.80	60.19	69.57	67.19	71.68	58.04	54.91	60.79	58.27	54.38	61.69
	(2.55)	(3.01)	(4.01)	(2.85)	(3.70)	(4.26)	(2.72)	(3.11)	(4.20)	(3.54)	(5.35)	(4.58)
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically	66.89	66.88	66.91	81.96	79.76	83.90	82.76	81.21	84.13	91.81	91.47	92.11

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	(2.06)	(3.07)	(2.79)	(1.70)	(2.15)	(2.47)	(1.32)	(1.65)	(2.02)	(1.35)	(1.98)	(1.86)
Proportion women: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	77.27	75.97	78.41	88.12	86.06	89.93	91.54	90.90	92.11	96.71	96.35	97.02
Would consider child marriage	(1.72)	(2.56)	(2.32)	(1.32)	(1.45)	(2.03)	(1.22)	(1.47)	(1.89)	(0.37)	(0.52)	(0.53)
Child marriage ever acceptable (respondent)	0.14	0.17	0.12	0.13	0.20	0.06	0.19	0.23	0.15	0.13	0.16	0.10
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.51	0.59	0.44	0.34	0.47	0.22	0.70	0.77	0.64	0.33	0.37	0.30
Solely decides about whether children in family should marry	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.78	0.98	0.61	0.49	0.70	0.30	1.18	1.39	0.99	0.65	0.78	0.54
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.10)
	0.60	0.62	0.59	0.73	0.56	0.91	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.99	0.98	1.00
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.31	0.30	0.32	0.23	0.30	0.17
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
	0.57	0.59	0.56	0.72	0.55	0.90	0.66	0.67	0.65	0.76	0.68	0.83
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
	0.67	0.64	0.69	0.82	0.73	0.90	0.67	0.63	0.70	0.78	0.73	0.83
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Worries daily	0.21 (0.03)	0.21 (0.05)	0.21 (0.04)	0.21 (0.03)	0.21 (0.05)	0.22 (0.04)	0.16 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)	0.20 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.22 (0.04)
Worries weekly	0.24 (0.02)	0.23 (0.03)	0.26 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.19 (0.02)
Worries monthly	0.27 (0.02)	0.31 (0.04)	0.23 (0.03)	0.21 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.23 (0.03)	0.28 (0.03)	0.23 (0.04)	0.33 (0.04)	0.28 (0.03)	0.31 (0.05)	0.25 (0.04)
Feels depressed daily	0.06 (0.02)	0.07 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)
Feels depressed weekly	0.16 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.07 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Feels depressed monthly	0.20 (0.02)	0.19 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.13 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.02)	0.21 (0.03)	0.14 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)
Wellbeing score (-1 to 1)	0.42 (0.02)	0.44 (0.04)	0.41 (0.03)	0.56 (0.02)	0.51 (0.03)	0.60 (0.02)	0.41 (0.01)	0.41 (0.02)	0.42 (0.02)	0.49 (0.02)	0.43 (0.02)	0.54 (0.02)
Mostly felt cared for by spouse	0.64 (0.03)	0.65 (0.06)	0.64 (0.04)	0.82 (0.02)	0.72 (0.03)	0.90 (0.02)	0.90 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.88 (0.02)	0.96 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.98 (0.01)
Mostly felt respected by spouse	0.67 (0.03)	0.65 (0.06)	0.69 (0.04)	0.85 (0.03)	0.75 (0.04)	0.94 (0.01)	0.93 (0.01)	0.94 (0.02)	0.92 (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)	0.96 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)
Felt satisfied by marriage	0.90 (0.02)	0.91 (0.03)	0.88 (0.03)	0.93 (0.01)	0.89 (0.03)	0.96 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)
Log of household income (Syrian pounds in millions)	13.50 (0.04)	13.54 (0.07)	13.47 (0.04)	13.50 (0.07)	13.54 (0.09)	13.48 (0.10)	13.51 (0.06)	13.50 (0.09)	13.52 (0.09)	13.53 (0.06)	13.43 (0.07)	13.62 (0.08)
N	581	272	309	580	271	309	581	272	309	580	271	309

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. IPV indicators capture women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table C-2 Outcomes by wave and treatment group (women's only measures)

	Wives					
	Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Economic or emotional IPV	0.61 (0.04)	0.57 (0.06)	0.64 (0.05)	0.41 (0.04)	0.51 (0.06)	0.32 (0.05)
Any emotional violence	0.55 (0.04)	0.51 (0.06)	0.58 (0.05)	0.36 (0.04)	0.47 (0.06)	0.27 (0.04)
Number of types of emotional violence	1.55 (0.15)	1.46 (0.24)	1.62 (0.18)	0.77 (0.10)	1.12 (0.16)	0.47 (0.08)
Intensity of emotional violence (0-15)	3.16 (0.32)	2.97 (0.52)	3.32 (0.40)	1.42 (0.20)	2.10 (0.32)	0.82 (0.16)
Insulted you or made you feel bad	0.42 (0.03)	0.41 (0.06)	0.43 (0.04)	0.24 (0.03)	0.34 (0.05)	0.16 (0.04)
Belittled or humiliated	0.33 (0.03)	0.30 (0.05)	0.37 (0.05)	0.16 (0.02)	0.24 (0.04)	0.08 (0.02)
Threatened about divorce	0.19 (0.02)	0.17 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.07 (0.01)	0.11 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)
Threatened to hurt you or someone else	0.23 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.23 (0.04)	0.07 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)
Did things to scare or intimidate	0.38 (0.04)	0.36 (0.07)	0.40 (0.05)	0.24 (0.03)	0.32 (0.05)	0.17 (0.03)
Sense of control (-24 to 24)	-5.29 (0.30)	-5.61 (0.36)	-5.02 (0.46)	-3.78 (0.34)	-4.85 (0.45)	-2.84 (0.39)
Group membership	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.07 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)
Couple quarrelled	0.79 (0.04)	0.73 (0.06)	0.85 (0.04)	0.71 (0.04)	0.72 (0.04)	0.70 (0.06)
N	581	272	309	581	272	309

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Emotional IPV questions were administered to women only. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table C-3 Trends in empowerment outcomes

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.78	0.66	0.90	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.97	0.97
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Number of sole or joint decisions	4.65	4.64	4.66	6.59	5.44	7.60	8.00	8.04	7.96	7.75	7.75	7.76
	(0.25)	(0.45)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.20)
Solely or jointly decides about land use	0.38	0.41	0.36	0.69	0.55	0.82	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Solely or jointly decides about keeping money from agricultural production	0.53	0.51	0.55	0.76	0.61	0.88	0.96	0.97	0.94	0.98	0.97	0.99
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about major purchases	0.41	0.43	0.39	0.73	0.58	0.87	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.99
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Solely or jointly decides about education or health	0.69	0.67	0.70	0.89	0.81	0.95	0.93	0.95	0.91	0.95	0.94	0.96
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about selling or buying items for family	0.44	0.45	0.43	0.76	0.62	0.87	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about food purchases	0.79	0.78	0.80	0.89	0.82	0.95	0.87	0.84	0.89	0.92	0.94	0.90
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline		Endline				Baseline		Endline			
Solely or jointly decides about who works outside the house	0.46	0.49	0.44	0.76	0.62	0.89	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.98
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Solely or jointly decides about savings	0.65	0.61	0.67	0.82	0.69	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.96	0.93
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.60	0.62	0.59	0.73	0.56	0.91	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.99	0.98	1.00
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.34	0.36	0.32	0.22	0.25	0.18
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Number of sole decisions	0.43	0.40	0.45	0.28	0.40	0.17	2.88	3.10	2.69	1.76	2.11	1.44
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.38)	(0.17)
Solely decides about land use	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.42	0.40	0.43	0.30	0.31	0.29
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Solely decides about keeping money from agricultural production	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.32	0.36	0.29	0.23	0.28	0.19
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Solely decides about major purchases	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.51	0.41	0.31	0.34	0.28
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Solely decides about education or health	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.23	0.25	0.21	0.11	0.14	0.09
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Solely decides about selling or buying items for family	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.41	0.42	0.39	0.24	0.30	0.19
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline		Endline				Baseline		Endline			
Solely decides about food purchases	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.22	0.08	0.17	0.19	0.15	0.09	0.14	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Solely decides about who works outside the house	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.50	0.55	0.46	0.31	0.36	0.26
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Solely decides about savings	0.12	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.11	0.05	0.27	0.31	0.24	0.16	0.23	0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Solely decides about whether children in family should marry	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.31	0.30	0.32	0.23	0.30	0.17
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Number of joint decisions	4.23	4.24	4.22	6.31	5.04	7.43	5.12	4.94	5.27	6.00	5.64	6.31
	(0.24)	(0.42)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.22)
Proportion of joint decisions	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.75	0.60	0.88	0.62	0.60	0.64	0.75	0.72	0.79
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Jointly decides about land use	0.37	0.38	0.35	0.69	0.54	0.82	0.57	0.58	0.56	0.69	0.67	0.70
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Jointly decides about keeping money from agricultural production	0.49	0.48	0.51	0.75	0.61	0.88	0.63	0.61	0.65	0.75	0.69	0.80
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Jointly decides about major purchases	0.39	0.42	0.38	0.73	0.57	0.86	0.53	0.48	0.58	0.68	0.65	0.72
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Jointly decides about education or health	0.64	0.61	0.66	0.86	0.78	0.94	0.70	0.70	0.71	0.84	0.80	0.88
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline		Endline				Baseline		Endline			
Jointly decides about selling or buying items for family	0.44	0.45	0.43	0.76	0.61	0.87	0.58	0.56	0.60	0.75	0.69	0.80
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Jointly decides about food purchases	0.63	0.62	0.64	0.74	0.60	0.87	0.70	0.65	0.74	0.83	0.80	0.85
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Jointly decides about who works outside the house	0.44	0.47	0.42	0.76	0.61	0.89	0.49	0.45	0.53	0.68	0.63	0.72
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Jointly decides about savings	0.53	0.52	0.53	0.74	0.57	0.88	0.65	0.61	0.68	0.78	0.72	0.84
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.57	0.59	0.56	0.72	0.55	0.90	0.66	0.67	0.65	0.76	0.68	0.83
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Work hours	13.86	13.63	14.06	13.34	13.22	13.45	14.24	14.35	14.14	14.47	14.35	14.58
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Work hours (excluding domestic)	4.92	5.17	4.70	4.80	4.84	4.77	10.19	10.25	10.14	10.15	10.24	10.07
	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Domestic work hours	8.94	8.46	9.36	8.54	8.38	8.68	4.04	4.10	3.99	4.32	4.11	4.51
	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.25)
Time spent caring for children (hours)	4.77	4.43	5.08	4.73	4.53	4.91	2.81	2.93	2.70	2.93	2.63	3.19
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.22)
Time spent on housework (hours)	4.22	4.09	4.33	3.83	3.86	3.80	1.27	1.18	1.34	1.41	1.49	1.33
	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Time spent working on own field (hours)	3.49	3.70	3.30	3.34	3.48	3.22	6.02	6.21	5.86	6.63	6.93	6.37

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline		Endline				Baseline		Endline			
Time spent working off farm (hours)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.26)
	0.49	0.39	0.58	0.57	0.39	0.72	2.13	2.40	1.90	1.87	1.76	1.97
Time spent at paid job (hours)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.25)
	0.98	1.12	0.86	0.90	0.97	0.84	2.08	1.67	2.44	1.68	1.58	1.77
	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.33)
N	581	272	309	581	272	309	581	272	309	581	272	309

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Sample size provided for the whole panel sample, but not all decisions were applicable to all participants so sample sizes on specific items vary. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table C-4 Trends in gender attitudes outcomes

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline		Endline				Baseline		Endline			
	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	2.24	1.77	2.65	7.36	4.33	10.05	3.73	2.88	4.47	6.49	5.16	7.66
	(0.73)	(1.20)	(0.87)	(0.82)	(1.13)	(0.73)	(0.94)	(1.22)	(1.36)	(0.77)	(1.13)	(0.97)
Children's health is only the mother's responsibility*	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.66	0.54	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.81	0.80	0.83
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
The woman decides what food to buy and cook, and the husband should not interfere	0.46	0.49	0.44	0.62	0.48	0.76	0.53	0.47	0.57	0.67	0.73	0.62
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
The men should work outside and women should look after the family*	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.50	0.33	0.65	0.48	0.44	0.52	0.56	0.54	0.59
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
A man should have the final word about decisions in his home*	0.23	0.21	0.24	0.41	0.26	0.54	0.39	0.35	0.43	0.47	0.44	0.50
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
It is a man's role to decide if his wife should work outside the home*	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.29	0.17	0.39	0.28	0.23	0.33	0.36	0.33	0.38
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Women should be able to safely speak out in her household and community without	0.79	0.81	0.78	0.93	0.89	0.96	0.82	0.80	0.83	0.89	0.85	0.92
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
A woman should not be allowed to speak in public without her husband's	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.60	0.46	0.73	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.57	0.56	0.58

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers-only	Vouchers + EA\$E
permission	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Women should hold more leadership positions in society	0.77	0.74	0.79	0.88	0.82	0.93	0.71	0.68	0.74	0.71	0.62	0.79
I would like my daughter to be able to work outside the home so that she can support herself	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)
	0.77	0.76	0.79	0.85	0.83	0.87	0.69	0.67	0.72	0.76	0.73	0.79
Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environments	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.80	0.72	0.87	0.67	0.60	0.72	0.70	0.59	0.80
In certain situations, marrying a daughter before the age of 18 is acceptable*	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)
	0.67	0.64	0.69	0.82	0.73	0.90	0.67	0.63	0.70	0.78	0.73	0.83
A woman should tolerate violence to keep her family together*	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)
	0.47	0.40	0.52	0.68	0.58	0.78	0.62	0.59	0.65	0.71	0.70	0.72
If a woman seeks help outside of her household for violence she experiences at home	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
	0.43	0.38	0.48	0.73	0.61	0.85	0.59	0.60	0.58	0.68	0.68	0.68
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)

Note: Estimates are means with clustered standard errors. *indicates reverse coded statements - all statements were coded so that more positive values indicate more equitable gender attitudes. Individual statements reflect agreement or strong agreement with statements. Individual statements had different sample sizes as some respondents chose not to answer some statements. These respondents were coded as missing. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table C-5 Trends in perceptions of gender norms outcomes

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouche rs-only	Vouche rs + EA\$E	Overall	Vouche rs-only	Vouche rs + EA\$E	Overall	Vouche rs-only	Vouche rs + EA\$E	Overall	Vouche rs-only	Vouche rs + EA\$E
Proportion men: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	65.66	67.66	63.90	74.28	74.46	74.12	59.66	58.19	60.97	59.88	58.95	60.69
	(2.52)	(2.53)	(4.13)	(2.43)	(2.61)	(3.97)	(2.74)	(2.80)	(4.51)	(2.81)	(3.89)	(4.01)
Proportion women: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	68.64	69.56	67.82	76.43	76.11	76.71	64.82	63.05	66.39	61.42	59.97	62.70
	(1.89)	(2.57)	(2.69)	(2.14)	(2.48)	(3.40)	(2.19)	(1.99)	(3.70)	(2.54)	(3.51)	(3.62)
Proportion men: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	55.37	55.93	54.88	67.17	65.20	68.92	53.24	50.91	55.31	57.34	53.57	60.68
	(3.13)	(3.61)	(4.94)	(3.47)	(4.09)	(5.46)	(3.11)	(3.57)	(4.88)	(3.78)	(5.41)	(5.19)
Proportion women: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	60.01	59.77	60.22	69.57	67.23	71.65	58.04	54.89	60.83	58.27	54.40	61.69
	(2.55)	(3.00)	(4.02)	(2.85)	(3.69)	(4.27)	(2.73)	(3.10)	(4.22)	(3.54)	(5.33)	(4.59)
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	66.89	66.96	66.83	81.96	79.82	83.86	82.76	81.28	84.08	91.81	91.49	92.09
	(2.07)	(3.08)	(2.80)	(1.70)	(2.14)	(2.47)	(1.32)	(1.66)	(2.02)	(1.35)	(1.98)	(1.87)
Proportion women: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	77.27	76.03	78.38	88.12	86.11	89.90	91.54	90.94	92.08	96.71	96.36	97.02
	(1.73)	(2.57)	(2.33)	(1.32)	(1.44)	(2.04)	(1.22)	(1.47)	(1.89)	(0.37)	(0.52)	(0.53)
N	581	273	308	581	273	308	581	273	308	581	273	308

Note: Estimates are means with clustered standard errors. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table C-6 Trends in child marriage outcomes

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Voucher s-only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers- only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers- only	Vouchers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouchers- only	Vouchers + EA\$E
Would consider child marriage	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.12 (0.02)	0.13 (0.03)	0.20 (0.04)	0.06 (0.01)	0.19 (0.03)	0.23 (0.05)	0.15 (0.03)	0.13 (0.02)	0.16 (0.04)	0.10 (0.02)
Child marriage acceptable	0.51 (0.04)	0.59 (0.06)	0.44 (0.06)	0.34 (0.04)	0.47 (0.05)	0.23 (0.05)	0.70 (0.04)	0.77 (0.05)	0.64 (0.05)	0.33 (0.04)	0.37 (0.06)	0.30 (0.06)
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	0.78 (0.07)	0.98 (0.11)	0.61 (0.08)	0.49 (0.07)	0.70 (0.09)	0.30 (0.08)	1.18 (0.09)	1.40 (0.14)	0.98 (0.10)	0.65 (0.09)	0.78 (0.15)	0.55 (0.10)
Economic problems	0.20 (0.02)	0.24 (0.03)	0.16 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.23 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.25 (0.03)	0.28 (0.04)	0.21 (0.03)	0.18 (0.03)	0.24 (0.05)	0.13 (0.02)
Accept bride price	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.10 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)
Daughter's economic care	0.15 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.05 (0.01)	0.19 (0.03)	0.21 (0.03)	0.18 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.25 (0.05)	0.15 (0.03)
Girl wanted to marry	0.29 (0.03)	0.35 (0.04)	0.23 (0.05)	0.17 (0.03)	0.24 (0.04)	0.11 (0.03)	0.32 (0.03)	0.38 (0.05)	0.27 (0.04)	0.16 (0.03)	0.19 (0.04)	0.13 (0.03)
Worried about family honour	0.08 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.12 (0.03)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Other reasons	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.15 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.15 (0.03)	0.05 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.07 (0.03)
N	538	247	291	563	261	302	541	253	288	552	252	300

Note: Estimates are means with clustered standard errors. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table C-7 Trends in mental health and wellbeing outcomes

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouch ers-on ly	Vouch ers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouc hers- only	Vouch ers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouc hers- only	Vouch ers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouc hers- only	Vouch ers + EA\$E
Worries daily	0.21 (0.03)	0.21 (0.05)	0.20 (0.04)	0.21 (0.03)	0.21 (0.05)	0.22 (0.04)	0.16 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)	0.20 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.22 (0.04)
Worries weekly	0.24 (0.02)	0.23 (0.03)	0.26 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.18 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.19 (0.02)
Worries monthly	0.27 (0.02)	0.31 (0.04)	0.23 (0.03)	0.21 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.23 (0.03)	0.28 (0.03)	0.23 (0.04)	0.33 (0.04)	0.28 (0.03)	0.31 (0.05)	0.25 (0.04)
Feels depressed daily	0.06 (0.02)	0.07 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)
Feels depressed weekly	0.16 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.17 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.07 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Feels depressed monthly	0.20 (0.02)	0.20 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.13 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.14 (0.02)	0.17 (0.02)	0.21 (0.03)	0.14 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.15 (0.04)	0.10 (0.03)
Wellbeing score (-1 to 1)	0.40 (0.02)	0.42 (0.04)	0.39 (0.03)	0.54 (0.02)	0.50 (0.03)	0.58 (0.02)	0.40 (0.01)	0.40 (0.02)	0.40 (0.02)	0.47 (0.02)	0.41 (0.02)	0.53 (0.02)
I am always optimistic about my future	0.83 (0.02)	0.85 (0.04)	0.82 (0.02)	0.91 (0.02)	0.88 (0.03)	0.94 (0.01)	0.84 (0.02)	0.87 (0.02)	0.81 (0.03)	0.86 (0.02)	0.86 (0.03)	0.86 (0.02)
There are people in my life who really care about me	0.83 (0.02)	0.85 (0.04)	0.81 (0.03)	0.94 (0.01)	0.91 (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)	0.87 (0.02)	0.88 (0.02)	0.87 (0.02)	0.93 (0.01)	0.91 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)
When things go wrong in my life it generally takes me a long time to get back to normal	0.38 (0.03)	0.36 (0.05)	0.39 (0.03)	0.54 (0.03)	0.47 (0.05)	0.61 (0.03)	0.46 (0.03)	0.43 (0.03)	0.49 (0.05)	0.50 (0.03)	0.45 (0.05)	0.55 (0.04)
In general, I feel very positive about myself	0.80 (0.03)	0.81 (0.04)	0.78 (0.04)	0.93 (0.01)	0.88 (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)	0.88 (0.02)	0.89 (0.02)	0.86 (0.03)	0.89 (0.01)	0.88 (0.03)	0.90 (0.02)
I actively contribute to the happiness and wellbeing of others	0.91 (0.01)	0.91 (0.02)	0.91 (0.02)	0.98 (0.01)	0.95 (0.02)	1.00 (0.00)	0.94 (0.01)	0.94 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.96 (0.01)	0.96 (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)
People respect me	0.87 (0.01)	0.88 (0.02)	0.87 (0.02)	0.96 (0.01)	0.94 (0.02)	0.99 (0.00)	0.94 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.96 (0.02)	0.98 (0.01)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouch ers-on ly	Vouch ers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouc hers- only	Vouch ers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouc hers- only	Vouch ers + EA\$E	Overall	Vouc hers- only	Vouch ers + EA\$E
Disability score (0 to 24)	(0.02) 1.67 (0.17)	(0.04) 1.66 (0.25)	(0.02) 1.67 (0.22)	(0.01) 1.35 (0.10)	(0.01) 1.25 (0.14)	(0.01) 1.44 (0.14)	(0.01) 1.18 (0.07)	(0.02) 1.30 (0.12)	(0.01) 1.07 (0.09)	(0.01) 1.09 (0.07)	(0.01) 1.03 (0.10)	(0.01) 1.14 (0.10)
Difficulty seeing, even when wearing your glasses	0.28 (0.03)	0.29 (0.04)	0.28 (0.04)	0.22 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.26 (0.02)	0.33 (0.03)	0.37 (0.05)	0.29 (0.03)	0.22 (0.03)	0.18 (0.03)	0.25 (0.04)
Difficulty hearing, even when using a hearing aid	0.09 (0.02)	0.09 (0.04)	0.08 (0.02)	0.06 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.09 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)
Difficulty walking or climbing steps	0.42 (0.04)	0.41 (0.05)	0.43 (0.05)	0.45 (0.04)	0.47 (0.06)	0.44 (0.04)	0.34 (0.03)	0.38 (0.05)	0.30 (0.04)	0.34 (0.03)	0.33 (0.04)	0.35 (0.04)
Difficulty communicating, for example understanding or being understood?	0.06 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)	0.04 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)
Difficulty remembering or concentrating	0.20 (0.03)	0.18 (0.05)	0.21 (0.05)	0.11 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.14 (0.02)	0.14 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)
Difficulty raising a 2 liter bottle of water or soda from waist to eye level	0.23 (0.03)	0.23 (0.04)	0.23 (0.04)	0.18 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.20 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.13 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.12 (0.01)	0.11 (0.02)	0.13 (0.01)
Difficulty with self care, such as washing all over or dressing	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.11 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.10 (0.03)	0.06 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.06 (0.01)	0.09 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)
Difficulty hands and fingers, such as picking up small objects	0.27 (0.02)	0.24 (0.03)	0.29 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.14 (0.02)	0.22 (0.03)	0.07 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)	0.08 (0.01)	0.06 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)
N	579	271	308	581	273	308	578	272	306	579	273	306

Note: Estimates are means with clustered standard errors. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Appendix D: Trends by Region

Table D-1 Outcomes by wave and treatment group (women's and men's measures), Homs

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Any economic violence	0.40 (0.04)	0.33 (0.07)	0.46 (0.05)	0.22 (0.04)	0.35 (0.05)	0.11 (0.03)	0.22 (0.03)	0.26 (0.04)	0.19 (0.04)	0.22 (0.03)	0.20 (0.04)	0.23 (0.04)
Number of types of economic violence	0.82 (0.13)	0.65 (0.16)	0.98 (0.18)	0.36 (0.07)	0.61 (0.10)	0.13 (0.04)	0.34 (0.05)	0.40 (0.08)	0.29 (0.06)	0.32 (0.05)	0.31 (0.08)	0.32 (0.05)
Intensity of economic violence (0-12)	1.59 (0.24)	1.24 (0.31)	1.92 (0.34)	0.53 (0.10)	0.87 (0.16)	0.21 (0.07)	0.72 (0.10)	0.84 (0.15)	0.60 (0.12)	0.63 (0.09)	0.62 (0.16)	0.63 (0.10)
Stopped wife from working outside home	0.16 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)	0.19 (0.05)	0.11 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.05 (0.02)	0.13 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.14 (0.04)	0.10 (0.02)
Spent money household needed	0.27 (0.04)	0.21 (0.06)	0.34 (0.06)	0.11 (0.02)	0.19 (0.04)	0.04 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.11 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)	0.12 (0.04)	0.15 (0.04)
Refused to give wife money	0.24 (0.04)	0.19 (0.05)	0.30 (0.06)	0.10 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.03 (0.01)	0.08 (0.01)	0.09 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)
Took wife's earnings	0.18 (0.03)	0.15 (0.05)	0.22 (0.05)	0.08 (0.02)	0.13 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)
Discordance in economic violence reporting	0.47 (0.03)	0.44 (0.04)	0.49 (0.05)	0.38 (0.03)	0.47 (0.04)	0.30 (0.03)	0.47 (0.03)	0.44 (0.04)	0.49 (0.05)	0.38 (0.03)	0.47 (0.04)	0.30 (0.03)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.62	0.64	0.61	0.84	0.73	0.93	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.96
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.29	0.31	0.26	0.18	0.20	0.17
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Proportion of joint decisions	0.57	0.59	0.56	0.80	0.68	0.91	0.67	0.65	0.70	0.78	0.77	0.80
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Work hours	14.09	13.74	14.42	14.02	13.83	14.20	14.39	14.60	14.18	14.58	14.51	14.64
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.28)
Work hours (excluding domestic)	5.19	5.37	5.03	5.32	5.33	5.32	10.13	10.32	9.95	10.11	10.29	9.94
	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.26)
Domestic work hours	8.90	8.37	9.39	8.70	8.50	8.88	4.25	4.28	4.23	4.46	4.22	4.69
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.30)
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	3.95	3.68	4.21	8.00	5.48	10.38	6.13	4.87	7.32	8.08	6.76	9.32
	(0.52)	(0.96)	(0.40)	(0.91)	(1.25)	(0.91)	(0.55)	(0.88)	(0.48)	(0.63)	(1.04)	(0.52)
Proportion men: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	70.72	69.96	71.44	79.89	78.43	81.26	65.87	62.28	69.24	63.93	60.82	66.86
	(1.71)	(2.76)	(2.13)	(1.41)	(1.92)	(2.07)	(1.88)	(2.54)	(2.31)	(2.66)	(4.38)	(2.76)
Proportion women: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	72.16	71.99	72.32	81.27	79.85	82.61	68.76	64.65	72.63	64.10	60.55	67.45

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Proportion men: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	(1.69)	(2.80)	(2.00)	(1.39)	(2.00)	(1.93)	(1.79)	(2.33)	(2.24)	(2.59)	(4.15)	(2.75)
	63.10	61.13	64.95	75.23	71.41	78.83	60.54	55.76	65.03	62.08	54.70	69.03
Proportion women: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	(1.91)	(3.07)	(2.29)	(2.17)	(3.30)	(2.58)	(2.41)	(3.44)	(2.74)	(3.85)	(6.24)	(3.67)
	65.60	63.54	67.54	76.25	72.42	79.84	63.55	58.46	68.35	62.09	55.10	68.67
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	(1.79)	(2.90)	(2.05)	(2.08)	(3.30)	(2.29)	(2.45)	(3.28)	(2.92)	(3.89)	(6.39)	(3.69)
	71.33	71.47	71.19	85.71	82.96	88.30	85.78	83.45	87.97	94.92	95.28	94.57
Proportion women: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	(1.77)	(2.64)	(2.37)	(1.39)	(1.83)	(1.73)	(1.00)	(1.41)	(1.26)	(0.60)	(0.64)	(1.01)
	80.96	80.05	81.81	90.96	87.72	94.01	93.00	91.17	94.71	96.78	96.68	96.86
Would consider child marriage	(1.49)	(2.11)	(2.06)	(1.05)	(1.39)	(0.98)	(0.98)	(1.77)	(0.74)	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.61)
	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.12	0.19	0.05	0.15	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.07
Child marriage ever acceptable (respondent)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
	0.42	0.52	0.33	0.26	0.42	0.12	0.66	0.75	0.57	0.26	0.31	0.21

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	(0.04) 0.67	(0.06) 0.88	(0.06) 0.48	(0.04) 0.37	(0.05) 0.60	(0.02) 0.15	(0.05) 1.09	(0.07) 1.39	(0.06) 0.81	(0.04) 0.53	(0.06) 0.68	(0.03) 0.39
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	(0.07) 0.67	(0.11) 0.69	(0.08) 0.64	(0.06) 0.76	(0.09) 0.61	(0.03) 0.93	(0.10) 0.98	(0.16) 0.99	(0.08) 0.97	(0.08) 0.99	(0.15) 0.98	(0.06) 1.00
Solely decides about whether children in family should marry	(0.04) 0.03	(0.06) 0.03	(0.05) 0.04	(0.05) 0.01	(0.06) 0.01	(0.03) 0.02	(0.01) 0.31	(0.01) 0.31	(0.02) 0.31	(0.01) 0.18	(0.01) 0.21	(0.00) 0.16
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	(0.01) 0.73	(0.02) 0.70	(0.01) 0.77	(0.01) 0.86	(0.01) 0.77	(0.01) 0.94	(0.03) 0.75	(0.04) 0.68	(0.06) 0.82	(0.04) 0.83	(0.06) 0.80	(0.04) 0.86
Worries daily	(0.03) 0.13	(0.05) 0.13	(0.04) 0.13	(0.03) 0.15	(0.06) 0.15	(0.02) 0.15	(0.04) 0.13	(0.06) 0.17	(0.03) 0.09	(0.03) 0.21	(0.05) 0.17	(0.02) 0.24
Worries weekly	(0.02) 0.21	(0.03) 0.20	(0.02) 0.22	(0.02) 0.14	(0.04) 0.13	(0.02) 0.16	(0.02) 0.19	(0.03) 0.21	(0.02) 0.17	(0.03) 0.18	(0.03) 0.15	(0.05) 0.21
Worries monthly	(0.02) 0.32	(0.03) 0.36	(0.02) 0.27	(0.02) 0.22	(0.02) 0.22	(0.03) 0.22	(0.02) 0.30	(0.02) 0.24	(0.03) 0.35	(0.02) 0.33	(0.03) 0.35	(0.03) 0.31
Feels depressed daily	(0.02) 0.02	(0.03) 0.02	(0.03) 0.03	(0.02) 0.03	(0.03) 0.03	(0.03) 0.04	(0.03) 0.02	(0.04) 0.03	(0.04) 0.01	(0.03) 0.05	(0.06) 0.06	(0.04) 0.04
Feels depressed weekly	(0.01) 0.11	(0.01) 0.11	(0.01) 0.11	(0.01) 0.05	(0.02) 0.06	(0.02) 0.03	(0.01) 0.07	(0.01) 0.09	(0.01) 0.04	(0.01) 0.04	(0.02) 0.03	(0.01) 0.05
Feels depressed monthly	(0.02) 0.20	(0.02) 0.20	(0.02) 0.20	(0.01) 0.11	(0.02) 0.10	(0.01) 0.11	(0.01) 0.17	(0.02) 0.20	(0.01) 0.13	(0.01) 0.15	(0.02) 0.17	(0.01) 0.14
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Wellbeing score (-1 to 1)	0.46 (0.02)	0.49 (0.03)	0.44 (0.02)	0.57 (0.02)	0.55 (0.03)	0.59 (0.03)	0.42 (0.01)	0.40 (0.02)	0.43 (0.02)	0.49 (0.02)	0.44 (0.03)	0.53 (0.03)
Mostly felt cared for by spouse	0.70 (0.03)	0.71 (0.05)	0.68 (0.04)	0.85 (0.02)	0.76 (0.03)	0.92 (0.02)	0.91 (0.01)	0.92 (0.02)	0.89 (0.02)	0.96 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.98 (0.01)
Mostly felt respected by spouse	0.72 (0.03)	0.73 (0.06)	0.71 (0.04)	0.87 (0.03)	0.78 (0.04)	0.95 (0.02)	0.93 (0.02)	0.95 (0.02)	0.92 (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)	0.96 (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)
Felt satisfied by marriage	0.94 (0.02)	0.95 (0.02)	0.93 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.93 (0.02)	0.97 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	1.00 (0.00)
Log of household income (Syrian pounds in millions)	13.47 (0.04)	13.51 (0.08)	13.44 (0.04)	13.42 (0.08)	13.48 (0.11)	13.36 (0.10)	13.47 (0.07)	13.49 (0.11)	13.44 (0.10)	13.48 (0.06)	13.41 (0.08)	13.54 (0.09)
N	460	223	237	459	222	237	460	223	237	459	222	237

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. IPV indicators capture women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table D-2 Outcomes by wave and treatment group (women's only measures), Homs

	Wives					
	Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Economic or emotional IPV	0.53 (0.05)	0.49 (0.07)	0.57 (0.06)	0.36 (0.04)	0.44 (0.06)	0.29 (0.05)
Any emotional violence	0.50 (0.05)	0.47 (0.07)	0.54 (0.07)	0.32 (0.04)	0.41 (0.06)	0.24 (0.05)
Number of types of emotional violence	1.48 (0.18)	1.36 (0.27)	1.59 (0.24)	0.71 (0.12)	1.04 (0.18)	0.41 (0.10)
Intensity of emotional violence (0-15)	2.94 (0.39)	2.69 (0.60)	3.18 (0.52)	1.32 (0.24)	1.93 (0.37)	0.75 (0.21)
Insulted you or made you feel bad	0.38 (0.04)	0.36 (0.05)	0.40 (0.05)	0.19 (0.04)	0.28 (0.05)	0.11 (0.04)
Belittled or humiliated	0.31 (0.04)	0.27 (0.06)	0.35 (0.06)	0.14 (0.03)	0.21 (0.04)	0.06 (0.02)
Threatened about divorce	0.16 (0.03)	0.15 (0.04)	0.17 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.09 (0.03)	0.03 (0.01)
Threatened to hurt you or someone else	0.25 (0.04)	0.25 (0.06)	0.26 (0.05)	0.08 (0.02)	0.13 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Did things to scare or intimidate	0.38 (0.05)	0.34 (0.08)	0.41 (0.07)	0.25 (0.04)	0.32 (0.06)	0.18 (0.04)
Sense of control (-24 to 24)	-4.71 (0.28)	-5.22 (0.32)	-4.24 (0.39)	-3.37 (0.37)	-4.43 (0.47)	-2.38 (0.41)
Group membership	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
N	460	223	237	460	223	237

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Emotional IPV questions were administered to women only. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table D-3 Outcomes by wave and treatment group (women's and men's measures), Rural Damascus

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Any economic violence	0.71 (0.04)	0.71 (0.03)	0.71 (0.06)	0.34 (0.07)	0.53 (0.05)	0.21 (0.08)	0.42 (0.05)	0.37 (0.05)	0.46 (0.06)	0.22 (0.04)	0.31 (0.05)	0.17 (0.03)
Number of types of economic violence	1.39 (0.09)	1.39 (0.08)	1.39 (0.14)	0.60 (0.16)	1.00 (0.25)	0.33 (0.13)	0.54 (0.06)	0.51 (0.12)	0.56 (0.06)	0.25 (0.05)	0.35 (0.05)	0.18 (0.04)
Intensity of economic violence (0-12)	3.09 (0.25)	3.10 (0.16)	3.08 (0.41)	1.19 (0.31)	1.98 (0.46)	0.65 (0.26)	1.21 (0.14)	1.10 (0.22)	1.28 (0.17)	0.57 (0.12)	0.84 (0.10)	0.39 (0.09)
Stopped wife from working outside home	0.63 (0.05)	0.69 (0.05)	0.59 (0.07)	0.30 (0.09)	0.59 (0.10)	0.15 (0.07)	0.22 (0.05)	0.25 (0.06)	0.19 (0.07)	0.17 (0.04)	0.21 (0.05)	0.13 (0.05)
Spent money household needed	0.31 (0.04)	0.27 (0.06)	0.35 (0.04)	0.15 (0.05)	0.22 (0.09)	0.11 (0.05)	0.19 (0.06)	0.10 (0.03)	0.25 (0.08)	0.06 (0.03)	0.12 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)
Refused to give wife money	0.34 (0.05)	0.27 (0.07)	0.40 (0.06)	0.17 (0.05)	0.31 (0.09)	0.08 (0.03)	0.16 (0.03)	0.14 (0.05)	0.17 (0.04)	0.06 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)
Took wife's earnings	0.25 (0.04)	0.31 (0.05)	0.22 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.21 (0.10)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.09 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Discordance in economic violence reporting	0.52 (0.05)	0.55 (0.09)	0.50 (0.05)	0.41 (0.05)	0.55 (0.04)	0.32 (0.06)	0.52 (0.05)	0.55 (0.09)	0.50 (0.05)	0.41 (0.05)	0.55 (0.04)	0.32 (0.06)
Proportion of sole or joint decisions	0.28 (0.05)	0.16 (0.04)	0.36 (0.05)	0.59 (0.10)	0.30 (0.05)	0.79 (0.05)	0.94 (0.01)	0.94 (0.01)	0.94 (0.02)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Proportion of sole decisions	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.53	0.57	0.49	0.34	0.51	0.23
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Proportion of joint decisions	0.23	0.14	0.30	0.56	0.26	0.77	0.41	0.37	0.44	0.64	0.48	0.75
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Work hours	12.97	13.10	12.89	10.77	10.44	11.00	13.67	13.20	13.99	14.08	13.60	14.40
	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.60)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.67)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.49)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.38)
Work hours (excluding domestic)	3.87	4.24	3.61	2.82	2.61	2.97	10.43	9.92	10.78	10.30	10.00	10.50
	(0.62)	(1.33)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.31)	(0.76)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.40)	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.24)
Domestic work hours	9.10	8.86	9.27	7.95	7.83	8.03	3.24	3.28	3.21	3.78	3.61	3.90
	(0.47)	(1.07)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.62)	(0.45)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.37)
Gender attitudes score (-26 to 26)	-4.29	-7.27	-2.26	4.93	-0.96	8.94	-5.40	-6.10	-4.93	0.45	-2.22	2.26
	(1.19)	(0.70)	(1.61)	(1.81)	(1.45)	(0.77)	(1.06)	(2.22)	(1.07)	(1.25)	(1.44)	(1.71)
Proportion men: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	46.43	57.55	38.86	52.96	56.29	50.69	36.08	40.67	32.96	44.47	50.86	40.12
	(5.55)	(2.50)	(5.84)	(5.51)	(8.24)	(6.53)	(4.50)	(5.50)	(5.48)	(5.23)	(7.55)	(5.64)
Proportion women: Women should be allowed to work outside of the home	55.26	58.29	53.19	58.02	58.98	57.36	49.86	57.00	45.00	51.21	57.76	46.76
	(3.25)	(2.62)	(4.55)	(4.34)	(6.58)	(5.52)	(4.67)	(3.27)	(5.69)	(5.15)	(5.29)	(6.54)
Proportion men: Women should have the right to	26.00	32.35	21.68	36.53	36.65	36.44	25.50	28.65	23.36	39.31	48.31	33.18

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
work in semi-segregated environment	(5.13)	(6.86)	(5.61)	(5.16)	(3.56)	(8.30)	(3.08)	(4.55)	(3.21)	(8.00)	(11.70)	(8.00)
Proportion women: Women should have the right to work in semi-segregated environment	38.74	42.78	35.99	44.21	43.37	44.79	37.07	38.76	35.93	43.74	51.12	38.71
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	(5.27)	(6.25)	(6.95)	(3.15)	(3.08)	(4.97)	(2.34)	(1.00)	(3.56)	(6.02)	(7.24)	(7.00)
Proportion women: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	50.04	46.00	52.79	67.70	65.20	69.40	71.30	71.04	71.47	79.98	74.10	83.99
Proportion men: Men do not have the right to physically hurt their wives if they disobey their wishes	(3.73)	(6.71)	(4.48)	(2.61)	(1.60)	(4.04)	(2.11)	(3.02)	(2.92)	(4.59)	(4.05)	(6.51)
Would consider child marriage	63.25	57.41	67.22	77.29	78.47	76.49	86.02	89.67	83.53	96.44	94.84	97.53
Child marriage ever acceptable (respondent)	(3.43)	(6.37)	(3.74)	(2.94)	(3.55)	(4.25)	(3.58)	(1.36)	(5.29)	(0.82)	(0.58)	(1.00)
	0.24	0.29	0.20	0.16	0.26	0.10	0.35	0.40	0.31	0.22	0.27	0.19
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
	0.87	0.93	0.82	0.66	0.76	0.60	0.88	0.86	0.89	0.63	0.67	0.61
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.13)

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Number of acceptable situations (0-6)	1.23	1.43	1.10	0.99	1.24	0.84	1.51	1.39	1.60	1.17	1.33	1.07
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.41)	(0.25)
Solely or jointly decides about whether children in family should marry	0.42	0.35	0.47	0.66	0.36	0.87	0.94	0.90	0.97	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Solely decides about whether children in family should marry	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.29	0.33	0.33	0.50	0.18
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Child marriage unacceptable (attitudes)	0.41	0.39	0.43	0.68	0.52	0.78	0.33	0.41	0.28	0.60	0.41	0.74
	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.06)
Worries daily	0.50	0.55	0.47	0.45	0.49	0.43	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.19	0.22	0.17
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Worries weekly	0.37	0.35	0.39	0.27	0.33	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.14	0.12
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Worries monthly	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.19	0.08	0.26	0.23	0.18	0.26	0.07	0.08	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Feels depressed daily	0.21	0.29	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Feels depressed weekly	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.27	0.43	0.17	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Feels depressed monthly	0.19	0.16	0.21	0.21	0.16	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.15	0.02	0.06	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.00)
Wellbeing score (-1 to 1)	0.27	0.21	0.31	0.51	0.33	0.63	0.40	0.44	0.37	0.49	0.37	0.56

	Wives						Husbands					
	Baseline			Endline			Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Mostly felt cared for by spouse	(0.04) 0.44	(0.03) 0.35	(0.06) 0.51	(0.06) 0.70	(0.05) 0.53	(0.04) 0.80	(0.02) 0.89	(0.02) 0.94	(0.02) 0.86	(0.05) 0.96	(0.03) 0.92	(0.07) 0.99
Mostly felt respected by spouse	(0.07) 0.50	(0.09) 0.33	(0.09) 0.61	(0.06) 0.79	(0.05) 0.60	(0.06) 0.91	(0.04) 0.93	(0.03) 0.92	(0.06) 0.93	(0.02) 0.97	(0.04) 0.98	(0.01) 0.96
Felt satisfied by marriage	(0.08) 0.73	(0.07) 0.73	(0.08) 0.73	(0.06) 0.84	(0.06) 0.69	(0.03) 0.94	(0.03) 0.96	(0.05) 0.94	(0.04) 0.97	(0.02) 0.98	(0.02) 0.98	(0.03) 0.97
Log of household income (Syrian pounds in millions)	(0.04) 13.62	(0.06) 13.68	(0.06) 13.58	(0.05) 13.83	(0.05) 13.79	(0.02) 13.86	(0.01) 13.68	(0.01) 13.54	(0.02) 13.78	(0.02) 13.71	(0.02) 13.49	(0.03) 13.87
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)
N	121	49	72	121	49	72	121	49	72	121	49	72

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. IPV indicators capture women's reported experiences and men's reported perpetration. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Table D-4 Outcomes by wave and treatment group (women’s only measures), Rural Damascus


	Wives					
	Baseline			Endline		
	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE	Overall	Vouchers only	Vouchers + EASE
Economic or emotional IPV	0.88 (0.04)	0.92 (0.06)	0.85 (0.04)	0.60 (0.08)	0.82 (0.05)	0.44 (0.09)
Any emotional violence	0.71 (0.05)	0.73 (0.11)	0.69 (0.04)	0.52 (0.09)	0.76 (0.06)	0.36 (0.07)
Number of types of emotional violence	1.80 (0.18)	1.92 (0.41)	1.72 (0.08)	1.00 (0.18)	1.47 (0.29)	0.68 (0.07)
Intensity of emotional violence (0-15)	3.98 (0.36)	4.27 (0.81)	3.79 (0.10)	1.79 (0.37)	2.86 (0.53)	1.06 (0.15)
Insulted you or made you feel bad	0.60 (0.06)	0.67 (0.12)	0.54 (0.05)	0.43 (0.08)	0.58 (0.13)	0.32 (0.07)
Belittled or humiliated	0.42 (0.05)	0.41 (0.10)	0.42 (0.04)	0.23 (0.05)	0.35 (0.07)	0.15 (0.02)
Threatened about divorce	0.28 (0.04)	0.27 (0.10)	0.29 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.16 (0.02)	0.07 (0.01)
Threatened to hurt you or someone else	0.12 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)
Did things to scare or intimidate	0.40 (0.06)	0.45 (0.11)	0.38 (0.04)	0.21 (0.06)	0.35 (0.11)	0.12 (0.04)
Sense of control (-24 to 24)	-7.50 (0.37)	-7.39 (0.82)	-7.57 (0.28)	-5.34 (0.59)	-6.78 (0.64)	-4.36 (0.49)
Group membership	0.14 (0.06)	0.20 (0.12)	0.10 (0.05)	0.29 (0.10)	0.16 (0.12)	0.38 (0.12)
N	121	49	72	121	49	72

Note: Estimates are means with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Emotional IPV questions were administered to women only. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes.

Appendix E: Impacts (Homs)


Empowerment

Figure E-1 Programme impacts on composite decision-making outcomes




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-2 Programme impacts on sole or joint decision-making outcomes




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-3 Programme impacts on sole decision-making outcomes




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-4 Programme impacts on joint decision-making outcomes



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Figure E-5 Programme impacts on time use, group membership and sense of control



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Gender attitudes and norms

Figure E-6 Programme impacts on composite gender attitudes and perceptions of norms




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-7 Programme impacts on individual gender attitudes statement agreement (Part 1)



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Figure E-7 Programme impacts on individual gender attitudes statement agreement (Part 2)



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Child marriage

Figure E-8 Programme impacts on child marriage outcomes




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-9 Programme impacts on child marriage acceptance statements



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Figure E-10 Programme impacts on individual wellbeing



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Wellbeing

Figure E-11 Programme impacts on mental health




Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-12 Programme impacts on relationship quality



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure E-13 Programme impacts on household income



Note: Figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of Vouchers + EA\$E compared to Vouchers-only groups. Each point estimate is a separate regression with 90% confidence intervals. See Appendix [Table A-2](#) for details on construction of outcomes. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix F: List of Supporting Documentation

This report was submitted along with the following supporting documentation:

- I. BLRS Communication Plan
- II. Terms of Reference for FAO/UNFPA VAWG Impact Study in Homs